global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESIt would be extremely beneficial if continuing reductions inthe U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals encourage China andthe other nuclear weapons countries, including those outsidethe NPT (India, Israel, and Pakistan) to participate in a nuclearweapons summit to discuss multilateral force reductions andde-alerting. There are reasons to believe that China and someothers would in fact join such a forum, particularly one devotedto framing a multilateral de-alerting agreement.There exists some internal interests in these countries that opposeentering into a nuclear disarmament process, and somepossibility that continuing U.S.-Russian reductions, especiallydeep cuts, would stimulate China or other countries to “rushto parity” with the United States. The prevailing view, however,is that China does not seek such equivalency. (According torecent Senate testimony by General C. Robert Kehler, “I do notsee, nor has the intelligence community reported to me thatthey are seeking to have some kind of numeric parity with theUnited States or with Russia.”) 141 China’s current small arsenalof approximately 150 total nuclear weapons reflects China’straditional policy of “minimal deterrence,” which harks backto Mao Zedong’s guidance a half century ago to deploy only asmall nuclear arsenal. The Chinese military has adhered strictlyto this time-honored doctrine. Its arsenal is projected to growto perhaps 200-250 total weapons over the next ten years, andno more than 250-300 in the worst case. A much larger effortto “rush to parity” with the United States appears to be veryunlikely. In any event, such an effort would take many years,would be detectable, and would allow the United States to tailoror curtail further U.S. reductions as needed.Based upon these considerations, the President will seek theRussian President’s cooperation in laying out a basic proposalto the other nuclear weapons states, as follows. They will proposethat the United States and Russia negotiate deep bilateralcuts to 900-1,500 total weapons (strategic, nonstrategic, and reserve)– a 70-80% reduction from current levels – which will befully implemented on the condition that the other nuclear powersagree to (i) cap their arsenals at 300 total nuclear weaponsand (ii) begin consultations to enter into multilateral talks to141 Gen. Kehler, Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee,March 12, 2013, op.cit.proportionately reduce their arsenals in the future (the reductionsacross the board, realistically, would not happen beforeapproximately 2022).The proposed ceiling of 300 is France’s current stockpile sizebut it is significantly higher than any other nation (the UnitedStates and Russia aside) and is the upper-end of the stockpileprojections for Pakistan and China over the next 10 years. Thusall parties can comfortably agree to this cap whether or not theyagree to join multilateral talks for reducing their arsenals.Accordingly, the President will invite Russia to join together inpitching the P-5 countries to join multilateral talks and then enlistbroader participation by the other nuclear weapons countries.The United States will indicate its intention to deploy thelower end of the range (900) if that flexibility can be leveragedinto commitments from others to cap their arsenals at 300, jointhe multilateral talks, and/or agree to proportional reductions(40% in the U.S. case if 900 down from 1,500).U.S.-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation. The beginning of anew round of bilateral nuclear arms negotiations has stalled inpart because of Russia’s concern that the United States may acquirethe capability to negate its strategic nuclear missile forcethrough a combination of U.S. swords and shields. Russia isespecially apprehensive about the later phases of U.S. missiledefenses ten or more years down the road. Russia has soughta formal guarantee from the United States that missile defenseswill not be aimed at Russia and will not undermine Russia’sstrategic deterrent forces. The United States has not met thisdemand nor otherwise satisfied Russia’s need for assurances. Asa result, Russia worries that the U.S. program will evolve intoincreasingly threatening variants (including space-based strikesystems) that become more difficult for Russia to offset withinexpensive countermeasures.To a large extent, Russian discomfort with U.S. missile defensesstems from a generalized fear of U.S. technological prowess andfrom the uncertainty and unpredictability surrounding the U.S.program. (Its programmatic elements are rather uncertain toAmericans as well since they are works in progress.) There arealso domestic political and economic reasons behind Russiancomplaints that the United States is bent on negating Russia’sstrategic deterrent – complaints that are exploitable for domesticpolitical gain by politicians and for economic gain by the82