global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESthe number available for prompt launch in peacetime. Ona much slower re-alerting schedule (weeks to months), theUnited States could upload tactical nuclear weapons to deliveryplatforms in Europe and the United States, expandingits total nuclear arsenal on high alert to approximately 2,500weapons.Russia has shortened the launch time even more, by automatingthe firing process. High command posts in theMoscow area need only seconds to directly fire rockets outof silos as far away as Siberia. 61 Under normal peacetimeconditions, Russia could fire approximately 80 land-basedmissiles carrying a total of 600 warheads within minutes,and fire an additional 160 warheads sitting atop one to twostrategic submarines on patrol at sea or on pier-side alert(launching on the surface at dockside). 62 A couple of regimentsof land mobile rockets normally on peacetime patrolcould also be fired quickly on command. In a crisis, the restof Russia’s operationally deployed forces could be generatedto high alert in a matter of days to weeks, increasing Russia’sstrategic firepower on high alert to more than 1,000 warheadson land-based rockets, submarines, and heavy bombers.In this time frame Russia could also upload tacticalweapons to their delivery platforms and thereby bolster itsfirepower by an additional 1,000 or so weapons, for a grandtotal of approximately 2,000 weapons. 63G. THE DANGERS OF PROMPT LAUNCHDuring the Cold War both sides honed procedures to sendthe go-code at the first signs of incoming warheads reportedby early warning satellites and ground radar. Under this planto launch on warning, which remains intact and frequentlyexercised on both sides today, nuclear decision-makingis extremely rushed and emotionally charged. To preventpanic, it is pre-scripted, driven by checklists, and enacted61 Blair, “Lowering the Nuclear Threshold,” op.cit.62 Assumes 80% readiness/reliability for SS-18; 66.6% for SS-19; and90% for all other land-based missiles.63 Russia figures are based on Pavel Podvig, “Strategic Rocket Forces,”Russian strategic nuclear forces (blog), January 15, 2015, http://russianforces.org/missiles.by rote. In some scenarios, after only a three-minute assessmentof early warning data, the U.S. president receivesa 30-second briefing on his nuclear response options andtheir consequences. He then has at most 12 and probablycloser to six minutes to choose one, or else it would be toolate to avoid the severe force attrition, command disruption,communications breakdowns, and possibly the decapitationof top nuclear commanders that an actual large-scale Russianattack could inflict.Prompt launch is a holdover from the Cold War when ridingout an attack was not a viable option because of the fragilityof command and communications and the vulnerability ofmissiles in silos, garages, and submarine pens. Both sidesstood to lose the bulk of their forces and the command centersthat controlled them if they waited too long to retaliate.So during the 1970s and ’80s, both shortened the reactiontime of their nuclear missiles to seconds and prepared tolaunch them en masse at the first signs of incoming enemymissiles. Although U.S. nuclear strategy supposedly underwrotedeterrence based on an ability to ride out an attackand then retaliate with sufficient nuclear firepower to assuredlydestroy any nuclear aggressor, the U.S. operationalposture was geared to unleash U.S. forces before the arrivalof enemy warheads and the onset of massive disruption ofcommand and control. As a former commander of the strategicforces in the waning years of the Cold War explained:Our policy was premised on being able to acceptthe first wave of attacks […] Yet at theoperational level it was never accepted […]They built a construct that powerfully biasedthe president’s decision process towardlaunch before the arrival of the first enemywarhead […] a move in practice to a systemstructured to drive the president invariablytoward a decision to launch under attack[…] 64U.S. presidents reluctantly acquiesced to this systemic im-64 Jonathan Schell, The Gift of Time (New York: Metropolitan Books,1998), pp. 191–94.34
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESperative of making a quick decision to fire on warning.While it was an accident-prone policy, top presidential advisorssuch as Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft arguedin a top secret meeting of the National Security Council thatthis risky policy bolstered deterrence and that: “It is not toour disadvantage if we appear irrational to the Soviets in thisregard.” 65Ronald Reagan lamented in his memoirs:Russian submarines off our East Coast withnuclear missiles could turn the White Houseinto a pile of radioactive rubble within six oreight minutes. Six minutes to decide how torespond to a blip on a radar scope and decidewhether to release Armageddon! How couldanyone apply reason at a time like that? 66Former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote:[A] bolt out of the blue could create such initialdisbelief among the U.S. decision makersthat they would be unable to make a promptresponse […] A sudden massive attackwould put the American leaders under extraordinarypsychological pressure, capableof inducing erratic behavior and hesitation. 67Brzezinski spoke from experience, having received a shockingcall in the middle of the night in 1979 informing himof the launch of 220 Soviet submarine missiles at the UnitedStates. A second call indicated that 2,200 missiles werestreaking toward the United States – an all-out first strike.His biggest worry at this stage was figuring out how hewould convince a groggy president that this was the real65 “Minutes: National Security Council Meeting, Subject, SALT (andAngola),” December 22, 1975, top secret/sensitive/declassified, Washington,D.C.: National Security Archive, p. 9.66 Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography (New York:Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 257.67 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “From Arms Control to Controlled Security,”The Wall Street Journal, July 10, 1984.thing requiring an immediate nuclear response. As he preparedto call President Carter, he received a call ending thenightmare. It was later found that a defective computer chiphad caused the false alarm. 68While acquiescing to the imperative of quickly authorizingthe execution of the U.S. nuclear war plan, U.S. presidentsand their key advisors also recognized the impracticality oflaunch on warning given the extremely short deadlines entailedand the need for near-perfect coordination throughoutthe chain of command. Accordingly, given the specterof a decapitating Soviet strike should prompt-launch failto be carried out in time, every president from Eisenhowerthrough Reagan pre-delegated nuclear release authority extensivelyto military commanders in the field. This increasedthe risk of an unauthorized launch.On the Soviet side, where top leaders in an authoritarianpolitical culture eschewed relinquishing nuclear launch authority,special command posts and communications linkswere dug deeply underground to protect them, and novellaunch mechanisms capable of operating in a severe nuclearenvironment were invented. One such apparatus, called Perimeter(mentioned above), ensured semi-automatic retaliationin the event of a decapitating strike on Moscow andother central command facilities. 6968 On the occasions of the two major false alarms in U.S. history (causedby human error and computer malfunction, respectively), includingthis one involving Brzezinski, it took the crews eight minutes instead ofthe requisite three to resolve the confusing contradictory indications,resulting in their being immediately relieved of duty (“fired”) both times.Cases in Russia were similarly fraught with confusion.69 Anton Valagin, “Guaranteed wages: how the Russian system ‘Perimeter’,”Rossiya Gazeta January 22, 2014; Michael Tymoshenko, “RetaliatoryNuclear Strike Will Be Mounted Under Any Circumstances,” Red Star,February 19, 2015; David Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Storyof the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy (Anchor, 2009);Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, ed.Pavel Podvig (Cambridge, MA:MIT Press, 2004); Valery E. Yarynich, C3: Nuclear Command, Control,Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2003);Pavel Podvig, “Russia lost all its early-warning satellites,” Russianforces.org February 11, 2015; Bruce Blair, “Russia’s Doomsday Machine,” NewYork Times, October 8, 1993. See also: William J. Broad, “Russia Has‘Doomsday’ Machine, U.S. Expert Says,” New York Times, October 8,1993.35
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