global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESforces of 450 warheads would be de-alerted and require a smallnumber of days (24-72 hours) to become launch ready. Mostof the 450 reserve warheads could be taken from storage andloaded on delivery vehicles within weeks to months.A 10-boat fleet of Trident SSBNs will assign seven to the Pacificand three to the Atlantic basins. Assuming two boats arenormally in overhaul and the U.S. Navy maintains its historicalat-sea rate of 70 percent for the remainder, there will normallybe four and two SSBNs at sea in the Pacific and Atlantic, respectively,carrying a total of 270 warheads. This day-to-dayforce would be survivable under worst-case conditions andversatile in providing prodigious target coverage of all prospectivenuclear-armed aggressors. As noted earlier, it wouldoperate on modified alert outside the normal launch stationsand require 24-72 hours to generate immediate offensive strikecapability.With only 270 U.S. warheads that could be made available forfiring within 24-72 hours, Russia would be assured that theUnited States does not pose a threat of a sudden decapitatingfirst strike. Russian strategic forces in garrison or port couldeasily disperse to hidden locations in the forests and oceansduring the protracted period of visible re-alerting of any U.S.forces. Consequently, the specter of a one-two Americanknockout punch consisting of an offensive U.S. first strike designedto decimate Russian forces in combination with U.S.missile defenses mopping up the few surviving Russian missilesfired in retaliation would evaporate.In an emergency, an additional two Pacific boats in port armedwith 90 additional warheads could be flushed to sea withinhours and the fleet of 18 B-2 bombers could be loaded with90 gravity bombs and put on strip-alert status within 24-48hours. After 24-72 hours of force generation, the total numberof survivable U.S. warheads would thus grow to 450.A protracted nuclear crisis or severe deterioration of geostrategicrelations between the United States and either Russia orChina lasting for weeks or months would allow time for a largefraction of the U.S. arsenal of reserve warheads to be uploadedon SSBNs and B-2 bombers over the course of that period. Bysix months into a crisis period, the U.S. strategic arsenal couldgrow to upwards of 900 deliverable warheads.The capacity to deliver 900 warheads would project a threat ofdraconian dimensions at any prospective aggressor country. Aforce of this size could support extensive counterforce againstopposing nuclear forces, counter value against war-supportingindustries and operations against command centers of the opponent’stop political and military leadership.The decision to eliminate the Minuteman ICBM force andconsequently the triad of delivery vehicles in favor of a nucleardyad stems from severe Minuteman vulnerability and targetingdeficiencies. Minuteman is vulnerable to sudden decimationunless it is launched promptly on tactical warning ofan incoming Russian missile strike, a survival tactic that thisguidance eliminates because it deprives the President of thetime needed for careful deliberation. The second deficiency –targeting inflexibility – is equally severe. Minuteman forces aresuitable for the most improbable scenario – large-scale nuclearwar with Russia – and are unsuitable for nuclear operationsagainst North Korea or Iran because the missiles would haveto fly over both China and Russia to reach either of them. Nordoes the possibility of U.S.-China nuclear conflict justify keepingthe Minuteman force. Such a conflict is highly improbableand in any event Minuteman missiles would have to fly overRussia to reach China.By contrast, submarines or bombers offer means of dealingwith almost any scenario involving a weapon of mass destruction(WMD) threat to the United States from any nation-stateadversary. Neither U.S. strategic submarine missiles nor strategicbombers are constrained by rigid flight trajectories. Theseare versatile platforms that offer highly flexible angles of attackagainst practically any target on the globe, and in the case ofsubmarines a strike could be carried out within an hour.H. DOWNSIZING THE NUCLEAR COMPLEXUnder this plan, the number of different types of nuclear weaponsin the U.S. active inventory would decrease from seventypes today to four by 2022. 134 The need to re-furbish weapons134 W-76 and W-88 on Trident SSBNs, and B61 (mods 7 and 11) andB83 on B-2 bombers. See Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy CommissionReport, op cit., p. 12.78
