global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESal de-alerting negotiations are that they be universal andnon-discriminatory. India expresses little interest in regionalnuclear agreements or in bilateral nuclear arms controlwith Pakistan (beyond the nuclear confidence-buildingmeasures with Pakistan that have been successfully established).It would value and seek a <strong>global</strong> pact that equitablyverifiably de-alerts all nuclear weapons in all countries. India’sposition thus aligns perfectly with this proposal for amultilateral process leading to a <strong>global</strong> de-alerting compact.India would certainly join a serious effort led by the UnitedStates and Russia to begin a process as long as China andPakistan participated. India, unlike China, has not madeU.S.-Russian deep bilateral cuts a precondition of its participationin nuclear arms negotiations. India instead emphasizesthe importance of all nuclear-armed nations adoptingthe principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons as a sign oftheir commitment to their elimination. Universal de-alertingwould mark a true step in the direction of no-first-use –and thus India should not only embrace such an agenda butalso consider leading it.The main sticking points are the Pakistani desire for additionalIndian security assurances to Pakistan, thereby enablingPakistan to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons tocompensate for India’s conventional superiority, and India’sdesire for a complete end to terrorism against India carriedout by Pakistani-based jihadists, thereby relieving India ofits need for counter-terrorism conventional forces that, whiledefensive in purpose, project an offensive cross-border capability.Although the two countries have improved relationssignificantly despite their longstanding border dispute andKashmir-related terrorism, both will need to cooperate insolving this conundrum. The prospects that both India andPakistan would join multilateral de-alerting negotiations andaccept binding constraints on their nuclear postures dependsignificantly on the depth of their future cooperation.F. ISRAELIsrael’s active participation in multilateral negotiations for a nuclearde-alerting agreement seems extremely doubtful in lightof the nation’s commitment to a policy of opacity by which itsnuclear status is undeclared and uncertain. However, Israelwould consider an agreement that constrains the attack readinessof the other nuclear countries to be consonant with Israel’snational security interest. Therefore Israel should, at minimum,lend tacit support to the process. Israel might go further andsign an agreement and submit it to the Knesset for ratification,as it is doing in the case of the CTBT. Much depends upon theverification requirements. Intrusive monitoring of the alert statusof nuclear forces would be inconsistent with Israel’s policyof opacity. But that policy might change over time, especially ifde-alerting gains widespread international support among nuclearand non-nuclear countries alike.Israel is widely assumed to possess a stockpile of nuclear weaponskept on low-alert status under normal conditions as wellas stocks of weapons-grade fissile material. Unofficial sourcesestimate the former to range upwards of 80-120 weapons andthe latter to be equivalent to 100-200 nuclear devices. Their rolein Israeli security policy has long been receding, and could conceivablydisappear if the Iranian nuclear program is rolled backand further proliferation in the Middle East does not occur.Israel’s security today depends far less on nuclear weaponsthan it did in 1967, when it reportedly acquired its first device,and surely much less than when Prime Minister Ben Gurionconceived the idea of the bomb in the 1950s. In those previouseras, Israel faced Arab states that denied its right to exist andpursued the point on the battlefield. Fearing the creation of apan-Arab (conventional) war coalition against Israel and theinability of the small Israeli army to cope with large land armiesand air forces, Prime Minister Gurion viewed the bomb as apowerful counterweight, an ultimate insurance policy againstan existential threat, and a last resort means of deterring or defeatingArab aggression.This rationale is no longer compelling. Israel now possesses sophisticatedconventional capabilities that far surpass those of itspotential adversaries, individually or in coalition. Indeed, Israelhas become the region’s conventional military powerhouse.Israeli conventional forces are more than adequate to handlecurrent and foreseeable non-nuclear high-end threats to Israel’sexistence. Their capabilities for handling lesser threats – urban-and-guerrillawarfare, intifadas, mortar and rocket attackslaunched from Palestinian lands, terrorism and other asymmetricalthreats – are considerably less, but of course nuclear48
