global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESal de-alerting negotiati<strong>on</strong>s are that they be universal andn<strong>on</strong>-discriminatory. India expresses little interest in regi<strong>on</strong>al<strong>nuclear</strong> agreements or in bilateral <strong>nuclear</strong> arms c<strong>on</strong>trolwith Pakistan (bey<strong>on</strong>d the <strong>nuclear</strong> c<strong>on</strong>fidence-buildingmeasures with Pakistan that have been successfully established).It would value and seek a <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> pact that equitablyverifiably de-alerts all <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s in all countries. India’spositi<strong>on</strong> thus aligns perfectly with this proposal for amultilateral process leading to a <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> de-alerting compact.India would certainly join a serious effort led by the UnitedStates and Russia to begin a process as l<strong>on</strong>g as China andPakistan participated. India, unlike China, has not madeU.S.-Russian deep bilateral cuts a prec<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> of its participati<strong>on</strong>in <strong>nuclear</strong> arms negotiati<strong>on</strong>s. India instead emphasizesthe importance of all <strong>nuclear</strong>-armed nati<strong>on</strong>s adoptingthe principle of no-first-use of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s as a sign oftheir commitment to their eliminati<strong>on</strong>. Universal de-alertingwould mark a true step in the directi<strong>on</strong> of no-first-use –and thus India should not <strong>on</strong>ly embrace such an agenda butalso c<strong>on</strong>sider leading it.The main sticking points are the Pakistani desire for additi<strong>on</strong>alIndian security assurances to Pakistan, thereby enablingPakistan to reduce its reliance <strong>on</strong> <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s tocompensate for India’s c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al superiority, and India’sdesire for a complete end to terrorism against India carriedout by Pakistani-based jihadists, thereby relieving India ofits need for counter-terrorism c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al forces that, whiledefensive in purpose, project an offensive cross-border capability.Although the two countries have improved relati<strong>on</strong>ssignificantly despite their l<strong>on</strong>gstanding border dispute andKashmir-related terrorism, both will need to cooperate insolving this c<strong>on</strong>undrum. The prospects that both India andPakistan would join multilateral de-alerting negotiati<strong>on</strong>s andaccept binding c<strong>on</strong>straints <strong>on</strong> their <strong>nuclear</strong> postures dependsignificantly <strong>on</strong> the depth of their future cooperati<strong>on</strong>.F. ISRAELIsrael’s active participati<strong>on</strong> in multilateral negotiati<strong>on</strong>s for a <strong>nuclear</strong>de-alerting agreement seems extremely doubtful in lightof the nati<strong>on</strong>’s commitment to a policy of opacity by which its<strong>nuclear</strong> status is undeclared and uncertain. However, Israelwould c<strong>on</strong>sider an agreement that c<strong>on</strong>strains the attack readinessof the other <strong>nuclear</strong> countries to be c<strong>on</strong>s<strong>on</strong>ant with Israel’snati<strong>on</strong>al security interest. Therefore Israel should, at minimum,lend tacit support to the process. Israel might go further andsign an agreement and submit it to the Knesset for ratificati<strong>on</strong>,as it is doing in the case of the CTBT. Much depends up<strong>on</strong> theverificati<strong>on</strong> requirements. Intrusive m<strong>on</strong>itoring of the alert statusof <strong>nuclear</strong> forces would be inc<strong>on</strong>sistent with Israel’s policyof opacity. But that policy might change over time, especially ifde-alerting gains widespread internati<strong>on</strong>al support am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>nuclear</strong>and n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> countries alike.Israel is widely assumed to possess a stockpile of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>skept <strong>on</strong> low-alert status under normal c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s as wellas stocks of weap<strong>on</strong>s-grade fissile material. Unofficial sourcesestimate the former to range upwards of 80-120 weap<strong>on</strong>s andthe latter to be equivalent to 100-200 <strong>nuclear</strong> devices. Their rolein Israeli security policy has l<strong>on</strong>g been receding, and could c<strong>on</strong>ceivablydisappear if the Iranian <strong>nuclear</strong> program is rolled backand further proliferati<strong>on</strong> in the Middle East does not occur.Israel’s security today depends far less <strong>on</strong> <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>sthan it did in 1967, when it <strong>report</strong>edly acquired its first device,and surely much less than when Prime Minister Ben Guri<strong>on</strong>c<strong>on</strong>ceived the idea of the bomb in the 1950s. In those previouseras, Israel faced Arab states that denied its right to exist andpursued the point <strong>on</strong> the battlefield. Fearing the creati<strong>on</strong> of apan-Arab (c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al) war coaliti<strong>on</strong> against Israel and theinability of the small Israeli army to cope with large land armiesand air forces, Prime Minister Guri<strong>on</strong> viewed the bomb as apowerful counterweight, an ultimate insurance policy againstan existential threat, and a last resort means of deterring or defeatingArab aggressi<strong>on</strong>.This rati<strong>on</strong>ale is no l<strong>on</strong>ger compelling. Israel now possesses sophisticatedc<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al capabilities that far surpass those of itspotential adversaries, individually or in coaliti<strong>on</strong>. Indeed, Israelhas become the regi<strong>on</strong>’s c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al military powerhouse.Israeli c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al forces are more than adequate to handlecurrent and foreseeable n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> high-end threats to Israel’sexistence. Their capabilities for handling lesser threats – urban-and-guerrillawarfare, intifadas, mortar and rocket attackslaunched from Palestinian lands, terrorism and other asymmetricalthreats – are c<strong>on</strong>siderably less, but of course <strong>nuclear</strong>48