global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESor perceived “use or lose” vulnerabilities that lower it on theother side. The overall effect of such crosscutting technologieson nuclear stability defies calculation, but once again aconservative view is that such unpredictability suggests increasedrisk.Its get even more complicated. Disruptive technologies canhave very complex effects on arms competition and crisisinteractions. Again, consider U.S. missile defenses as an introductorymove in an action-reaction sequence. If Chinaregards the defenses in Asia as a threat to its second-strikenuclear deterrent, or to its non-nuclear missiles forces arrayedagainst Taiwan, then China could be strongly motivatedto develop anti-satellite weapons capable of neutralizingthe U.S. early-warning infrared surveillance satellites ingeosynchronous orbit designed to detect the hot plume ofmissiles during their boost phase of launch. Such satellitescould play an important role in cueing U.S. ballistic missileinterceptors. Such a Chinese anti-satellite capability couldhelp relieve pressure on Chinese decision-makers to mounta preemptive nuclear strike meant to overwhelm the U.S.defenses. An effective Chinese anti-satellite weapon, particularlyone armed with a conventional warhead, would offera credible strategic alternative to a Chinese nuclear offensive,and could thus work to delay a nuclear decision. Nuclearrisk is lower at this stage in the interaction.But while a conventional anti-satellite capability would workto raise the nuclear threshold for Chinese decision-makers,the program would motivate the United States to developnew disruptive technologies to suppress Chinese anti-satelliteweapons on their launch pads. One such technologywould be a hypersonic glide vehicle armed with a conventionalwarhead and capable of reaching and destroying aChinese launch site soon (within one hour) after detectingChinese preparations to loft its anti-satellite weapon intospace. Absent the availability of such a U.S. hypersonic system(the situation today), the United States might assignGuam-based B-2 stealth bombers armed with conventionalweapons to strike Chinese launch pads, but rapid Chineseadvances in air defenses (disruptive!) have presumably compromisedthe B-2’s chances of penetrating these defenses,possibly to the point that U.S. confidence in this mission hasgreatly declined. As a result, the United States currently dependson U.S. offensive ballistic missiles armed with nuclearwarheads for an option to destroy promptly (within onehour after launch) Chinese launch pads before anti-satelliteweapons can lift off. Nuclear risk rises at this stage.In this scenario, the combination of disruptive systems onboth sides has the effect of raising the nuclear thresholdfor Chinese decision-makers, but lowering it for U.S. decision-makers.The situation is unstable and also fraught withpossibilities for unintended consequences. For instance, ifa Chinese anti-satellite weapon demolished the U.S. early-warningsatellite parked over the Indian Ocean in geosynchronousorbit, then the United States would lose the keysatellite used to monitor Russian as well as Chinese nuclearmissile launches. Blinded in one eye, the United Stateswould depend almost entirely upon ground radar for missileattack early warning (as Russia does today). And given U.S.reliance on launch-on-warning (see discussion below), therisks of mistaken launch on false warning would thereforeincrease. Cyber attack on the early warning system couldfurther degrade its performance and exacerbate the problemof inadvertent nuclear launch.A grasp of these synergies in geopolitical context is essentialin order to develop new tools that actually strengthenrather than undermine crisis stability, reduce nuclear risk,and reinforce rather than undercut the utility of de-alertingmeasures.VI. ESCALATION: SPECIFIC RISK FACTORS AMONGTHE WORLD’S NUCLEAR POSTURES 12The specter of an unmanageable crisis escalating to nucleardimensions also stems from a host of specific risk factorsassociated with the nuclear postures of the many countriesthat possess and operate nuclear forces. This <strong>commission</strong>concludes, once again, that these risks are trending in thewrong direction. Of particular concern is a trend towardfast-reaction postures – the bane of nuclear crisis management.Paradoxically, nuclear weapons are becoming more12 This section draws heavily upon the nuclear program descriptions foreach country found in the appendix.20