global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESThere might be no better formula for progresstoward a nuclear-free zone in the Middle Eastthan a return to a concept in which two paralleltracks move toward a comprehensive Israeli-Arabpeace, along the lines of the Arab PeaceInitiative, and to the establishment of a zonefree of weapons of mass destruction in the region.To work, the Arabs must accord to Israelkey benefits of peace before peace has been formallyachieved. Israel, for its part, must recommitto the doctrine of former Israeli Prime MinisterYitzhak Rabin that only a comprehensiveregional peace agreement can prevent the MiddleEast from declining into nuclear chaos. 85Progress toward peace in Syria, a settlement with the Palestinians,and normalization of Israeli relations with all its Arabneighbors could accelerate the nuclear disarmament process inthe region. It would be conducive to arms control if Israel’s relationswith its neighbors do not drastically deteriorate in thewake of the upheaval sweeping the region. But even adversariescan find common interest and mutual benefit in arms control,as the Cold War adversaries discovered 40 years ago. If the Sovietsand Americans had insisted upon sequencing peace andnuclear arms control talks instead of pursuing both in tandem,little progress on either track may have been made.Containing Iran’s nuclear program remains a crucial objectivethat is not only key to Israeli and pan-Arab security but also todiminishing Israel’s attachment to the nuclear option. It is alsothe key to saving the <strong>global</strong> non-proliferation regime. If Iran’snuclear ambitions can be verifiably repressed, either by dint ofthe mounting pressures being applied today by the internationalcommunity or in the future by a broader regional agreementthat bans all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East –and if Iran’s compliance with its non-proliferation pledge couldand would be stringently enforced – then Israel’s national securityinterest would be well served by proceeding to downgradethe importance of its nuclear option, notwithstanding the with-85 Shlomo Ben-Ami, “Global Zero Requires Peace in the Middle East,”The Moscow Times, Sept 8, 2011, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/authors/shlomo-ben-ami/382455.html.drawal pangs experienced by some. Regional security for Arabstates would be strengthened, and the <strong>global</strong> system in place tostop the spread of nuclear weapons would be saved from collapse.In this context, an Israeli commitment to a <strong>global</strong> multilateralde-alerting regime would make sense.G. KEY NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNTRIESThe major question to address here is extended deterrence.Would U.S. de-alerting undermine the confidence of allieswho shelter under the American nuclear umbrella? Wouldthey oppose U.S. de-alerting, even if Russia and other nuclearweapons countries also de-alerted? What compensatorysteps would need to be taken to restore lost confidence?This <strong>commission</strong>, composed of many leaders from the keynon-nuclear weapons countries, raised no major objectionsto de-alerting to be backed by non-nuclear defense to offsetconceivable risks, and indeed endorse the report’s recommendations.Of particular importance to these countriesis increased transparency. Japan and other countries seekclarity on China’s nuclear forces and strategy, and redoubledefforts to ensure the denuclearization of North Korea.IX. A U.S.-RUSSIA EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT TODE-ALERT NUCLEAR FORCESThis model presidential directive lays the groundwork forpursuing a de-alerting agreement with Russia, and a separatemultilateral agreement with the other nuclear weaponscountries. This section focuses on the bilateral agenda.A. KEY PRECEDENTS FOR DE-ALERTINGA bold precedent was set by President George H. W. Bush at theend of September 1991, when the Soviet Union began to crumblein the wake of the August coup attempt. U.S. officials worriedthat Soviet control over its far-flung nuclear arsenal, muchof it residing in Eastern European nations and Soviet republicsthat were declaring independence from the imploding Sovietempire, might break down and result in the unauthorizeduse of Soviet weapons – perhaps even an unauthorized launchof strategic forces against the U.S. homeland. President Bush50
