GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESof missile launches and other potential threats through jointwarning centers manned by Russians, Americans, Chinese,and many other nati<strong>on</strong>alities. We may witness joint technologicalventures such as U.S.-Russian early warning satellite deploymentswith the output widely shared with other nati<strong>on</strong>s. Overtime, this increasingly <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> cooperati<strong>on</strong> could lead to jointmissile defenses am<strong>on</strong>g some strange bedfellows.These trends appear to be deeply embedded in a <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g>izingworld of growing ec<strong>on</strong>omic and informati<strong>on</strong>al engagementand mutual dependence am<strong>on</strong>g the world’s leading nati<strong>on</strong>s.K. GUIDANCE SUMMATIONA transformati<strong>on</strong>al change in U.S. <strong>nuclear</strong> strategy, postureand force structure is urgently needed to squarely address thesecurity threats facing the nati<strong>on</strong> in the 21st century. The currentstrategy inherited from the Cold War perpetuates <strong>nuclear</strong>stockpiles that are much larger than required for deterrencetoday and that have scant efficacy in dealing with the mainthreats to U.S. and <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> security – <strong>nuclear</strong> proliferati<strong>on</strong>, terrorism,cyber warfare and a multitude of other threats stemmingfrom the diffusi<strong>on</strong> of power in the world today.Strategic stability based <strong>on</strong> a bilateral balance of <strong>nuclear</strong> terror,the unvarnished versi<strong>on</strong> of the anodyne “mutual deterrence,”is a dated and less useful c<strong>on</strong>struct. Today, stability is a multipolarand multidimensi<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>cern that includes many factorsbesides <strong>nuclear</strong> forces: cyber warfare capabilities, missiledefenses, c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al forces, special operati<strong>on</strong>s and “softer”factors including diplomatic and ec<strong>on</strong>omic clout.The United States can and will proceed <strong>on</strong> its own accord tomake many of the necessary changes to its <strong>nuclear</strong> strategyand force posture, but China and Russia are critical partnersin the resoluti<strong>on</strong> of <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> security problems. The importanceof achieving greater security cooperati<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g our three nati<strong>on</strong>sis difficult to overstate. The world looks to us for leadershipin grappling with the <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> ec<strong>on</strong>omic, envir<strong>on</strong>mental,and security problems of the 21st century, and we cannotexpect to solve these collective challenges while at the sametime maintaining <strong>nuclear</strong> policies rooted in threats to annihilate<strong>on</strong>e another. Preserving mutual deterrence, a euphemismfor mutual <strong>nuclear</strong> terror, as the central organizing principleof our relati<strong>on</strong>ship obstructs our ability to achieve the level oftrust and cooperati<strong>on</strong> needed to effectively address the realthreats that we and the rest of the world face.“Mutual deterrence” must allow scope for security cooperati<strong>on</strong>and we must persist in our efforts to join China, Russia,and others to set the world’s course toward the total eliminati<strong>on</strong>of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s. The path forward is clear: reducedreliance <strong>on</strong> <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s, deep bilateral reducti<strong>on</strong>s andde-alerting, the c<strong>on</strong>vening of the first-in-history multilateral<strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s summit to c<strong>on</strong>sider proposals for achievinga world free of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s, and seeking a multilateralde-alerting agreement that prohibits placing <strong>nuclear</strong> forces <strong>on</strong>an accident-pr<strong>on</strong>e posture of hair-trigger launch readiness.These efforts would affirm U.S. support for the NPT, whichc<strong>on</strong>tinues to be the bedrock of the internati<strong>on</strong>al community’seffort to prevent and roll back proliferati<strong>on</strong>. The Article VI obligati<strong>on</strong>to pursue good faith negotiati<strong>on</strong>s for <strong>nuclear</strong> disarmamentmay have been “essentially hortatory” at <strong>on</strong>e time, buttoday it is and must be taken seriously. Through <strong>nuclear</strong> armsc<strong>on</strong>trol, the United States shows respect for the <strong>nuclear</strong> disarmamentaspirati<strong>on</strong>s of the vast majority of the Treaty’s 189signatories, and in return the United States can expect them tostiffen their resolve in enforcing the NPT, supporting the P5+1talks with Iran, and pressuring North Korea to end its <strong>nuclear</strong>pursuits and return to compliance with its NPT obligati<strong>on</strong>s(notwithstanding its proclaimed withdrawal).The days of U.S. and Russian lip service to the disarmamentclause of the NPT are over if we hope to preserve and strengthenthe Treaty in the face of growing proliferati<strong>on</strong> pressuresaround the world. And the more the <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s countriesreduce their <strong>nuclear</strong> stockpiles, the more vigilant theworld will become in ferreting out and clamping down <strong>on</strong>clandestine programs and other NPT violati<strong>on</strong>s. This collectiveresolve is crucial to the security of the United States andall countries.84
