global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTUREStheir nuclear programs from sparking proliferation amongthreatened neighboring states in the regions, (ii) prevent Iranfrom acquiring a nuclear weapons capability – defined as thetechnical capacity to “break out” of its obligations and builda working weapon in less than one year – and ensure its fullcompliance with its obligations under the NPT, (iii) induceNorth Korea to relinquish its nuclear arsenal and rejoin theNPT in good standing, and (iv) prevent a nuclear conflict betweenthe United States or our allies and Iran or North Korea.The United States will mitigate the adverse effects of the Iranianand North Korean nuclear programs through arms salesand other military assistance to our friends and allies in theregions. Joint efforts with them to deploy effective missile defensesagainst existing and expected near- and medium-termmissile threats will continue to have high priority.In the event of nuclear conflict with North Korea, whichpossesses a small arsenal of nuclear explosive fission devices(10-12) and is developing means of their delivery, the UnitedStates will seek to minimize damage to the United States andour regional allies and defeat North Korea using all necessarymeans at our disposal.The President has conventional options bolstered by missiledefenses to suppress the nascent North Korean nuclear programand, in extremis, could resort to nuclear strikes to neutralizethis threat. U.S. nuclear forces will target the spectrumof North Korean nuclear forces, leadership, and war-supportingindustry in addition to selected bastions of conventionalforces that threaten Seoul.The President continues to need a nuclear option in light ofthe artillery threat to Seoul posed by North Korean units duginto the mountains to the north. The terrain provides a naturalfortress that protects these units from conventional attack.The U.S. and South Korea possess conventional superiorityover the North and could suppress the North’s artillery overtime, but currently lack the capability to quickly suppress abarrage of thousands of shells trained on the South Koreancapital.Nuclear weapons could quickly suppress the barrage but theclose proximity of the explosions and radioactive fall-out toU.S.-South Korean forces and South Korean population (ifnot evacuated from Seoul) and Japanese population rendersthe option extremely undesirable.The United States therefore will seek to substantially strengthenits capabilities for timely non-nuclear counterforce strikesagainst North Korean conventional as well as nuclear threats.The President directs the Defense Department to develop effectivenon-nuclear options – active and passive defenses aswell as conventional offenses – that would minimize the damagethat could be inflicted by North Korea in wartime andpreclude the need to employ U.S. nuclear weapons.U.S. nuclear strategy toward Iran focuses on preventing Iranfrom acquiring a nuclear weapons capability through diplomacy,prohibition of nuclear materials trade, economic sanctions,sabotage and other covert action (e.g. cyber warfare)against its nuclear infrastructure.If Iran breaks out and approaches the threshold of acquiringa nuclear weapons capability that could become operationalon short notice (months or less), the President musthave an effective missile defense option to intercept Iranianmissiles. The President must also have a conventional optionto severely damage its nuclear capability in a timely fashionand moreover to detect and inflict further severe damage onfuture reconstituted Iranian nuclear weapons infrastructureand delivery platforms.If Iran would manage to successfully break out a deliverablenuclear arsenal and a nuclear conflict ensues, U.S. nuclearforces will be prepared to selectively target Iranian nucleardeployments and infrastructure. If the President elects to executethis option, its aim will be to neutralize Iran’s nuclearprogram and forces and coerce Iran to yield to terms of conflicttermination that are in the national security interests ofthe United States and our allies in the region.U.S. nuclear forces will also hold Iranian leadership andwar-supporting industry at risk. However, the close proximityof nuclear explosions and radioactive fall-out to Israel andother friends in the region makes it imperative that any nuclearstrikes against Iran would be kept as limited as possible.74
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESRegarding Syria, our goal is a peaceful transition of power.The raging civil war poses an imminent multipronged risk,including the possibility that Syria did not turn over its entirestockpile of chemical weapons and has hidden a cache ofthem for rainy day use. Such a cache could be broken out andunleashed by Syrian troops on short notice against the oppositionrebels or against neighboring states (e.g., Turkey) if thecivil war spills across borders and escalates into internationalconflict. Or, if such hidden chemical weapons exist, theycould be seized by rebels and fall into the hands of terroristfactions that may use them against their sworn enemies (e.g.,Israel).Although nuclear weapons could destroy these weapons attheir central storage facilities or field deployment locations,the United States will no longer plan for such contingencies.Nor will U.S. nuclear forces continue to target Syrian leadershipfacilities or military and war-supporting industry. Inlight of the chaos in Syria, and the successful elimination ofthe vast bulk of its chemical weapons by the international taskforce led by the United States and Russia, the United Stateswill drop Syria from its nuclear war plans and seek to developviable conventional alternatives.E. OTHER NUCLEAR-ARMED STATESThe immediate priority of U.S. nuclear policy toward France,India, Israel, Pakistan, France and the United Kingdom – allallies or friends of the United States – is to bring them alongwith Russia, China and the United States to the negotiating tableto begin multilateral talks leading to equitable reductions andeventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, and to an agreementto refrain from putting nuclear forces on high alert. TheUnited States will also strongly encourage India and Pakistan topursue additional bilateral confidence-building measures suchas pre-notification of nuclear exercises and missile tests.Another high priority is to provide assistance, if requested bytheir national command authorities, in strengthening the securityand safety of India and Pakistan’s arsenals. Technicalassistance will be provided if so requested during peacetimeor in the event of domestic emergencies that compromise securityand render nuclear weapons vulnerable to capture. TheUnited States will be prepared to intervene if so requested inorder to prevent “loose nukes” from falling into the hands ofunauthorized parties.F. NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE ANDSTRUCTURE: 2015-2022Strategic stability is the paramount aim of the U.S. nuclear forceposture and structure. A balance of U.S. and Russian nuclearforces “sized” for stability creates room for phased reductionson the path toward <strong>global</strong> <strong>zero</strong>. Stockpile size per se is a lesserconsideration. Priority must always be given to alleviating theconditions that could trigger and escalate a nuclear conflict.Stability is achieved by (i) minimizing vulnerabilities in commandsystems and forces that may create incentives or pressuresfor early release (war plan execution) and escalation, (ii)maximizing the time allowed for nuclear decision-making,and (ii) minimizing deficiencies that create risks of mistaken,accidental, or unauthorized launch or theft.The current U.S. and Russian nuclear force postures and structuresare ill configured for avoiding dynamic instability in acrisis. They both are geared to rapid force generation and tolaunch on warning – and need to be re-designed to removethese pre-dispositions. This bolstering of stability would provideconfidence in seeking further reductions in their arsenals.To strengthen strategic stability, the guidance below will be followedin shaping the nuclear posture and force structure overthe next decade (2015-2022).The President alone possesses the authority to order the executionof U.S. nuclear attack plans. Nuclear release authoritywill not be pre-delegated to military commanders under normalpeacetime circumstances. At the President’s sole discretionbased on authority vested in the Commander-in-Chief bythe U.S. Constitution, special provisions for delegating nuclearauthority may be arranged under crisis or wartime circumstances,or if relations between the United States and Russiadeteriorate to the point of becoming predominantly adversarialand strategic intelligence and warning raise the level ofnuclear threat.75
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