GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTUREScomputer-based system with a view to disrupting or evennegating c<strong>on</strong>trol. The effectiveness of current safeguardsin preventing such access and the neutralizing, deranging,or seizing of launch c<strong>on</strong>trol is uncertain, at least tothis <str<strong>on</strong>g>commissi<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g>. What can be argued is that a de-alertingregime that stands down 100 percent of the strategic forces<strong>on</strong> all sides would be effective in thwarting the mostdiabolical of cyber warfare scenarios that can be imagined– as well as those that have so far escaped imaginati<strong>on</strong>.In short, a persuasive case can be made to acceleratethe de-alerting schedule proposed in this <strong>report</strong>.XI. U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT PROJECT ON DE-ALERTINGIn c<strong>on</strong>juncti<strong>on</strong> with the urgent business of eliminatingprompt launch from the <strong>nuclear</strong> postures of both sides,and reciprocally standing down a porti<strong>on</strong> of their highalertstrategic forces according to the draw-down schedulepresented earlier, Russia and the United States need toresume <strong>nuclear</strong> talks. Their experts should work togetherto design, test, dem<strong>on</strong>strate, and validate de-alertingmethods and associated verificati<strong>on</strong> procedures. As partof this joint undertaking, they should compare and shareassessments of the <strong>risk</strong>s posed by their current strategicpostures, including the <strong>risk</strong>s to the integrity of <strong>nuclear</strong>command, c<strong>on</strong>trol, communicati<strong>on</strong>s, and early warningnetworks posed by cyber warfare. They should jointlyassess the <strong>nuclear</strong> programs of other countries, the <strong>risk</strong>sthey carry, and remedies including c<strong>on</strong>fidence-buildingmeasures and de-alerting.XII. TOWARD A GLOBAL MULTILATERALDE-ALERTING AGREEMENTPrevious secti<strong>on</strong>s and the model U.S. presidential <strong>nuclear</strong>guidance presented later explained the grounds forstanding down and keeping down the <strong>nuclear</strong> forces ofall nati<strong>on</strong>s. Simply put, de-alerting serves their nati<strong>on</strong>alsecurity interests. There are no excepti<strong>on</strong>s. The dotsbetween de-alerting and a wider set of Chinese, French,Indian, Israeli, Pakistani, Russian, U.K. and U.S. securityc<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>s have been c<strong>on</strong>nected and elaborated. It isdifficult to refute.The present positi<strong>on</strong> of the U.S. government neverthelessdoes refute the basic claims presented in this <strong>report</strong> – notably,that the <strong>risk</strong>s of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s use are excessive,that they stem from inadequate warning and decisi<strong>on</strong>time, and that other weaknesses in <strong>nuclear</strong> command andc<strong>on</strong>trol create opportunities for <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s use byaccident or design. The official refutati<strong>on</strong> is brief and tothe point. It was most recently articulated in a letter writtenin resp<strong>on</strong>se to a United Nati<strong>on</strong>s resoluti<strong>on</strong> calling forthe <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s countries to reduce the operati<strong>on</strong>alreadiness of their <strong>nuclear</strong> forces. (For further discussi<strong>on</strong>of the de-alerting movement at the United Nati<strong>on</strong>s, seethe next secti<strong>on</strong> of this <strong>report</strong>.) Speaking <strong>on</strong> behalf of theUnited Kingdom and France as well as the United States,U.S. Ambassador Robert Wood wrote:We c<strong>on</strong>tinue to disagree with the basicpremises of this resoluti<strong>on</strong>, which suggestthat the current level of readiness of <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s increases the <strong>risk</strong> of the unintenti<strong>on</strong>alor accidental use and that loweredalert levels will automatically and inall cases lead to heightened internati<strong>on</strong>alsecurity. While alert levels can and havebeen lowered in resp<strong>on</strong>se to an improvedinternati<strong>on</strong>al security climate, the relati<strong>on</strong>shipbetween alert levels and securityis complex and not reducible to simple formulaicresp<strong>on</strong>ses.We would like to restate that the operati<strong>on</strong>alreadiness of our respective <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s systems is maintained at a levelc<strong>on</strong>s<strong>on</strong>ant with our nati<strong>on</strong>al security requirementsand our obligati<strong>on</strong>s to our allies,within the larger c<strong>on</strong>text of the current<str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> strategic situati<strong>on</strong>. In reflecti<strong>on</strong>thereof, we have decreased the operati<strong>on</strong>alreadiness and alert levels of our respectiveforces since the early 1990s. Additi<strong>on</strong>ally,our respective <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s systems areno l<strong>on</strong>ger targeted against any state.Collectively, those steps have reduced the62