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESremaining in the stockpile would greatly diminish – almost allweapons previously requiring it would be eliminated from theactive inventory. This drastic curtailing of the life-extension programfor thousands of weapons currently in the pipeline wouldsave many billions of dollars.The existing plutonium pit facility at Los Alamos could readilyservice the regular pit manufacturing demands of a 900-warheadarsenal. Assuming a 50-year pit shelf life, 135 only 2 percentof the active stockpile (18 warheads) would need to be remanufacturedeach year. The facility has a normal throughput capacityof about 20 per year with the option to add extra staff shiftsin order to raise capacity to 40 pits per year. With the additionof extra equipment (5-6 years to install), the capacity could beincreased to perhaps as high as 80 per year.This number would grow higher still if old pits could be reusedand if pits with sensitive, conventional high explosives couldbe refitted with insensitive high explosives to improve safety.Current studies underway at the U.S. national laboratories to becompleted within the next couple of years should determine thefeasibility of these options. Preliminary analyses suggest that upwardsof 50 percent of plutonium pits in the stockpile could beswapped out in these processes, allowing for a much faster rateof pit replacement.In an emergency in which a systemic defect in one of the fourwarhead types warranted a crash effort to replace those warheads,it appears feasible that upwards of 120 defective weaponsper year could be remedied through a combination of pit manufacturingand pit re-use. Such a systemic defect is a low-probabilityevent, but assuming 225 defective warheads (notionallyone-fourth of the 900-warhead total) needed to be repaired, itwould take approximately two years of full-capacity work to finishthe job.In sum, the current plutonium facility – with some new equipmentworking overtime with other partners such as the Pantexfacility – could probably handle an unusual emergency to replacea big chunk of the arsenal. This capability of the existing135 This is extremely conservative. Recent government scientific studiesestimate pit longevity at 85-150 years.facilities obviates the need to build the multi-billion-dollar newfacility now in the early construction stage at Los Alamos. However,some small additional risk of reduced stockpile reliabilitymust be acknowledged if we shrink the variety of warhead typesfrom seven to four, and the margin of comfort for replacing anentire category of weapons in the event of a systemic defect isnot large. On balance, these risks appear to be quite low, andacceptable.Nevertheless, the President requests a full-scope survey by thepertinent agencies – NNSA, the national laboratories, and StrategicCommand – to determine an optimal infrastructure insupport of the 900-warhead arsenal outlined herein.I. MISSILE DEFENSE AND CONVENTIONALFORCE AUGMENTATIONWhile reducing U.S. reliance on offensive nuclear weapons onlaunch-ready alert, the United States will shift to a defensivestrategy featuring vigilant missile defenses backed by advancedconventional forces kept on constant alert and by cyber warfarecapabilities. This integrated new strategy will offset any risk incurredby the downsizing of the U.S. strategic arsenal, partiallyoffset the decrease in target coverage, and provide a cushionduring an initial 24-72 hours of conflict when U.S. offensive nuclearforces may be generated to combat alert status. It thereforewill support the goal of increasing nuclear decision time andthus have a stabilizing effect on the U.S. nuclear posture.Alert missile defenses augmented by passive defenses (e.g.,hardening, sheltering) provide especially effective tools in deterringor defeating a regional adversary such as Iran or NorthKorea for a 24-72 hour period. Such a time-limited requirementwould ease the burden on missile defenses to interceptingthe maximum number of offensive missiles that an adversarycould launch during this period – defined as the total numberof launchers times the number of reloads per launcher duringa 24-72 hour period. Missile defenses will not have to handleevery missile in the adversary’s stockpile – only those that couldbe fired during this initial phase of conflict.This reduced burden would allow a theater missile defense program,such as the adaptive system for protecting Europe from79
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TABLEOF CONTENTSExecutive Summary1O
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