global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESD. ONGOING EFFORTS AND PROPOSALS FORFUTURE CBMSNon-Proliferation and Disarmament De-alerting Initiative(United Nations). A joint working paper on de-alertingsubmitted by a dozen countries 113 (see attached forfull version) proposed that all nuclear weapons states –both within and outside the NPT – take steps (unilaterally,bilaterally, or multilaterally) toward de-alerting andprovide updates on actions taken toward the goal. Thejoint statement gave several reasons for urging states tode-alert including:• Demonstrating commitment to reduce the role of nuclearweapons in national security doctrines, and todisarmament;• Moving forward with commitments from the 2010NPT review conference (see below);• Reflecting post-Cold War tension reductions; and• Taking steps to lessen the risk of nuclear war. 114Recent P5 Commitments on De-Alerting. All permanentmembers of the U.N. Security Council – China, France,Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States – approvedthe 2010 NPT review conference’s action planwhich called upon them to “consider the legitimate interestof non-nuclear-weapon states in further reducingthe operational status of nuclear weapons systems in waysthat promote international stability and security” (Action5). 115The first P5 Conference on Confidence-Building Mea-sures towards Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferationwas held in London in 2009. It was followed bygatherings in July 2011 (Paris), June 2012 (Washington),April 2013 (Paris), April 2014 (Beijing), and February2015 (London). So far, the process has sidestepped theidea of pursuing multilateral nuclear arms reductions andde-alerting. Its modest agenda has:• Established a Chinese-led working group on anagreed glossary of key nuclear terms to be submittedto the 2015 NPT Review Conference;• Issued a pledge to renew efforts to promote a FissileMaterial Cut-off Treaty;• Committed to work toward the signature of Protocolto the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone;• Committed states to promote swift entry into forceof the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; and• Committed states to full implementation of the 1995Resolution on the Middle East for a Middle East NuclearWeapon Free Zone.Recent Non-Governmental Proposals for U.S./NATO/Russia Nuclear Weapons CBMs. The following list substantiallyoverlaps the recommendations of this report:• “Establish 100-mile exclusion zones for U.S. missiledefense deployments adjacent to Russian territory”; 116• Increase warning and decision time in the commandand control systems through de-alerting; 117• Data exchanges on nonstrategic nuclear warheads destroyedin the past 20 years; 118• Reciprocal visits to former naval and air force storagesites to ensure removal and tactical weapons are notavailable for quick re-deployment; 119113 Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, theNetherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United ArabEmirates.114 Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, “De-alerting jointworking paper,” submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the 2015Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, New York City, March 14, 2014.115 “Final Document,” adopted by 2010 Review Conference of theParties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NewYork, May 3-28, 2010, p. 2.116 “Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report,” May 2012,p. 11.117 Ibid.118 Deep Cuts Commission, “Preparing for Deep Cuts: Options forEnhancing Euro-Atlantic and International Security,” April 2014, http://www.deepcuts.org/files/pdf/First_Report_of_the_Deep_Cuts_Commission_English.pdf,p. 5.119 Ibid, p. 12. Also proposed in Global Zero NATO-Russia Commission66
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURES• Exchange declarations of intent of nuclear use includingemphasizing that a strong nuclear deterrent doesnot require the ability to retaliate immediately; 120• Exchange declarations on missile defense programsfor the next ten years; 121• Increase transparency on current locations, types andnumbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons; 122• Agreement to separate tactical nuclear weapons fromdelivery vehicles and keep them de-mated; 123 and• Agreement to remove tactical nuclear weapons fromcombat bases in Europe. 124In February 2014, a working group composed of 22NATO and Russian experts analyzed various transparencyconfidence-building measure proposals and rankedthem taking into account political, security, military/operationand practical considerations. 125Breakthrough (options with low implementation costsand significant added value):• None identified.Low-Hanging Fruit (options with relatively low costs andrelatively modest added value):• Formalized, recurring joint seminars on nuclear doctrinesand tactical nuclear weapons employment; and• Joint nuclear incident response “live” exercises (sim-Report, op.cit., pp. 2.120 Ibid, p. 16.121 Ibid, p. 18.122 Global Zero NATO-Russia Commission Report, op.cit., p. 2.123 Ibid.124 Ibid.125 Jacek Durkalec and Andrei Zagorski, “Options for Transparency andCBMs Related to Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Cost-BenefitMatrix,” presented at the Polish Institute for International Affairs (PISM)and Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the RussianAcademy of Sciences Workshop, Warsaw, Poland, July 2014, http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=17781, 19-43.ilar exercises exist between Russia and the UnitedStates).Challenging (options in which agreement would createdifficulties for either party, but are worth exploring ifthere would be robust political will by both sides):• Collaboration on developing verification techniques;• Exchanges of information on past and current numbers;• NATO reaffirmation of nuclear “three NOs” (“nointention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclearweapons on the territory of new members”);• U.S.-Russia reaffirmation of commitment to 1991Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (see earlier discussionof the informal reciprocal PNIs); and• Pledges on transparent modernization of tactical nuclearweapons.Dead Ends (options with excessively high implementationcosts in the next decade):• Exchange of information on all former tactical nuclearweapons storage facilities;• Notifications on movements of tactical nuclear weapons(limited notifications of movements included inNew START);• Removal of weapons from NATO-Russian borders;• Exchange of officers; and• Pledge not to modernize existing warheads or makenew delivery vehicles.South Asia – Lahore Declaration. On February 21, 1999,the prime ministers of India and Pakistan signed the LahoreDeclaration, a series of statements on a wide range ofbilateral relations, regional cooperation and other issuesof international concern. One of the agreements – theMemorandum of Understanding (MOU) by the ForeignSecretaries – emphasized measures to improve nuclearsecurity and prevent an accidental nuclear exchange.Both countries committed to exchange information onnuclear doctrines; prevent accidental nuclear crises; improvecontrol of nuclear weapons; review existing CBMs;work to make moratorium on nuclear testing binding;67
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TABLEOF CONTENTSExecutive Summary1O
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