global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESIran, to be scaled down by 10 to 50 percent. This downsizingcoupled with U.S.-Russian cooperation in this arena and confidence-buildingmeasures discussed below would reassure Russiathat its strategic missile force would not be put in jeopardy.This regional defensive strategy will be bolstered by advancedU.S. conventional arms whose accuracy of delivery allows themto reduce the role of nuclear weapons in covering the targetbase. The rapid increase in the lethality of conventional forcesachieved in recent years allows conventional forces to threatenthe destruction of very hard targets (including missile silosprotected up to 1,000 pounds per square inch. This technologicalprogress translates into the capability of using conventionalforces to cover increasing portions of the Iranian, North Korean,and Syrian target bases previously covered by nuclear forces. 136(Dug-in North Korean artillery batteries within range of Seoulremain largely invulnerable to U.S. and South Korean conventionalstrikes during the initial phase of a conflict.) A promptconventional assault on an adversary’s missile installations (e.g.,in Iran or North Korea) could severely degrade its capacity andease the work of U.S. missile defenses. For many such scenarios,U.S. conventional forces may well suffice to defeat a regionaladversary without needing to generate any U.S. nuclear forcesat all.The United States could further shift from an offensive nuclearstrategy to a dynamic defensive strategy and further reduceits reliance on nuclear weapons by investing more smartly andinnovatively in new non-nuclear alternatives. A more diverseportfolio of active and passive defenses (against missiles, cyberwarfare, and biological/chemical threats), non-nuclear offensivecapabilities (e.g., general purpose forces, conventional intercontinentalmissiles, cyber warfare), forward-deployed equipmentand supplies for U.S. and allied troops to converge to (as op-posed to maintaining a permanent forward presence), 137 andcoalition missile defenses on alert in region would help replenishthe President’s toolkit and thus expand his “decision space.”These additional tools would strengthen our ability to ward offaggression, adapt flexibly and with sufficient timeliness to diversethreats, control escalation in complex situations, and denytactical and strategic advantage to the adversary.The Defense Department should put priority on “early prevention”measures such as joint exercises demonstrating rapid deploymentto a given region and rapid mobilization in the regionusing prepositioned materiel. Other visible shows of coalitionforces, including U.S. forces dispatched to the region for jointexercises, also serve this deterrent function. Long-range bombersand naval ships are especially versatile for such purposes.The traditional set-piece deployments of large land armies andheavy armor are least versatile. (The last U.S. heavy armor unitin Europe recently left the theater and returned to the U.S.)As part of this shift to a dynamic defense strategy, the vast majorityof U.S. units will be based in the contiguous United Statesor U.S. territories. Small contingents of U.S. forces would bedeployed overseas to maintain aircraft and special operationsbases in close cooperation with host nation militaries to receiveand support U.S. troops rotating through and back in shows ofdefense solidarity, fulfillment of defense treaty commitments,and sundry exercises.Requirement for Small-Scale Deployment of ConventionalICBMs. A conventional-armed extended-range ICBM – somevariant of the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2 (HTV-2) –should be designed and developed to provide a one-hour <strong>global</strong>strike capability by 2022. 138 With a total of 20-50 such vehi-136 Regarding Russia and China, large-scale conflict with the UnitedStates is implausible. Theoretically, however, we estimate that U.S. conventionalforces could cover between 10 and 30 percent of an expansiveRussian target base previously covered by U.S. nuclear forces. If Russia’splanned $150 billion investment in “air-space defense” over the next 10years is productive then the target coverage figure would be lean towardthe lower end of the range. Concerning China, we estimate that U.S.conventional forces could cover between 30 and 50 percent of the Chinesetarget base s previously covered by U.S. nuclear forces. The Chinesetarget set is roughly one-half the size of the Russian target set.137 A good example is the Marine Corps’ Maritime PrepositioningForce program that keeps 55 heavy battle tanks forward positioned at alltimes on five maritime marine ships cruising the waters near potentialhotspots such as the Baltics.138 Russia started developing an HTV before the United States initiatedits program, and President Putin attaches high priority to the program.Both programs are making progress, and both face major challenges –achieving aerodynamic stability in the Russian case, and overcomingheat-shielding problems in the U.S. case. Russia recently experienced itssecond test failure of the developmental system.80
