global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESof missile launches and other potential threats through jointwarning centers manned by Russians, Americans, Chinese,and many other nationalities. We may witness joint technologicalventures such as U.S.-Russian early warning satellite deploymentswith the output widely shared with other nations. Overtime, this increasingly <strong>global</strong> cooperation could lead to jointmissile defenses among some strange bedfellows.These trends appear to be deeply embedded in a <strong>global</strong>izingworld of growing economic and informational engagementand mutual dependence among the world’s leading nations.K. GUIDANCE SUMMATIONA transformational change in U.S. nuclear strategy, postureand force structure is urgently needed to squarely address thesecurity threats facing the nation in the 21st century. The currentstrategy inherited from the Cold War perpetuates nuclearstockpiles that are much larger than required for deterrencetoday and that have scant efficacy in dealing with the mainthreats to U.S. and <strong>global</strong> security – nuclear proliferation, terrorism,cyber warfare and a multitude of other threats stemmingfrom the diffusion of power in the world today.Strategic stability based on a bilateral balance of nuclear terror,the unvarnished version of the anodyne “mutual deterrence,”is a dated and less useful construct. Today, stability is a multipolarand multidimensional concern that includes many factorsbesides nuclear forces: cyber warfare capabilities, missiledefenses, conventional forces, special operations and “softer”factors including diplomatic and economic clout.The United States can and will proceed on its own accord tomake many of the necessary changes to its nuclear strategyand force posture, but China and Russia are critical partnersin the resolution of <strong>global</strong> security problems. The importanceof achieving greater security cooperation among our three nationsis difficult to overstate. The world looks to us for leadershipin grappling with the <strong>global</strong> economic, environmental,and security problems of the 21st century, and we cannotexpect to solve these collective challenges while at the sametime maintaining nuclear policies rooted in threats to annihilateone another. Preserving mutual deterrence, a euphemismfor mutual nuclear terror, as the central organizing principleof our relationship obstructs our ability to achieve the level oftrust and cooperation needed to effectively address the realthreats that we and the rest of the world face.“Mutual deterrence” must allow scope for security cooperationand we must persist in our efforts to join China, Russia,and others to set the world’s course toward the total eliminationof nuclear weapons. The path forward is clear: reducedreliance on nuclear weapons, deep bilateral reductions andde-alerting, the convening of the first-in-history multilateralnuclear weapons summit to consider proposals for achievinga world free of nuclear weapons, and seeking a multilateralde-alerting agreement that prohibits placing nuclear forces onan accident-prone posture of hair-trigger launch readiness.These efforts would affirm U.S. support for the NPT, whichcontinues to be the bedrock of the international community’seffort to prevent and roll back proliferation. The Article VI obligationto pursue good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmamentmay have been “essentially hortatory” at one time, buttoday it is and must be taken seriously. Through nuclear armscontrol, the United States shows respect for the nuclear disarmamentaspirations of the vast majority of the Treaty’s 189signatories, and in return the United States can expect them tostiffen their resolve in enforcing the NPT, supporting the P5+1talks with Iran, and pressuring North Korea to end its nuclearpursuits and return to compliance with its NPT obligations(notwithstanding its proclaimed withdrawal).The days of U.S. and Russian lip service to the disarmamentclause of the NPT are over if we hope to preserve and strengthenthe Treaty in the face of growing proliferation pressuresaround the world. And the more the nuclear weapons countriesreduce their nuclear stockpiles, the more vigilant theworld will become in ferreting out and clamping down onclandestine programs and other NPT violations. This collectiveresolve is crucial to the security of the United States andall countries.84
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESXV. THE GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEARRISK REDUCTION POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSThis <strong>commission</strong> encourages all nuclear weapons countriesto adopt nuclear policies that place the highest priorityon survivable forces and command systems in orderto reduce dependence on first use, launch on warning,and “use or lose” strategies. Non-survivable nuclear forcesshould be eliminated during force modernization andthrough arms reduction negotiations whenever possible.A. BILATERAL STEPSThis <strong>commission</strong> supports these U.S.-Russia bilateral steps:1. Provide detailed notification by each of the partieswell in advance of intended missile launches, assurethe timely detection of all missile launches, and exchangereal-time information on detected missilelaunches and the identity of the country responsiblefor the launch.2. Establish a joint early warning center, manned byRussian and U.S. personnel (and later expanded forChinese and other participation) to provide a conduitfor this sharing. Expanding on the June 2000Memorandum of Agreement to establish a U.S.-RussianJoint Data Exchange Center, this early warningcenter should also exchange information on cyberwarfare attacks and the source of such attacks, particularlythose attacks that impact early warningsystem performance and corrupt the output of earlywarning networks.3. Notify each other whenever their strategic submarinesleave their homeports.4. Refrain from deploying strategic submarines at forwardlocations that allow their nuclear-armed missilesto reach the territories of Russia and the UnitedStates in less than 30 minutes.5. Notify each other whenever they are going to alertand deploy their back-up nuclear command systems,even if only for the purpose of exercising them.6. Sign an executive agreement with appropriate ratificationprocesses calling upon them to take urgent,priority measures to prevent the possibility of missilelaunches on the basis of false warnings, and implementsuch measures within six months to one year.7. Cease conducting exercises that involve the launchof land, sea, and air strategic missiles on the basis ofinformation from early warning systems; exchangeinformation about ongoing and planned nuclear militaryexercises; invite observers to each others’ topcommand position during full-scale exercises; andalso, if requested by the other side, invite observersto any exercises of their strategic nuclear forces.8. Alter their nuclear war plans (Emergency War Orders,or EWO) to eliminate launch-on-warning proceduresfrom them.9. Strengthen command and warning systems to makethem more survivable and capable of directing nuclearforces to coherent national purposes after absorbingan attack, in order to reduce pressure to launchon warning or pre-delegate nuclear release authority.10. Agree to a specific phased plan to decrease the attackreadiness of their individual strategic nuclear forcesto 24-72 hours (time required to re-alert) until a totalstand-down is achieved over a period of approximatelyten years under a fast-track option.11. Mutually stand down 20 percent of their currenthigh-alert strategic forces (approximately 170 strategicweapons on each side) in the first tranche ofde-alerting, and stand down additional forces overtime according to this drawdown schedule:• Within one year, 20 percent (approximately170 weapons on each side) of the currentalert strategic forces would be stood down,leaving 680 on high alert on each side.85
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