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESXV. THE GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEARRISK REDUCTION POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSThis <str<strong>on</strong>g>commissi<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g> encourages all <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s countriesto adopt <strong>nuclear</strong> policies that place the highest priority<strong>on</strong> survivable forces and command systems in orderto reduce dependence <strong>on</strong> first use, launch <strong>on</strong> warning,and “use or lose” strategies. N<strong>on</strong>-survivable <strong>nuclear</strong> forcesshould be eliminated during force modernizati<strong>on</strong> andthrough arms reducti<strong>on</strong> negotiati<strong>on</strong>s whenever possible.A. BILATERAL STEPSThis <str<strong>on</strong>g>commissi<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g> supports these U.S.-Russia bilateral steps:1. Provide detailed notificati<strong>on</strong> by each of the partieswell in advance of intended missile launches, assurethe timely detecti<strong>on</strong> of all missile launches, and exchangereal-time informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> detected missilelaunches and the identity of the country resp<strong>on</strong>siblefor the launch.2. Establish a joint early warning center, manned byRussian and U.S. pers<strong>on</strong>nel (and later expanded forChinese and other participati<strong>on</strong>) to provide a c<strong>on</strong>duitfor this sharing. Expanding <strong>on</strong> the June 2000Memorandum of Agreement to establish a U.S.-RussianJoint Data Exchange Center, this early warningcenter should also exchange informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> cyberwarfare attacks and the source of such attacks, particularlythose attacks that impact early warningsystem performance and corrupt the output of earlywarning networks.3. Notify each other whenever their strategic submarinesleave their homeports.4. Refrain from deploying strategic submarines at forwardlocati<strong>on</strong>s that allow their <strong>nuclear</strong>-armed missilesto reach the territories of Russia and the UnitedStates in less than 30 minutes.5. Notify each other whenever they are going to alertand deploy their back-up <strong>nuclear</strong> command systems,even if <strong>on</strong>ly for the purpose of exercising them.6. Sign an executive agreement with appropriate ratificati<strong>on</strong>processes calling up<strong>on</strong> them to take urgent,priority measures to prevent the possibility of missilelaunches <strong>on</strong> the basis of false warnings, and implementsuch measures within six m<strong>on</strong>ths to <strong>on</strong>e year.7. Cease c<strong>on</strong>ducting exercises that involve the launchof land, sea, and air strategic missiles <strong>on</strong> the basis ofinformati<strong>on</strong> from early warning systems; exchangeinformati<strong>on</strong> about <strong>on</strong>going and planned <strong>nuclear</strong> militaryexercises; invite observers to each others’ topcommand positi<strong>on</strong> during full-scale exercises; andalso, if requested by the other side, invite observersto any exercises of their strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> forces.8. Alter their <strong>nuclear</strong> war plans (Emergency War Orders,or EWO) to eliminate launch-<strong>on</strong>-warning proceduresfrom them.9. Strengthen command and warning systems to makethem more survivable and capable of directing <strong>nuclear</strong>forces to coherent nati<strong>on</strong>al purposes after absorbingan attack, in order to reduce pressure to launch<strong>on</strong> warning or pre-delegate <strong>nuclear</strong> release authority.10. Agree to a specific phased plan to decrease the attackreadiness of their individual strategic <strong>nuclear</strong> forcesto 24-72 hours (time required to re-alert) until a totalstand-down is achieved over a period of approximatelyten years under a fast-track opti<strong>on</strong>.11. Mutually stand down 20 percent of their currenthigh-alert strategic forces (approximately 170 strategicweap<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> each side) in the first tranche ofde-alerting, and stand down additi<strong>on</strong>al forces overtime according to this drawdown schedule:• Within <strong>on</strong>e year, 20 percent (approximately170 weap<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> each side) of the currentalert strategic forces would be stood down,leaving 680 <strong>on</strong> high alert <strong>on</strong> each side.85