global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTUREScomputer-based system with a view to disrupting or evennegating control. The effectiveness of current safeguardsin preventing such access and the neutralizing, deranging,or seizing of launch control is uncertain, at least tothis <strong>commission</strong>. What can be argued is that a de-alertingregime that stands down 100 percent of the strategic forceson all sides would be effective in thwarting the mostdiabolical of cyber warfare scenarios that can be imagined– as well as those that have so far escaped imagination.In short, a persuasive case can be made to acceleratethe de-alerting schedule proposed in this report.XI. U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT PROJECT ON DE-ALERTINGIn conjunction with the urgent business of eliminatingprompt launch from the nuclear postures of both sides,and reciprocally standing down a portion of their highalertstrategic forces according to the draw-down schedulepresented earlier, Russia and the United States need toresume nuclear talks. Their experts should work togetherto design, test, demonstrate, and validate de-alertingmethods and associated verification procedures. As partof this joint undertaking, they should compare and shareassessments of the risks posed by their current strategicpostures, including the risks to the integrity of nuclearcommand, control, communications, and early warningnetworks posed by cyber warfare. They should jointlyassess the nuclear programs of other countries, the risksthey carry, and remedies including confidence-buildingmeasures and de-alerting.XII. TOWARD A GLOBAL MULTILATERALDE-ALERTING AGREEMENTPrevious sections and the model U.S. presidential nuclearguidance presented later explained the grounds forstanding down and keeping down the nuclear forces ofall nations. Simply put, de-alerting serves their nationalsecurity interests. There are no exceptions. The dotsbetween de-alerting and a wider set of Chinese, French,Indian, Israeli, Pakistani, Russian, U.K. and U.S. securityconsiderations have been connected and elaborated. It isdifficult to refute.The present position of the U.S. government neverthelessdoes refute the basic claims presented in this report – notably,that the risks of nuclear weapons use are excessive,that they stem from inadequate warning and decisiontime, and that other weaknesses in nuclear command andcontrol create opportunities for nuclear weapons use byaccident or design. The official refutation is brief and tothe point. It was most recently articulated in a letter writtenin response to a United Nations resolution calling forthe nuclear weapons countries to reduce the operationalreadiness of their nuclear forces. (For further discussionof the de-alerting movement at the United Nations, seethe next section of this report.) Speaking on behalf of theUnited Kingdom and France as well as the United States,U.S. Ambassador Robert Wood wrote:We continue to disagree with the basicpremises of this resolution, which suggestthat the current level of readiness of nuclearweapons increases the risk of the unintentionalor accidental use and that loweredalert levels will automatically and inall cases lead to heightened internationalsecurity. While alert levels can and havebeen lowered in response to an improvedinternational security climate, the relationshipbetween alert levels and securityis complex and not reducible to simple formulaicresponses.We would like to restate that the operationalreadiness of our respective nuclearweapons systems is maintained at a levelconsonant with our national security requirementsand our obligations to our allies,within the larger context of the current<strong>global</strong> strategic situation. In reflectionthereof, we have decreased the operationalreadiness and alert levels of our respectiveforces since the early 1990s. Additionally,our respective nuclear weapons systems areno longer targeted against any state.Collectively, those steps have reduced the62