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESordered an immediate stand-down of U.S. strategic bombersthat for decades had stood ready for takeoff within 15 minutes.Their nuclear weapons were unloaded and placed in storage attheir bases. In addition, he took off alert a large number of landandsea-based strategic missiles slated for elimination underSTART I – 450 Minuteman II missiles along with the missilesin ten Poseidon submarines. These measures, removing about3,000 strategic warheads from high alert, were implemented ina matter of days. (The warheads were de-mated later.)President Mikhail Gorbachev followed suit a week later by orderingthe deactivation of more than 500 land-based rockets and sixstrategic submarines, promising to keep strategic bombers at alow level of readiness, and consigning Russia’s rail-based missilesto their home garrisons. These reciprocal steps would eventuallyentail removing about 2,000 strategic warheads from high alert.In subsequent months, both countries also withdrew manythousands of shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons deployedwith their far-flung armies and surface navies and placed theseweapons in storage depots on their home territories.A second, less noteworthy precedent occurred a few years later.Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin pledged in 1994 to stop aimingstrategic missiles at each other’s country. The guidance computerson U.S. land-based missiles were oriented to ocean areas inthe far northern latitudes, 86 and Russia switched its land-basedrockets to a “<strong>zero</strong> flight plan.” These adjustments of the primarytarget settings, though a welcome symbolic gesture, can bereversed in seconds and had negligible significance in terms oflaunch readiness. 87 A Russian missile fired by accident auto-86 Cleverly, U.S. targeteers programmed these ocean aim points to lie onthe direct path to the missiles’ wartime targets so that a slight adjustmentto the elevation angle of the missiles during lift-off would send them ontheir wartime trajectories – similar to pointing a hose at a near verticalangle and then lowering it for distance.87 Preprogrammed wartime target coordinates remained in the computermemories of the missiles, and missile commanders could activatethese target files within seconds. In other words, the Clinton-Yeltsin“de-targeting” agreement could and can still be reversed by either side inseconds. Selecting targets in this fashion is in fact a standard procedurefor launching missiles in wartime – and hence the accord did notextend the launch preparation time by even a single solitary second. Inthe United States, local launch crews in the missile fields perform thismatically switches over to its primary wartime target.B. EXTANT AND PROPOSEDCONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURESRecognizing the dangers inhering in the Cold War nuclearstandoff, the Soviets and Americans hammered out a spate ofconfidence-building measures (CBMs) to regulate and stabilizeoperational interactions between them. They were meant, byand large, to reduce the risk of misunderstandings that couldresult in the inadvertent or mistaken launch of strategic weaponsand escalation to an all-out nuclear exchange.A small number of significant post-Cold War measures werealso established. The most recent efforts, in particular theBudapest Memorandum and the Founding Act – the formerde-nuclearizing Ukraine in exchange for commitments fromRussia, the United Kingdom and the United States to respectUkraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the latterdeepening U.S.-NATO-Russian cooperation in the nuclearsphere – have proven less than confidence-inspiring in viewof the recent Ukrainian developments. Russia’s annexation ofCrimea and active military support for the Ukrainian separatistrebellion, and the West’s deepening involvement in Ukraineand in Central European defenses have worked to upend theBudapest Memorandum as well as NATO-Russian cooperationin nuclear affairs.standard procedure in accordance with the target plan designated bytheir launch orders. In the case of Russia, the local crews can performthe procedure or the General Staff, from their wartime command bunkersin the Moscow vicinity, can use a computer network to re-aim alltheir silo-based missiles at wartime targets in ten seconds. In fact, if theGeneral Staff transmits a launch order directly to the missiles in a modecalled “automatic regime,” then the missiles automatically switch overto their primary wartime target. For detailed discussions of all aspectsof “de-targeting,” see Bruce Blair, “Where Would All the Missiles Go?”Washington Post, October 15, 1996, p. A15; Bruce Blair, Global ZeroAlert for Nuclear Forces (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995); and BruceBlair, “Testimony on Russian Nuclear Policy and the Status of De-targetingbefore the House Committee on National Security’s Committeeon Military Research and Development,” March 13, 1997. An excellentRussian reference is Col. (Ret.) Valery Yarynich, C3: Nuclear Command,Control Cooperation, Center for Defense Information, May 2003.51
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