global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTUREScruise missiles or land rockets, among other options, 82 but itwould be technically challenging to undertake a new weaponsprogram and the cost might not compare all that favorablywith the bill for building a new submarine fleet. 83A <strong>global</strong> de-alerting agreement that verifiably takes all nuclearforces off of launch-ready alert would allow the United Kingdomto cease its continuous sea patrols. In peacetime, it couldundertake sea patrols (including short patrols for training andexercising) on a random schedule and otherwise maintain alow-level alert status for its submarines in port – short-noticesurge alert – when there is no perceived strategic threat. Thiswould suffice to preserve the invulnerability of its fleet if adequateprotection from surprise attack by torpedoes and otherconventional weapons can be provided. As long as opposingnuclear forces require 24-72 hours to be generated to high alertstatus, one or two U.K. submarines could be surged out of portduring this period of re-alerting, assuming that the agreementprovides a verification regime that can detect re-alerting in atimely and reliable fashion.For many decades France has consistently taken a clear andunequivocal position on its nuclear arsenal: it is the permanentcornerstone of French security and defense policy. AlthoughFrance does not participate in NATO nuclear planning,it regards its independent Dyad of air- and sea-basednuclear forces – armed with approximately 300 bombs andwarheads – as a means of providing European-wide protectionas well as deterring existential threats to France. It isnot a counterforce arsenal, but rather a strictly second-strikedeterrent under which Europe shelters along with France.This steadfast commitment to a nuclear deterrent forcedoes not imply a rejection of further stockpile reductionsor de-alerting, though neither is currently planned. France82 See The Trident Commission: Concluding Report, British AmericanSecurity Information Council, London, July 2014, http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/trident_<strong>commission</strong>_finalreport.pdf.83 The Trident Commission determined that the savings associatedwith switching to another type of platform or delivery vehicle are notsignificant enough when taking into account reductions in capabilities,including range and accuracy, and increases in vulnerability. [Ibid. pp.26-27.]appears to be open to the possibility of endorsing a multilateralnorm that eschews high alert status. France’s currentposture, like that of the United Kingdom, is already alignedwith such a norm as it normally keeps only a single submarineon modified alert at sea. The nuclear aircraft maintaina low level of attack readiness in peacetime. There are noobvious military or political obstacles to France joining intoa multilateral agreement. It has far more to gain from <strong>global</strong>constraints on nuclear attack readiness than it has to losefrom accepting a constraint on its force operations that alreadyinformally exists.D. PAKISTANPakistan should welcome a serious effort led by the leadingnuclear powers to begin multilateral negotiations to reach ade-alerting agreement. The Pakistani nuclear program imposesa heavy economic burden on a poor country, and itincreasingly presents a security threat to Pakistan itself in anera of violent extremism and terrorism in the country andregion. The terrorist capture and use of Pakistani nuclearweapons against Pakistan itself is arguably the gravest threatto Pakistani security. Growing internal threats of violent extremismcreated by three decades of strife in Afghanistanand by radicalization through jihadist indoctrination hasspilled over into the country, putting strain on the Pakistanimilitary and putting its expanding nuclear arsenal at somerisk of diversion. The arsenal’s security has been technicallyimproved in recent years, thanks in part to U.S. assistance– but the security challenge has grown more difficult. AlthoughPakistan keeps its nuclear weapons in varying degreesof disassembly at dispersed secret sites, the safeguardsare far from foolproof. In the event of conflict with India,these arsenals may be assembled and dispatched to the fieldwhere they would become at greater risk of capture or unauthorizeduse against either India or Pakistan. Both countriesthus have strong reasons to support a de-alerting regimethat keeps a lid on re-alerting during a crisis.Pakistan still views Indian conventional superiority as themain threat to its security, however, and hence would bemore inclined to participate in de-alerting negotiations ifIndia would provide stronger security assurances to Pakistanthan it currently does.46
