global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESand satellite infra-red plume detection – provide a means ofcrosschecking the validity of attack indications. This “dualphenomenology” redundancy is lacking on the Russia side,although a U.S. missile raid that is big enough to threatenthe survival of the Russian ICBM force is almost certainlygoing to be picked up by multiple Russian ground radars.And so there would be some means of cross-checking thevalidity of attack indications reported by any given Russianradar site.strain as it fields a variety of new weapons. Russia reportedlyis now deploying missiles in Crimea capable of carryingnuclear warheads 75 and will possibly deploy tactical nuclearweapons there, including for its Black Sea fleet. Russiais developing a train-mobile strategic missile. It is testing anew ground-launched cruise missile of intermediate rangeand may decide to withdraw from an existing treaty signedby Russia and the United States in which such missiles arebanned. A force of hundreds may emerge. And Russia hasother nuclear weapons in the pipeline that will pose a newset of command-control challenges.Russia’s scattered arsenal is in perpetual motion over ninetime zones – moving around on combat alert and shuttlingback and forth to repair facilities at their main field bases.Warheads and bombs from the field are transported for routinemaintenance several times per year. 76 Every ten years, onaverage, they are also transported long distances to nationalmanufacturing facilities to re-forge their plutonium pits.(Russian pit shelf-life averages only 8-12 years compared to80 years for U.S. pits.) Thus overall more than ten percent ofthe Russian nuclear arsenal is in transit during a given year.Since transportation is the Achilles heel of nuclear security:this constant movement runs a risk of terrorist capture.These timelines 74 are obviously very compressed on bothsides. The opportunities for ill-considered nuclear decision-makingare extensive regardless of the accuracy ofincoming early warning reports. Launch on warning putsenormous strain on the nuclear chains of command in bothcountries.But the humanitarian consequences of a tragic mistakewould not be constrained by the national borders of Russiaand the United States. A mistaken launch that triggers astrategic nuclear exchange today would have <strong>global</strong> repercussions.A worldwide calamity would ensue.Russia’s command and control will come under further74 Pavel Podvig,“Reducing the risk of accidental launch,” Science andGlobal Security, vol. 14, October 2006, http://russianforces.org/podvig/2006/10/reducing_the_risk_of_an_accide.shtml.VII. TOWARD BILATERAL AND MULTILATERALDE-ALERTING AGREEMENTSA compelling set of arguments can be made for pursuing a<strong>global</strong> multilateral de-alerting agreement that would standdown and lock down all of the world’s nuclear arsenals. Apartfrom the obvious benefit of reducing nuclear risk for all nations,several arguments in favor of de-alerting can be made.First, comprehensive de-alerting offers an alternative pathwayto deeper reductions and to the end goal of <strong>global</strong> <strong>zero</strong>. Second,75 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander of U.S. EuropeanCommand General Philip Breedlove told reporters that NATObelieves Russia is deploying nuclear-capable forces in Crimea. “Russianforces “capable of being nuclear” moving to Crimea, NATO chief says,”CBS News, November 11, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/russianforces-capable-of-being-nuclear-moving-to-crimea-nato-chief-says/.76 Study director’s estimate based on personal communications withRussian nuclear specialists.37