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global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTUREScomputer-based system with a view to disrupting or evennegating c<strong>on</strong>trol. The effectiveness of current safeguardsin preventing such access and the neutralizing, deranging,or seizing of launch c<strong>on</strong>trol is uncertain, at least tothis <str<strong>on</strong>g>commissi<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g>. What can be argued is that a de-alertingregime that stands down 100 percent of the strategic forces<strong>on</strong> all sides would be effective in thwarting the mostdiabolical of cyber warfare scenarios that can be imagined– as well as those that have so far escaped imaginati<strong>on</strong>.In short, a persuasive case can be made to acceleratethe de-alerting schedule proposed in this <strong>report</strong>.XI. U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT PROJECT ON DE-ALERTINGIn c<strong>on</strong>juncti<strong>on</strong> with the urgent business of eliminatingprompt launch from the <strong>nuclear</strong> postures of both sides,and reciprocally standing down a porti<strong>on</strong> of their highalertstrategic forces according to the draw-down schedulepresented earlier, Russia and the United States need toresume <strong>nuclear</strong> talks. Their experts should work togetherto design, test, dem<strong>on</strong>strate, and validate de-alertingmethods and associated verificati<strong>on</strong> procedures. As partof this joint undertaking, they should compare and shareassessments of the <strong>risk</strong>s posed by their current strategicpostures, including the <strong>risk</strong>s to the integrity of <strong>nuclear</strong>command, c<strong>on</strong>trol, communicati<strong>on</strong>s, and early warningnetworks posed by cyber warfare. They should jointlyassess the <strong>nuclear</strong> programs of other countries, the <strong>risk</strong>sthey carry, and remedies including c<strong>on</strong>fidence-buildingmeasures and de-alerting.XII. TOWARD A GLOBAL MULTILATERALDE-ALERTING AGREEMENTPrevious secti<strong>on</strong>s and the model U.S. presidential <strong>nuclear</strong>guidance presented later explained the grounds forstanding down and keeping down the <strong>nuclear</strong> forces ofall nati<strong>on</strong>s. Simply put, de-alerting serves their nati<strong>on</strong>alsecurity interests. There are no excepti<strong>on</strong>s. The dotsbetween de-alerting and a wider set of Chinese, French,Indian, Israeli, Pakistani, Russian, U.K. and U.S. securityc<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>s have been c<strong>on</strong>nected and elaborated. It isdifficult to refute.The present positi<strong>on</strong> of the U.S. government neverthelessdoes refute the basic claims presented in this <strong>report</strong> – notably,that the <strong>risk</strong>s of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s use are excessive,that they stem from inadequate warning and decisi<strong>on</strong>time, and that other weaknesses in <strong>nuclear</strong> command andc<strong>on</strong>trol create opportunities for <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s use byaccident or design. The official refutati<strong>on</strong> is brief and tothe point. It was most recently articulated in a letter writtenin resp<strong>on</strong>se to a United Nati<strong>on</strong>s resoluti<strong>on</strong> calling forthe <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s countries to reduce the operati<strong>on</strong>alreadiness of their <strong>nuclear</strong> forces. (For further discussi<strong>on</strong>of the de-alerting movement at the United Nati<strong>on</strong>s, seethe next secti<strong>on</strong> of this <strong>report</strong>.) Speaking <strong>on</strong> behalf of theUnited Kingdom and France as well as the United States,U.S. Ambassador Robert Wood wrote:We c<strong>on</strong>tinue to disagree with the basicpremises of this resoluti<strong>on</strong>, which suggestthat the current level of readiness of <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s increases the <strong>risk</strong> of the unintenti<strong>on</strong>alor accidental use and that loweredalert levels will automatically and inall cases lead to heightened internati<strong>on</strong>alsecurity. While alert levels can and havebeen lowered in resp<strong>on</strong>se to an improvedinternati<strong>on</strong>al security climate, the relati<strong>on</strong>shipbetween alert levels and securityis complex and not reducible to simple formulaicresp<strong>on</strong>ses.We would like to restate that the operati<strong>on</strong>alreadiness of our respective <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s systems is maintained at a levelc<strong>on</strong>s<strong>on</strong>ant with our nati<strong>on</strong>al security requirementsand our obligati<strong>on</strong>s to our allies,within the larger c<strong>on</strong>text of the current<str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> strategic situati<strong>on</strong>. In reflecti<strong>on</strong>thereof, we have decreased the operati<strong>on</strong>alreadiness and alert levels of our respectiveforces since the early 1990s. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally,our respective <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s systems areno l<strong>on</strong>ger targeted against any state.Collectively, those steps have reduced the62

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