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global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESIn the view of <strong>on</strong>e group of U.S. military experts, these raisedstandards of m<strong>on</strong>itoring and verificati<strong>on</strong> would be difficultto negotiate:Joint Staff arms c<strong>on</strong>trol experts’ evaluati<strong>on</strong>is that this [de-alerting] regime will requirelengthy and difficult negotiati<strong>on</strong>s to balancethe need to promptly detect any violati<strong>on</strong> andthe need to protect operati<strong>on</strong>al capabilitiesThese proposals would require breaking the“no below ground access” paradigm and willrequire access to ALL areas and functi<strong>on</strong>s ofthe <strong>nuclear</strong> complex <strong>on</strong> a nearly c<strong>on</strong>tinuousbasis. 3This <str<strong>on</strong>g>commissi<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g> acknowledges these difficulties, but <strong>on</strong>lyto a point. Most of the de-alerting opti<strong>on</strong>s in this <strong>report</strong>,including the major <strong>on</strong>es like warhead removal, can be adequatelyverified with available m<strong>on</strong>itoring techniques <strong>on</strong> anintermittent basis. Access to all areas of the <strong>nuclear</strong> complex<strong>on</strong> a nearly c<strong>on</strong>tinuous basis is definitely not necessary toverify de-alerting measures adequately, any more than it isnecessary for verifying New START.This <strong>report</strong> recognizes that the governments will not likelyaccede to the clari<strong>on</strong> call of some to immediately standdown all strategic forces from high alert, but rather will insistup<strong>on</strong> phasing in de-alerting over many years. This positi<strong>on</strong>is arguably unwise given the growing <strong>risk</strong>s of their use,unintenti<strong>on</strong>al or otherwise. One upside is that apprehensi<strong>on</strong>of “break out” and re-alerting instability during a crisis,whether justified or not, would be allayed if de-alerting isimplemented gradually over many years. Another upside isthat a prol<strong>on</strong>ged drawdown of alert forces would mean thatthe verificati<strong>on</strong> regime could be less intrusive in the initialstages.As the <strong>nuclear</strong> arsenals shrink over time and as growingporti<strong>on</strong>s of the arsenals are taken off alert, however, “breakout” and instability loom larger in the equati<strong>on</strong> if the deployedforces are not inherently survivable. M<strong>on</strong>itoring will3 Ibid.have to become increasingly stringent. As the stockpiles decreaseeventually to very low numbers and all or almost allof the forces are taken off alert, the m<strong>on</strong>itoring regime willhave to be able to track and assess the alert status of practicallyevery weap<strong>on</strong> and do so <strong>on</strong> a more frequent schedulethan is currently possible. It will likely become necessary todevelop new c<strong>on</strong>cepts, methods and technologies in orderto meet the strict m<strong>on</strong>itoring requirements envisi<strong>on</strong>ed bythe U.S. Joint Staff.Military-to-military talks should begin so<strong>on</strong> to assessde-alerting opportunities and begin tackling the verificati<strong>on</strong>challenges. The U.S. and Russian governments will surelydetermine the compositi<strong>on</strong> of the forces to be de-alerted.Their preferences would tend to favor the de-alerting of olderweap<strong>on</strong>s slated for early retirement. This <strong>report</strong> proposesinitially de-alerting approximately 170 strategic warheads<strong>on</strong> each side. It suggests de-alerting a specific mix of silo-,road-mobile-, and submarine- missiles. Whatever the mixthat the governments elect, those units would be subject toinspecti<strong>on</strong> to verify their de-alerted status. This <strong>report</strong> outlinesa verificati<strong>on</strong> approach for each measure – though itdoes not begin to exhaust the creative possibilities. U.S. andRussian military experts and inspectors will need to deviseand prove the necessary m<strong>on</strong>itoring procedures. The partiesshould establish a joint working group to coordinate this effort.De-alerting should eventually be extended to all of the strategicforces, new and old alike. The joint working groupshould analyze, test, refine, and dem<strong>on</strong>strate a de-alertingand m<strong>on</strong>itoring regime applicable across the board. Thiswill be relatively straightforward for U.S. forces becausethere are <strong>on</strong>ly a few types of delivery systems. The Russianarsenal c<strong>on</strong>sists of many more varieties and will present atougher challenge. The menu of de-alerting measures listedabove partially meets the challenge but a great deal offurther study and official discussi<strong>on</strong>s am<strong>on</strong>g experts will beneeded to crack this nut. The effort should extend to future<strong>nuclear</strong> forces as well as existing <strong>on</strong>es in order to lay thegroundwork for more “de-alert friendly” weap<strong>on</strong>s systems.To smooth the transiti<strong>on</strong> from high- to low-alert postures,<strong>on</strong>ly a porti<strong>on</strong> of the alert U.S. and Russian strategic forces9

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