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global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESit would well serve the near-term nati<strong>on</strong>al security interests ofboth the possessor countries and the n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> countries ofthe world. Third, the basic idea of de-alerting – decreasing theoperati<strong>on</strong>al readiness of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s – enjoys almost universalsupport am<strong>on</strong>g the nati<strong>on</strong>s of the world and it derivesstr<strong>on</strong>g political and legal standing from the NPT. And fourth,it builds up<strong>on</strong> a set of historical antecedents in the form ofc<strong>on</strong>fidence-building measures designed reduce the <strong>risk</strong> of theuse of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s stemming from misunderstanding,miscalculati<strong>on</strong>, and breakdown of command and c<strong>on</strong>trol.An alternative pathway toward deep reducti<strong>on</strong>s and <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g><str<strong>on</strong>g>zero</str<strong>on</strong>g>. De-alerting offers an alternative to the other two mainpaths to this goal. Of the main paths, <strong>on</strong>e has stalled completelyand the other has failed to garner the support of the majorityof the world’s leading countries.The traditi<strong>on</strong>al main path is the step-by-step process that fordecades has dominated the arms c<strong>on</strong>trol agenda of the P-5 <strong>nuclear</strong>countries, their allies, and most of the rest of the internati<strong>on</strong>alcommunity. The key steps are ending the producti<strong>on</strong>of fissile materials (the Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty), fullyratifying and implementing a treaty banning <strong>nuclear</strong> chain reacti<strong>on</strong>sin weap<strong>on</strong>s testing (the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty),and further shrinking the world-wide <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>sstockpile through negotiated and unilateral reducti<strong>on</strong>s of U.S.and Russian weap<strong>on</strong>s (the next follow-<strong>on</strong> treaty to the 2010New START agreement).All of these steps have ground to a halt. FMCT, CTBT, andNew START follow-<strong>on</strong> negotiati<strong>on</strong>s are paralyzed by internati<strong>on</strong>aland domestic politics between and within the <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s countries.In the critical arena of U.S.-Russian <strong>nuclear</strong> arms reducti<strong>on</strong>sthere are no near-term prospects for progress. Their stockpilesare leveling off, after 30 years of steady decreases broughtthem down from a peak of 70,000 weap<strong>on</strong>s in the mid-1980sto 16,000 weap<strong>on</strong>s today. There is also no realistic prospect todayof bringing the other <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s countries to the tableto negotiate cuts, especially given the impasse between the<strong>nuclear</strong> superpowers who possess the vast bulk of the <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g>stockpile. On the c<strong>on</strong>trary, all <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s countries areinvesting heavily, or planning to do so, in the l<strong>on</strong>g-term modernizati<strong>on</strong>of their <strong>nuclear</strong> arsenals.A litany of obstacles can be recited. The bottom lines are thatPresident Putin has rebuffed President Obama’s overtures toresume strategic arms negotiati<strong>on</strong>s. Russia is also alleged tohave violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty(INF), putting it in jeopardy of collapsing. The animus betweenRussia and the West over Ukraine has also created a domesticpolitical climate that does not favor further unilateralor bilateral reducti<strong>on</strong>s by either side. Even if an arms reducti<strong>on</strong>agreement could be negotiated, the U.S. Senate would resistratifying it for domestic political as well as strategic reas<strong>on</strong>s.This traditi<strong>on</strong>al approach is deeply flawed in any case. It hasprofound structural deficiencies beginning with its completeneglect of tactical <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s (short-range, below 500kilometers in range) even though these weap<strong>on</strong>s are the mostuseable and dangerous in many respects. The Russia stockpileof these weap<strong>on</strong>s is large. Strategic reserve weap<strong>on</strong>s, whoseproporti<strong>on</strong> of the overall strategic stockpiles is increasing, geta free pass as well. The U.S. stockpile of these weap<strong>on</strong>s is large.Furthermore, no other possessor countries besides Russia andthe United States participate at all in negotiati<strong>on</strong>s to reduce eitherstrategic or tactical weap<strong>on</strong>s. The rest get a free pass, eventhough the <strong>risk</strong>s of <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s use appear to be greatestin South and Northeast Asia, home of four <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>scountries that steer clear of any multilateral regulati<strong>on</strong> fora.In short, this path leads down a blind alley at the present time,and in any case it offers diminishing returns. It needs to befundamentally restructured to become comprehensive andinclusive, putting tactical weap<strong>on</strong>s and strategic reserve weap<strong>on</strong>sin the negotiating basket and bringing all <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>scountries to the table to join the United States and Russia. Thisideal is unfortunately a dead letter for the foreseeable future.The other major pathway to arms reducti<strong>on</strong>s is less direct:delegitimize <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s. This approach emphasizes thedisastrous humanitarian c<strong>on</strong>sequences of using <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>seven <strong>on</strong> a small scale, the irreducible and growing <strong>risk</strong>sof such use in an era of proliferati<strong>on</strong>, and the utter lack of nati<strong>on</strong>al,instituti<strong>on</strong>al, and organizati<strong>on</strong>al capacity to provide effectiverelief to victims in the event of their use. This approachseeks to reinforce the taboo against their use or possessi<strong>on</strong> by38

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