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESvalue of further “de-alerting” as a priorityfor <strong>nuclear</strong> disarmament.We would also like to reiterate that our<strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s systems are subject to themost rigorous command, c<strong>on</strong>trol and communicati<strong>on</strong>systems, to ensure against thepossibility of accidental or unintenti<strong>on</strong>aluse, and to guarantee that such weap<strong>on</strong>scould <strong>on</strong>ly be used at the sole directi<strong>on</strong> ofthe proper nati<strong>on</strong>al command authorityand to maximise that authority’s decisi<strong>on</strong>time. 108With due respect to this official tripartite positi<strong>on</strong>, this<strong>report</strong> c<strong>on</strong>tends that current operati<strong>on</strong>al readiness is notc<strong>on</strong>s<strong>on</strong>ant with French, U.K. and U.S. nati<strong>on</strong>al securityrequirements and that significant adjustments to the currentposture are necessary to align readiness with thoserequirements. The value of further de-alerting is not declining,but rather is growing – and the case for furtherde-alerting flows not from premises, but from fact-basedanalysis. The readers of this <strong>report</strong> can decide for themselveswhether it builds a rigorous case.This <str<strong>on</strong>g>commissi<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g> believes, furthermore, that de-alertingwould also serve the nati<strong>on</strong>al security interests of thelarger c<strong>on</strong>stellati<strong>on</strong> of nati<strong>on</strong>s including all the <strong>nuclear</strong>possessor states as well as key n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>scountries.A. WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL SUPPORTAND STANDING FOR DE-ALERTINGSince 2007, a group of five countries – Chile, Malaysia,New Zealand, Nigeria and Switzerland – has put forwarda resoluti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> decreasing the operati<strong>on</strong>al readiness of<strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s systems at the United Nati<strong>on</strong>s GeneralAssembly (UNGA) <strong>on</strong> five separate occasi<strong>on</strong>s. Each res-108 Amb. Robert A. Wood, “Cluster One: Explanati<strong>on</strong> of the Vote Afterthe Vote,” statement to the Sixty-Ninth United Nati<strong>on</strong>s General AssemblyFirst Committee, New York City, October 29, 2014.oluti<strong>on</strong> calls <strong>on</strong> <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s states to take “furtherpractical steps […] to decrease the operati<strong>on</strong>al readinessof <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s systems, with a view to ensuring thatall <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s are removed from high alert status.”109 Taking up this call to acti<strong>on</strong>, they believe, wouldlower the <strong>risk</strong> of unintenti<strong>on</strong>al or accidental use of <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s and c<strong>on</strong>tribute to the process of <strong>nuclear</strong>disarmament by reducing the role of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s innati<strong>on</strong>al security policy and strengthening transparencyand c<strong>on</strong>fidence-building measures.At the 2000 NPT Review C<strong>on</strong>ference, states party to thetreaty, including Russia and the United States, agreed that<strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s states should further reduce the operati<strong>on</strong>alstatus of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s systems as part of the “13practical steps” toward <strong>nuclear</strong> disarmament. The importanceof this step was underscored at the 2010 NPT ReviewC<strong>on</strong>ference when all parties adopted a 64-point acti<strong>on</strong>plan to accelerate progress <strong>on</strong> <strong>nuclear</strong> disarmament,which included further reducti<strong>on</strong>s in the operati<strong>on</strong>al statusof <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s.In 2012, the General Assembly passed the fourth incarnati<strong>on</strong>of the de-alerting group’s resoluti<strong>on</strong> with a voteof 164 in favor, 4 against, and 19 abstaining. 110 The vote109 General Assembly resoluti<strong>on</strong> 69/42, Decreasing the operati<strong>on</strong>alreadiness of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s, A/RES/69/42, December 11, 2014.110 U.N. General Assembly voting record for 2012 Resoluti<strong>on</strong> 67/46Decreasing the operati<strong>on</strong>al readiness of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s systems:In favor: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia(Plurinati<strong>on</strong>al State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Camero<strong>on</strong>,Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China,Colombia, Comoros, C<strong>on</strong>go, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus,Democratic Republic of the C<strong>on</strong>go, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica,Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji,Finland, Gab<strong>on</strong>, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala,Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, H<strong>on</strong>duras, Iceland, India,Ind<strong>on</strong>esia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s DemocraticRepublic, Leban<strong>on</strong>, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania,Mauritius, Mexico, M<strong>on</strong>golia, M<strong>on</strong>tenegro, Morocco, Mozambique,Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,63