global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESing, and essential components of the missiles – warheads,electronic “inverter” devices, and/or guidance sets – couldbe detached and stored onboard or at central base facilities.Launch tube hatches could be welded shut.Although heavy strategic bombers could be uploaded withnuclear bombs and cruise missiles during a crisis and thenlaunched on warning, they are recallable and pose nothingclose to the risks associated with launching land- and seabasedstrategic missiles on warning (these are not recallable).This report calls for freezing their current posture in which allbomber nuclear payloads remain in local base storage or incentral storage facilities far removed from the airbases.The de-alerting agenda should also encompass other classesof nuclear forces on low-level alert, including those that todate have escaped regulation by arms control agreements.For the unregulated tactical (nonstrategic, shorter range)nuclear weapons, the two sides should preserve the existingpeacetime arrangements in which the warheads and bombsremain separated from their delivery vehicles and held instorage at local or central facilities. In due course, this principleof physical separation should be carried to the nextlevel. All tactical nuclear weapons should be removed fromforward combat base storage (collocated with the warplanesand missiles for delivering them) and transferred to centralstorage facilities in the United States and Russia. 1 And finally,weapons in the strategic reserve should remain in storageand fully off alert.This report offers a long menu of de-alerting options developedby experts over the past twenty-five years. All of themwere deeply researched by experts with military experience.At various times in the past a number of them have beenevaluated for technical feasibility and for their contributionto strategic stability at senior levels within the U.S. military(the source of some of them), where they have generallybeen evaluated positively in these terms:An initial assessment by the Joint Staff indicatesthat these proposals may be technicallyfeasible and if mutually implementedin a verifiable manner would contribute tothe mutual security of the U.S. and Russia. 2Verification presents a challenge. Many of the options requiremore intrusive monitoring than has previously beenrequired under the New START agreement and its predecessors.Verifying de-alerting measures taken inside of strategicsubmarines that slip into the ocean depths for monthson end is especially vexing. Nevertheless, this report findsthat national technical means (NTM) of verification (mainlyspace surveillance) coupled with intrusive on-site inspectionsconducted in conjunction with existing New STARTprocedures will generally suffice to verify adequately the keyproposed options such as warhead and flight battery removal.The New START treaty may well require a change to itsprotocol or an amendment (the latter requiring re-ratification)in order for monitoring to proceed under its auspices.Alternatively, a new executive agreement between the presidentsof the United States and Russia could stipulate themonitoring arrangements. For nuclear forces that fall outsidethe scope of the current strategic arms treaty, particularlytactical weapons and reserve strategic warheads, newverification provisions will be necessary.For some new measures, monitoring will need to be moreintrusive and frequent, and augmented by webcams andother surveillance devices. Depending upon the contoursof the de-alerting regime, on-site inspectors will sometimesneed much greater access than they currently enjoy underexisting agreements. Some inspections may need to be performedinside missile silos and submarines. Such access hasbeen strictly forbidden in the past, and granting it in thefuture would represent a breakthrough in cooperative monitoring.Such cooperation may strain credulity at this time offractured U.S.-Russian relations and may have to wait untilrelations return to normal.1 See Global Zero NATO-Russia Commission Report, February 2012:http://www.<strong>global</strong><strong>zero</strong>.org/files/gz_nato-russia_<strong>commission</strong>_report_-_en.pdf.2 Lt. Col. John Betts, J-5 Strategic Plans & Policy Directorate, JointChiefs of Staff, unpublished paper, July 8, 1997; and personal communicationswith study director.8
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESIn the view of one group of U.S. military experts, these raisedstandards of monitoring and verification would be difficultto negotiate:Joint Staff arms control experts’ evaluationis that this [de-alerting] regime will requirelengthy and difficult negotiations to balancethe need to promptly detect any violation andthe need to protect operational capabilitiesThese proposals would require breaking the“no below ground access” paradigm and willrequire access to ALL areas and functions ofthe nuclear complex on a nearly continuousbasis. 3This <strong>commission</strong> acknowledges these difficulties, but onlyto a point. Most of the de-alerting options in this report,including the major ones like warhead removal, can be adequatelyverified with available monitoring techniques on anintermittent basis. Access to all areas of the nuclear complexon a nearly continuous basis is definitely not necessary toverify de-alerting measures adequately, any more than it isnecessary for verifying New START.This report recognizes that the governments will not likelyaccede to the clarion call of some to immediately standdown all strategic forces from high alert, but rather will insistupon phasing in de-alerting over many years. This positionis arguably unwise given the growing risks of their use,unintentional or otherwise. One upside is that apprehensionof “break out” and re-alerting instability during a crisis,whether justified or not, would be allayed if de-alerting isimplemented gradually over many years. Another upside isthat a prolonged drawdown of alert forces would mean thatthe verification regime could be less intrusive in the initialstages.As the nuclear arsenals shrink over time and as growingportions of the arsenals are taken off alert, however, “breakout” and instability loom larger in the equation if the deployedforces are not inherently survivable. Monitoring will3 Ibid.have to become increasingly stringent. As the stockpiles decreaseeventually to very low numbers and all or almost allof the forces are taken off alert, the monitoring regime willhave to be able to track and assess the alert status of practicallyevery weapon and do so on a more frequent schedulethan is currently possible. It will likely become necessary todevelop new concepts, methods and technologies in orderto meet the strict monitoring requirements envisioned bythe U.S. Joint Staff.Military-to-military talks should begin soon to assessde-alerting opportunities and begin tackling the verificationchallenges. The U.S. and Russian governments will surelydetermine the composition of the forces to be de-alerted.Their preferences would tend to favor the de-alerting of olderweapons slated for early retirement. This report proposesinitially de-alerting approximately 170 strategic warheadson each side. It suggests de-alerting a specific mix of silo-,road-mobile-, and submarine- missiles. Whatever the mixthat the governments elect, those units would be subject toinspection to verify their de-alerted status. This report outlinesa verification approach for each measure – though itdoes not begin to exhaust the creative possibilities. U.S. andRussian military experts and inspectors will need to deviseand prove the necessary monitoring procedures. The partiesshould establish a joint working group to coordinate this effort.De-alerting should eventually be extended to all of the strategicforces, new and old alike. The joint working groupshould analyze, test, refine, and demonstrate a de-alertingand monitoring regime applicable across the board. Thiswill be relatively straightforward for U.S. forces becausethere are only a few types of delivery systems. The Russianarsenal consists of many more varieties and will present atougher challenge. The menu of de-alerting measures listedabove partially meets the challenge but a great deal offurther study and official discussions among experts will beneeded to crack this nut. The effort should extend to futurenuclear forces as well as existing ones in order to lay thegroundwork for more “de-alert friendly” weapons systems.To smooth the transition from high- to low-alert postures,only a portion of the alert U.S. and Russian strategic forces9
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