global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESwould be stood down immediately in conjunction with theinitial steps taken to remove launch on warning from bothside’s plans, exercises, and training. The rest of the strategicforces would be taken off of high alert status in stages overa period of ten years. A case can be made for acceleratingthe drawdown in view of risks that exist today, such as cyberwarfare, but, acceding to political realism, this <strong>commission</strong>proposes the following schedule of de-alerting of the currentforce of 800-900 high alert weapons on each side:• Within one year, 20 percent (approximately 170weapons on each side) of the current alert strategicforces would be stood down, leaving 680 on highalert on each side.• Within three years, 50 percent (425 weapons oneach side) would be off of alert, leaving 425 still onalert.• Within six years, 80 percent (680 weapons on eachside) would be off alert, leaving 170 on alert.• Within ten years, 100 percent (850 weapons on eachside) could be off alert if U.S.-Russian relations havereturned to normal and their security cooperationhas deepened.These bilateral steps have broader implications. By de-alerting,the nuclear superpowers would reduce the risk of a nuclearexchange that deposits radioactive fall-out far beyondU.S. and Russian borders. The worldwide environmentaland health consequences of the use of nuclear weaponscould be severe.By lengthening the fuses on their strategic nuclear forcesand submitting to verification inspections, the nuclear superpowerswould also set an example of responsible nuclearcustodianship for the rest of the world. The proposed precedentof early U.S.-Russian de-alerting, beginning within oneyear from the signing of an executive agreement by the presidentsof the United States and Russia should encourage theother nuclear weapons countries to follow suit. They wouldbe expected to refrain from elevating alert status while enteringinto a process involving all nuclear weapons countriesto achieve a comprehensive multilateral agreement thatverifiably constrains the attack readiness of all their nuclearforces. In accepting such obligations, unilaterally or by formalagreement, they would “lock in” the current low alertstatus of their nuclear forces and shelve any plans to raise it.This would arrest current trends toward rising alert levels inAsia and strengthen international security.In the view of this <strong>commission</strong>, North Korea is a specialcase. The Six Party Talks need to be reinvigorated by China,Russia and the United States in order to roll back North Korea’snuclear program and enforce its obligations under theNon-Proliferation Treaty, notwithstanding its proclaimedwithdrawal from the NPT.Under the terms of a multilateral de-alerting agreement, thenuclear postures of all other countries would be configuredand strictly regulated to minimize incentives to “break out.”The regimen would obviate the need to re-alert in a crisisby ensuring the robust survivability of retaliatory forces andpreventing any meaningful first-strike advantage from accruingto the fastest re-alerting force. Surreptitious re-alertingcould not succeed in trumping the opponent. Havingsubmitted to strict verification obligations, any significantre-alerting would be detected at an early stage and wouldnot confer advantage. An agreement would limit the scopeand timing of any re-alerting operation (e.g., for training,exercising, and in the event of a national security emergencythat justified it) and require pre-notification of re-alerting.Strategic stability would be strengthened by downsizing thearsenals as well as by de-alerting them. In the case of Russiaand the United States, robust stability would be achievedwhen the number of operationally deployed and highly survivablestrategic nuclear weapons declines to 200-300 totalon each side and when the attack readiness of these weaponsdeclines to 24-72 hours. (The New START agreement allowseach side 1,550 operationally deployed strategic weapons –the actual number is closer to 2,000 because each strategicbomber is counted as a single weapon even though it maycarry ten or more weapons – of which approximately 850weapons on average are poised for prompt launch today.)As previously mentioned, their reserve strategic weaponsand their tactical nuclear weapons should also remain off ofalert, as is done voluntarily today – and would be formallysubjected to verifiable constraints under a comprehensivemultilateral agreement. Counterforce first strikes could not10
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESbe even contemplated under these limitations.These U.S.-Russian ceilings on weapons and constraints onreadiness offer reasonable guidelines for limiting the forcestructure and alert postures of the other nuclear weaponscountries. Given the current modest size and low alert statusof the nuclear forces of China, France, United Kingdom,India, Pakistan, and Israel, and given projected levels oftheir stockpiles ten years from now at below 300 warheadsin all cases, their adoption of these U.S.-Russian limitationswould well align with their national security interests, strategies,modernization plans and operational requirements. 4Once agreed upon, these parameters for force size and alertstatus would pave the way for deep reductions in the U.S.and Russian stockpiles of reserve strategic weapons andsub-strategic (tactical) weapons. The road also would bepaved for multilateral negotiations seeking the phased, verifiedelimination of all nuclear weapons in the <strong>global</strong> stockpile.Deep de-alerting would so diminish the role of nuclearweapons in national security strategy that it would facilitatemuch deeper reductions in the nuclear stockpiles thanwould be possible otherwise. To start this ball rolling, thisreport urges the nuclear weapons countries to begin officialdiscussions on the elements of a comprehensive multilateralagreement on de-alerting. The report offers some guidelines.Further, this report examines the merits of and objections tode-alerting from the perspective of all of the nuclear weaponscountries as well as key non-nuclear countries that shelterunder the umbrella of extended deterrence. De-alertingis contextualized – related to each individual nation’s nationalsecurity interests, security strategy, and other broadconsiderations. Needless to say, these considerations do notalways converge, and yet the <strong>commission</strong> concludes thatthe individual and collective security of all countries wouldbenefit from the establishment of a de-alerting regime.In summary, the clock is ticking on the use of nuclear weap-4 The bandwidth of uncertainty surrounding unofficial open-sourceestimates of the size and alert status of arsenals is especially wide in thecases of China, India, Pakistan, and Israel.ons around the world. The countries that possess them donot enjoy a plethora of useful tools and options betweenlow-intensity conflict and nuclear escalation. We are witnessinga steady lowering of the nuclear threshold and anincreasing danger that the weapons will be used – deliberately,or as a result of inadvertent escalation, hasty decision-making,miscalculation, unauthorized acts, or captureand use by terrorists. That ticking clock is a <strong>global</strong> dangerthat requires greater international cooperation to de-fuse it.Disciples of nuclear deterrence theory argue that leadersought to behave very cautiously in the face of real risks oflosing control and in the face of apocalyptic threats to theirhomeland. But deterrence is a poor construct for reducingoperational risks. In fact, it is counterproductive in that deterrenceencourages the players to take operational risks toimpress and make credible their threats, even in peacetime.Its influence stems from taking and manipulating existentialrisk, especially during a crisis. Nuclear weapons thenbecome tools of coercive diplomacy, blackmail and other intimidationsthat go beyond basic deterrence into unchartedterritory. Waving the nuclear cudgel to frighten the opposingside into backing down is not an act of extreme caution– but is rather closer to its opposite. Such risky behavior hasbeen on display in past nuclear confrontations like the Cubanmissile crisis of 1962 and the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.Whatever leverage it conferred during the Cold War to resolvesuch disputes, today the risks outweigh the benefits.Yet today, many players have joined the game and are rollingthe dice. All are counting on a perpetually perfect run ofgood luck for their survival. By any objective reckoning, thisis tempting fate beyond reason. It smacks of a fool’s gamble.A much more dependable way to avoid nuclear weapons useis to lengthen the fuse on their nuclear postures. All nationswith nuclear forces should stand them down, take themoff of prompt launch alert, and reach a binding de-alertingagreement to refrain from putting nuclear weapons on highattack readiness. Deterrence would not suffer, but safety andsecurity would go way up.Progress on de-alerting will require governments to cooperatein framing a step-by-step process that is consistent withtheir national security interests and strategies. They will have11
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