global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTUREStive reflect its desire to prohibit the deployment of any weaponsin outer space, including conventional missile defense weapons,to require nuclear weapons to be located only on the territoryof their owners (this would only affect the 180 U.S. tacticalweapons in Europe), and to ratify a new treaty that would redressRussia’s overall conventional inferiority in the Europeantheater (this treaty, the Adapted Conventional Forces EuropeTreaty, was successfully negotiated but tripped up over the BalticNATO states’ refusal to ratify it until Russia withdraws itsforces from non-NATO Georgia/Abkhazia, leading Russia tosuspend its implementation of the treaty).Russia’s linkage of these contentious issues to future nucleararms control, including presumably any opening round ofbilateral or multilateral negotiations on de-alerting, reflectsRussia’s strong desire to broaden the security agenda and formnew <strong>global</strong> security architecture on the principal of equal securityfor all nations. This broadened agenda and architecturewould encompass much more than narrow military considerationsand in this respect economic ties and “soft” power couldsignificantly offset Russia’s technical military disadvantages.A more cooperative security relationship between Russia andEurope would open the door much wider for deep bilateralnuclear arms reductions. The model U.S. presidential guidancepresented later in this report seeks to find new ways to bridgethe divide.Unfortunately, the chasm is wider than ever. In light of theUkraine crisis and the estranged relations between Russiaand the West, such security cooperation has little pulse at themoment. In certain respects this state of affairs with its seriouspotential for further miscalculation and escalation gives allthe more reason to pursue confidence-building measures likede-alerting. The potential for the Ukraine crisis to escalate inadvertentlyand become unmanageable is steadily growing andneeds to be contained through urgent risk reduction measures.Russia has nothing to lose and much to gain from beginninga constructive dialogue on de-alerting – even if all the othersticking points are not immediately resolved. There is a growingrisk of nuclear inadvertence leading to the accidental, unauthorizedor mistaken use of nuclear weapons that could bereduced through de-alerting measures. Russia would becomemore secure. Russia would also demonstrate anew its commitmentto international norms and law. By taking de-alertingsteps that decrease the operational readiness of its nuclear forces,it would conform to the provisions of the NPT that Russiaitself approved during prior Review Conferences. Taking themodest initial steps outlined in this report would be roundlyapplauded by all or virtually all of the nations of the world.In this spirit, eminent Russian experts have advanced a boldproposal for de-alerting Russian strategic forces. These experts,who include several former senior Russian military officerswho are members of this <strong>commission</strong>, studied the U.S. de-alertingand force structure proposals contained in the model U.S.guidance spelled out later in this report, and formulated aRussian plan for reciprocal de-alerting (and force reductions)geared to the same timelines. They recommend a total weaponsceiling of 1,500 strategic and tactical weapons combined – a 70percent cut in the Russian arsenal – and endorse removing allremaining Russian strategic forces from launch-ready alert, onthe condition that multilateral talks on nuclear arms reductionsthat include China are initiated. According to these analysts,their plan would be fully consistent with Russian national securityinterests and strategy:Russia’s Nuclear Forces in 2022:Possible Force StructureTotal nuclear warheads 1,500of which:Strategic and in a state of reducedoperational readiness1,000Tactical and non-deployed 500Total deployed strategic warheads 500of which:On 270 ICBMs 270On 8 nuclear submarines with 128 SLBMs 140On 15 heavy bombers 90All strategic warheads in active reserve 500of which to be deployed:ICBMs 270Nuclear submarines 140Heavy bombers 9041