GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURES• Within three years, 50 percent (425 weap<strong>on</strong>s<strong>on</strong> each side) would be off of alert,leaving 425 still <strong>on</strong> alert.• Within six years, 80 percent (680 weap<strong>on</strong>s<strong>on</strong> each side) would be off alert, leaving170 <strong>on</strong> alert.• Within ten years, 100 percent (850 weap<strong>on</strong>s<strong>on</strong> each side) could be off alert ifU.S.-Russian relati<strong>on</strong>s have returned t<strong>on</strong>ormal and their security cooperati<strong>on</strong> hasdeepened.12. Form a joint working group to (i) assess the staticpeacetime and crisis re-alerting stability of alternativec<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong>s of de-alerted forces in order todesign optimally stable postures (which appear to beorganized around “tiers” of different types of forceswith varying re-alerting speeds), (ii) exchange informati<strong>on</strong>that explains the physical de-alerting opti<strong>on</strong>sunder c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong>, (iii) estimate time required tore-alert, (iv) propose the arrangements for verifyingthe de-alerting, and (v) dem<strong>on</strong>strate the end-to-endprocedures of de-alerting and verificati<strong>on</strong>. Their expertsshould work together to design, test, dem<strong>on</strong>strate,and validate de-alerting methods and associatedverificati<strong>on</strong> procedures. As part of this jointundertaking, they should compare and share assessmentsof the <strong>risk</strong>s posed by their current strategicpostures, including the <strong>risk</strong>s to the integrity of <strong>nuclear</strong>command, c<strong>on</strong>trol, communicati<strong>on</strong>s and earlywarning networks posed by cyber warfare. Theyshould jointly assess the <strong>nuclear</strong> programs of othercountries, the <strong>risk</strong>s they carry, and remedies includingc<strong>on</strong>fidence-building measures and de-alerting.60 warheads, and ten Topol-M SS-27 missiles with<strong>on</strong>e warhead each, or ten warheads), two regimentsof land-based mobile rockets (18 Topol M missileswith <strong>on</strong>e warhead each, or 18 warheads), and <strong>on</strong>eDelta IV strategic submarine (16 missiles with 4 warheadseach, or 64 warheads).14. Determine and declare the physical de-alerting stepsthat will be taken at the initial stage of the drawdownschedule. An illustrative set of measures supportedby this <str<strong>on</strong>g>commissi<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g> is given below al<strong>on</strong>g with estimatesof the time required to re-alert (see next page):13. Thereup<strong>on</strong> determine and declare the compositi<strong>on</strong>of the de-alerted forces. An illustrative initial c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong>supported by this <str<strong>on</strong>g>commissi<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g> is the following:The U.S. would stand down <strong>on</strong>e Minutemansquadr<strong>on</strong> (50 missiles with <strong>on</strong>e warhead each, or 50warheads) plus <strong>on</strong>e Trident submarine (24 missileswith four warheads each, or 96 warheads). Russiawould stand down two regiments of silo-based missiles(ten SS-19 missiles with six warheads each, or86
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESRUSSIA FIRST FORCES ONLINE ALL FORCES IN UNITSilo-based Regiments:Restore Warheads 24 hrs 58 daysRestore Gas Generators 10 hrs 4 daysRestore Flight Batteries 8 hrs 3 daysRoad-mobile Regiments:Restore Warheads 30 hrs 23 daysRestore Flight Batteries 8 hrs 6 daysRestore Removal of Metal Beams 12 hrs 9 daysRestore Re-build of Launcher 36 hrs 27 daysStrategic Submarines:Restore Warheads 12 hrs 8 daysOther (e.g., Open Welded Tubes*) >24 hrs >20 daysStrategic Bombers:Upload Weap<strong>on</strong>s >12 hrs >2 daysTactical Forces:Upload Weap<strong>on</strong>s 24 hrs 30 days* Potential safety hazard.UNITED STATES FIRST FORCES ONLINE ALL FORCES IN UNITSilo-based Squadr<strong>on</strong>s:Restore Targets 15 mins 24 hrsUndo “Safing” 3 hrs 10 hrsRestore Lid Explosives 10 hrs 5 daysRemove Heavy Objects 12 hrs 7 daysRestore Warheads 24 hrs 9 daysRec<strong>on</strong>nect Stages 6 hrs 4 daysStrategic Submarines:Restore Warheads (In Port) 3 hrs 3 daysRestore Warheads (Onboard) 12 hrs (weather dependent) >5 daysRestore Inverters 2 hrs 1 dayRestore Range >2 days >2 daysStrategic Bombers:Upload Weap<strong>on</strong>s >12 hrs 2 daysTactical Forces:Upload Weap<strong>on</strong>s 24 hrs 7 days (⅓) / 100 days (all)87
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