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESweapons play no role in these kinds of contingencies. 84 Thesame holds true for chemical and biological weapons threats,which arguably pose less than existential threats to Israel andcannot be removed by Israeli resort to nuclear arms. Furthermore,the old coalitions against Israeli have broken up. Israelhas made (cold) peace with two key former Arab foes – Egyptand Jordan – and no Arab state (apart from Hamas) denies Israel’sright to exist or openly seeks to destroy it.The raison d’être for Israel possessing a nuclear arsenal todayis thus significantly narrower than previously: to deter otherregional nuclear powers, presently consisting only of Iran’s potentialnuclear threat which, if not suppressed, could drive otherArab states to acquire the bomb. The Israeli nuclear option,even though lacking a well-defined military rationale today,can thus provide a hedge against an uncertain future. It is a securityblanket for a Holocaust-stricken nation and a leadershipliving in a hostile environment.Israeli leaders have generally eschewed <strong>global</strong> approaches tonuclear arms regulation (to wit, the NPT in particular) in favorof approaches that emphasize regional relations. Israel deeplydistrusts the efficacy of <strong>global</strong> approaches. It witnessed numerousinstances of cheating on the NPT by Iran, Iraq, Libyaand Syria, successful evasion of verification mechanisms, andlackluster enforcement. “Enforcement” defaulted to Israel on anumber of occasions, which it carried out unilaterally with militaryforce – notably, the aerial bombing of clandestine nuclearreactors under construction in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007).Despite Israel’s skepticism toward <strong>global</strong> approaches, a multilateralprocess aimed at regulating nuclear postures throughphased, verifiable de-alerting would serve Israel’s security interestin a number of ways. First, a <strong>global</strong> de-alerting agreementwould reinforce international commitments to stymie proliferationin the Middle East. Non-nuclear as well as nuclear weaponscountries would be more motivated to prevent the emergenceof new nuclear weapons threats and would try harder toestablish an enforcement regime that cannot be circumvented.Second, an international norm that restricts combat readiness84 An Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement is essential to overcome thedifficulties of defending Israeli borders against these threats. [EphraimSneh, “Bad Borders, Good Neighbors,” The New York Times, July 10,2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/11/opinion/11Sneh.html.]would diminish the utility of a nuclear weapons program inthe eyes of nations contemplating starting one. Third, the alternativeto establishing efficacious regulation of nuclear armsis to either try to destroy the incipient nuclear programs of itsneighbors in preemptive strikes, sabotage and other aggressivemeans, or to rely on nuclear deterrence – a psychological constructof unproven efficacy in the region. The former is an unsustainablepolicy over the long run and the latter’s reliability isquestionable, especially in a hydra-headed nuclear neighborhoodthat the Middle East could become. And fourth, althoughIsrael’s major adversaries reside in the region, its support fora multilateral nondiscriminatory de-alerting agreement thatreceives virtually universal support around the world wouldbring Israel into the mainstream of the nuclear playing field, onan equal footing with all the players.These interests may or may not overcome well-known obstacles.Reaching agreement to regulate nuclear postures in theregion faces the perennial arguments about the proper sequencingof the disarmament process and the peace process.The main players – Israel, key Arab states, Iran, and the UnitedStates – all take a different stance on whether peace or disarmamentcomes first. Israel has long insisted that a comprehensivepeace settlement (an Arab-Israeli peace and full recognition ofIsrael with normal relations with all its neighbors) must precedenuclear disarmament. The Arab position has long arguedthe opposite – disarmament leading to a nuclear-free MiddleEast must come before peace (defined as complete Israeli withdrawalfrom occupied Arab lands and the establishment of aPalestinian state). Iran’s position ostensibly endorses disarmamentnegotiations without preconditions, but in reality Iranwill require a security guarantee in some form before giving upfinally on its own nuclear option. The United States (along withmuch of the rest of the world) demands that peace comes firstin Israel’s case, and that disarmament comes first in Iran’s case.In view of the rising nuclear dangers in the region and the littletime remaining to rein in Iran and stop the tide of proliferation,it seems clear that the key players need to intensify their effortsto advance both the peace and disarmament talks, and to seekprogress on both tracks in parallel rather than sequentially. Inthe words of former Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, whoseadvice equally applies to the more modest goal of regulatingalert status:49
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