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESPakistan’s fast-growing nuclear arsenal (125 weapons today,increasing to 250-300 over the next 5-10 years) can belargely explained by Pakistan’s insecurity in its relations withIndia and its answer to India’s conventional superiority. Pakistanconducted its first nuclear explosive test in 1998 andhas developed a classical military doctrine to guide its weaponsprogram from design to field deployment. In a nutshell,the Pakistani military – which largely controls the nuclearplans, policies, infrastructure and forces – views nuclearweapons as tools of military warfare as well as strategic deterrence.The operational plan is to employ them to parry ordefeat India’s conventional forces in the event of war. UnlikeIndia, Pakistan has not eschewed the first-use of nuclearweapons and reserves this right if India attacks the countryand threatens its survival.Given Pakistan’s heavy reliance on nuclear weapons to offsetIndia’s conventional superiority, it would need strong securityassurances from India and additional confidence-buildingmeasures that mitigate India’s conventional threat inorder to accept tough constraints on re-alerting during acrisis with India. Some strong credible assurances from Indiawould greatly facilitate Pakistan’s participation in multilateralde-alerting talks. India should be willing to providesuch assurances since Pakistani nuclear weapons pose theprimary threat to India’s security today. The specter of intentional,accidental, or unauthorized use of these weaponsby the Pakistani military or by violent indigenous extremistswho get hold of them looms large in Indian threat assessment.Pakistan historically has strongly advocated for both <strong>global</strong>and regional disarmament and often-proposed bilateralnuclear arms control with India. However, New Delhi rejectsregional nuclear disarmament on the grounds that itis discriminatory, and so rebuffed the overtures (except forbilateral nuclear confidence building measures such as theirmutual pledge to never attack each other’s nuclear facilities).Pakistan has also indicated that, like India, it is amenableto broader multilateral talks to reduce and eliminate nuclearweapons on a <strong>global</strong> basis according to a timetable, aslong as the U.S.-Russia arsenals are further slashed and allthe nuclear powers join the negotiations. This bodes well forboth India’s and Pakistan’s joining a multilateral forum onde-alerting. If the United States and Russia forge an agreementon de-alerting, these South Asian powers should notbe reluctant to join a broader effort. Their national securityinterests would be served.E. INDIAIndia has always minimized the role of nuclear weaponsin its national security strategy, and strongly supports theidea of <strong>global</strong> multilateral talks to reduce and eliminate allnuclear weapons. The total elimination of nuclear weaponsis popular among all the major political parties and thepublic. Its prominent political leaders – most notably RajivGandhi – have proposed specific disarmament plans toworld audiences. India’s role as an emerging major poweron the world stage gives it an opportunity to assume leadershipin advancing the goal. Joining into de-alerting discussionswith the other nuclear weapons countries would alignwell with this historical commitment. It would also serve itsstrong national interest in securing Pakistan’s commitmentto de-alerting, in order to avoid Pakistani weapons on crisisalert that could go off on India’s doorstep through inadvertence,accident, unauthorized act, or terrorist capture.India’s current arsenal consists of 90-110 disassembled nuclearweapons under strict guidance of no-first-use (withqualifications as discussed earlier). India’s conventionalstrength (which has grown substantially in recent years dueto broad modernization) and overall national power relativeto its two main historical adversaries – China and Pakistan –have kept nuclear weapons in the background of its relationswith its neighbors. India in fact waited until the 1990s toacquire and test nuclear weapons – long after China testedits first bomb in 1964. While keeping a low nuclear profileand relying minimally on nuclear weapons, India’s nuclearconcerns have been shifting away from deterring China andPakistan and toward the threats of nuclear proliferation andterrorism. India’s fear of a breakdown of nuclear deterrenceleading to nuclear conflict with either China or Pakistanpales in comparison to its fear that nuclear weapons will fallinto the hands of terrorists and destroy an Indian city. Thisreordering of nuclear threat assessment by India gives furtherimpetus to its potential de-alerting ambitions.The key conditions for India’s participation in multilater-47
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