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTUREScles based in California, the Great Lakes region, and/or Alaska(co-located with missile defense bases), this ICBM would havethe down- and cross-range agility and reach to span continentsflying within the stratosphere and promptly hit virtually any targetaround the world (such as North Korean or Iranian missileinstallations) without overflying Russia or China. 139This program would not be designed or deployed against Russia.Although it would possess an ability to destroy very hardtargets including most Russian missile silos, the small numberof vehicles built and deployed (a maximum of 50) would allayRussian concern about their impact on Russia’s nuclear deterrentcapability. 140 Moreover, like missile defense interceptors, theUnited States would agree to count these vehicles on a one-foronebasis against any ceiling on nuclear arms that may be negotiatedin future.A conventional and versatile long-range ICBM would overcomethe drawbacks of other conventional delivery means – for instance,the range and speed constraints of Tomahawk IV missileson ships and submarines, and the strategic conventional(dual nuclear- and conventional-capable) bomber’s lack oftimeliness and in some cases difficulty of penetrating air defenses.Combined with other conventional forces and alert missiledefenses keyed to 24-72 hour effective operations, a versatilenon-nuclear ICBM force would enhance strategic stability andescalation control. It would provide a timely strike option to buytime for nuclear force generation and leadership deliberationif the conventional phase of the conflict did not end decisivelyin favor of the United States. It would also provide a means ofpromptly hitting terrorist targets anywhere on the globe, greatlyaugmenting existing Predator drone and other tools.J. DIPLOMACY AND OTHER “SOFT” POWERTOOLS139 Such a capability would require a downrange of 9,000 miles and across range of 3,000 miles.140 It appears realistic to achieve an accuracy of three meters with apayload of 1,000 lbs. We calculate that this performance translates intoroughly a 50 percent chance of destroying a missile silo hardened to1,000 lbs. per square inch. Fifty single-warhead HTVs would technicallypossess the capacity to destroy with high confidence only about 15missile silos.Diplomacy has offered an attractive and effective alternativeto fill the void when neither nuclear nor conventional optionspromise to be effective in neutralizing threats. In the examplegiven earlier of the Syrian chemical weapons threat, the “hard”options appear to be ineffective and they have other severedrawbacks. In contrast, U.S. and Russian diplomatic pressurehas so far worked to keep chemical weapons off the battlefield.An important lesson is that “soft” power tools and ad hoc coalitionsappear to be increasingly essential to expanding thePresident’s “decision space” in dealing with regional or <strong>global</strong>conflicts.Nuclear Arms Control. One of the key diplomatic tools is ofcourse formal negotiations to regulate nuclear and non-nucleararms. Regarding the former, the President remains committedto the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and seeks toset the world’s course to <strong>zero</strong> nuclear weapons by taking fourssteps: (i) negotiating further U.S.-Russian cuts to approximately900-1,500 total nuclear weapons on each side, (ii) reaching anexecutive agreement with Russia to eliminate launch-on-warningas an operational option on both sides and to de-alert U.S.and Russian nuclear forces across the board in a stable and verifiablemanner, (iii) establishing the first multilateral dialogue (a“nuclear weapons summit”) for all nuclear weapons countriesto present and critique proposals for eliminating nuclear weapons,and (iv) supporting multinational negotiations on a <strong>global</strong>de-alerting agreement that calls upon all the nuclear weaponscountries to refrain from placing nuclear forces on high alertstatus.Nuclear arms regulation must become comprehensive (coveringall types of nuclear weapons) and universal (involving allnations possessing them). The nearly half-century of arms negotiationswith the Russians has been an exclusively two-sidedaffair that has excluded China and the other nuclear-armednations. The major risks of nuclear weapons use, proliferation,and arms race instability in fact mostly lie outside the U.S.-Russianarena, particularly in Northeast and South Asia and in theMiddle East. Nuclear arms negotiations should therefore be extendedto China and others. It is therefore essential to begin amultilateral process that brings the rest of the nuclear-armedworld to the negotiating table to begin to cap, freeze, reduce,de-alert, and otherwise constrain these third-party nucleararms programs.81
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TABLEOF CONTENTSExecutive Summary1O
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