global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESable requirements of deterrence. Almost 800 U.S. warheadswould remain at sea in eight Trident submarines(instead of the usual nine after removing the warheadsof the ninth boat under this initial de-alerting programaimed at a 20 percent reduction in overall alert forces).With so many survivable warheads, each capable of destroyingthe heart of a large city, the United States woulddeter any potential nuclear aggressor with any hold onrationality. At the same time, the U.S. and Russian dailyalert forces, particularly silo-based missiles, would beginto relinquish their day-to-day counterforce threat thatcurrently provides a dubious rationale for maintainingthe forces on prompt launch alert on both sides. The stepstaken to implement the Dvorkin proposal (the agreementto excise launch on warning from each sides planningand exercising) would reinforce and accelerate this shiftaway from prompt launch.A breakout on any scale by either side would not makestrategic sense because it would not alter the strategicbalance or compromise the survivability of each side’sforces. In any event, a breakout of any significant proportionscould be detected in a timely fashion and wouldallow each side ample time to re-alert and disperse additionalsubmarines and land-mobile rockets into moresurvivable positions. The rates of reconstitution areroughly the same on each side, and could be calibratedto be more equivalent, which would work to stabilize anycrisis re-alerting dynamics that may ensue.In the event of the first use of nuclear weapons againstthe nuclear forces and their infrastructure on either side,the rates of reconstitution would be slowed considerablyby the damage and by hazardous levels of radioactivefallout. This degradation, as well as any degradation sufferedfrom early strikes by conventional weapons, representsa much larger complication for Russian than forU.S. reconstitution, given Russia’s greater dependence onland-based strategic forces and given the far greater capabilitiesof U.S. conventional weapons. However, the netassessment of re-alerting stability under this quite modestoption of 20 percent de-alerting 20 is that it is high.The stability question becomes more relevant when forcesare deeply de-alerted and when arsenals are muchsmaller than today’s. At the point at which 80 or 100 percentof the strategic forces would be de-alerted, care mustbe taken to configure them to be robustly stable duringany re-alerting race that might ensue. Verification alsobecomes more important in order to prevent a cheaterfrom gaining a huge head start in re-alerting. And atthe lower numbers, the possibility of shifting coalitionsamong cliques of nuclear weapons countries, each possessingcomparable or equal numbers of weapons, raisesconcerns about the strong ganging up on the weak.Rigorous analyses show that even fully de-alerted bilateralforces, if the de-alerting is done properly and verifiably,can sustain stability. 106 A well-designed posture withinherently survivable forces (e.g., strategic submarines atsea) can nullify any advantage and incentive to re-alertand launch a preemptive or preventive attack. The optimalposture appears to be organized around “tiers” ofdifferent types of forces with varying re-alerting speeds.Whether this finding holds for a multipolar situationwith opportunities for forming coalitions remains anopen question. Further study is required.The optimal posture also presupposes a resilient nuclearcommand system that could survive a heavy attack anddirect surviving re-alerted nuclear forces to coherent nationalpurposes. A survivable force structure controlledby a vulnerable command system would not relieve thepressure on national leaders to make quick decisions. Asthe U.S. Joint Staff analysis points out:De-alerting forces does not necessarilyeliminate the need to make quick executiondecisions […] De-alerting extends launch106 See Bruce Blair, et al., “Smaller and Safer: A New Plan For NuclearPostures,” Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, September-October2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66540/bruce-blair-victor-esin-matthew-mckinzie-valery-yarynich-and-pav/smaller-and-safer; and Bruce Blair, et al., “One Hundred Nuclear Wars:Stable Deterrence between the United States and Russia at Reduced NuclearForce Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses,”Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, August 9, 2011, http://www.<strong>global</strong><strong>zero</strong>.org/files/bb_one_hundred_nuclear_wars_08.09.2011.pdf.60
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTUREStime, but does not reduce need to “launchon warning” since the C3 for launch executionbecome much less reliable after absorbinga first strike, i.e., there would stillbe strong pressures to get an execution orderout before impact and degradation ofthe C3I system (which may include “incapacitation”of the key decision makers authorizedto execute nuclear weapons). 107As the de-alerting drawdown deepens over the next decade,command and warning systems will have to be redesignedto allow for riding out an attack instead of merelylaunching on warning. The systems will need to be affordedfar better protection than they currently receive.To relieve pressures on national decision-makers to makequick execution decisions, they must have confidence inthe continuity of command-control while under attack.The pre-delegation of authority would partially instillsuch confidence, but this creates its own set of thornyproblems and thus represents a very suboptimal solution.C. DEGREE OF STABILITY/VERIFIABILITYMost of the major de-alerting options such as warheadand flight battery removal are amenable to monitoringusing space surveillance and other national technicalmeans supplemented by on-site inspections piggybackingon New START verification procedures. Some of theoptions such as “safing” and “de-targeting” do not lendthemselves easily to strict and timely verification andwould thus tend to fall into the category of confidencebuilding measures that thicken over time. Other optionsfall between these two stools. But it is fair to say that thestandard of “adequate verification” can be met with thiscollection of options. The considerable amount of timerequired to re-alert and the scale and visibility of reconstitutionfor the 170 de-alerted strategic warheads in thisproposal also ensures timely detection.107 Lt. Col. John Betts, unpublished paper and personal communications,op.cit.D. FOSTERING A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEARWEAPONSThis plan would mark an incremental but notable stepon the path to reducing the salience of nuclear weaponsin ways that promote their ultimate elimination. At theinitial stage of de-alerting, arsenals would still exceedthe threshold number estimated to cause mass socialdestruction and conduct traditional war-fighting operationsas well. However, this initial de-alerting, includingthe steps taken to eliminate launch on warning, wouldbegin to contest the standard assumption that deterrencedepends upon the capacity for large-scale instant retaliation.It would also begin to whittle away at the primacy ofcounterforce strategy in nuclear planning. In short, thisinitial program would represent a step toward nucleardisarmament and bring a world free of nuclear weaponscloser to the visible horizon.E. IMPACT ON TODAY’S RISK OF ACCIDENTAL/UNAUTHORIZED USE OR THEFTRemoving prompt and large-scale launch from the repertoireof war options would extend warning and decisiontime well beyond the timeframe realistically required tointerpret attack indications and resolve false alarms inearly warning systems. It would thus be a salutary movein reducing the risks of mistaken launch. The deprogrammingof large-scale orchestrated attacks would alsoreduce the capacity for sudden first-strike as well as exciselaunch on warning from the repertoire of responseoptions available to nuclear decision-makers. The technicalde-alerting steps taken in this realignment wouldphysically eliminate the hair-trigger on a portion of theforces and reduce somewhat the amount of damage thatan unauthorized or accidental launch could inflict, includingterrorist-abetted launches.The major weakness of this option is its limited effecton the untoward consequences of unauthorized actionswithin the strategic command system, particularly theconsequences of cyber warfare. The theoretical opportunitystill exists for state and non-state actors to target the61
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