global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESorder to create “a strong guarantee against undesirable reactionarymissile launches by the president of the United Statesor the president of Russia.” 94 At a minimum, the two nationscould notify each other whenever strategic submarines leavetheir homeports. 95 Failure to address this concern in somemeaningful way means “the problem associated with a threatof a <strong>global</strong> catastrophe remains unresolved.” 96 The concern isheightened by the possibility, which the Russian expert arguescannot be excluded, that a third-party, a “rogue” state, or evenextremists who might hijack a vessel and launch on-boardmissiles from waters close to the other’s territory and trigger amistaken launch in retaliation based on misattribution of theresponsible party.The third major recommendation is that the two countriesshould notify each other whenever they are going to alert anddeploy their back-up nuclear command systems, even if onlyfor the purpose of exercising them. 97 These reserve elementssuch as ground mobile and airborne command posts, and airbornelaunch control centers, would be mobilized in preparationfor nuclear war, as they provide the backbone for ensuringthe survival and continuity of the nuclear chain of commandin wartime. As such, their generation to high alert could bemisinterpreted as a prelude to a first strike, and “hence thereexists the possibility of an unfortunate reaction by the otherparty in the absence of reliable information.” 98These principles and specific proposals underlie the de-alertingagenda presented in the next sections of this report. Notificationprotocols – for launches, forward positioning of strategicmissiles with extremely short flight times, and mobilizationof reserve nuclear command posts – are key to any de-alertingagreement. This principle should be expanded to coverthe alerting or re-alerting of tactical nuclear weapons, reservestrategic weapons normally kept in storage, and operationallydeployed strategic nuclear weapons that normally remain off94 Ibid.95 For the United States, this happens once a week or so.96 Ibid.97 Ibid.98 Ibid.high alert in peacetime.E. A FUTURE DE-ALERTING AGREEMENTA future bilateral de-alerting agreement could unfold in twostages. In stage one, urgent steps would be taken to eliminatelaunch-on-warning from the U.S. and Russian postures withinsix months to one year. Initial steps would be taken to decreasethe attack readiness of a portion of the individual strategic nuclearforces. These and additional de-alerting measures wouldbe implemented in phases for the rest of the force until a totalstand-down is achieved. The timeframe for this phased implementationis approximately ten years under a fast-track option.The urgent task of eliminating prompt launch from the nuclearpostures of both sides initially entails mainly adjustments intraining, exercising, and planning in order to begin changingthe mindset and organizational cultures in which the currentpostures are so deeply rooted. It would initially entail a reciprocalstand-down of a relatively small portion of their highalertstrategic forces. Keep in mind that today approximatelyone-half of their strategic forces, and none of their tactical nuclearforces, stand ready for immediate launch. The drawdownschedule thus applies to the fraction of day-to-day alert, assumingthe off alert remainder stays off alert. (The agreementwould so stipulate.)The alert portion, currently consisting of approximately 950weapons on each side, would stand down in phases accordingto this drawdown schedule:• Within one year, 20 percent (approximately 170weapons on each side) of the current alert strategicforces would be stood down, leaving 680 on high alerton each side.• Within three years, 50 percent (425 weapons on eachside) would be off of alert, leaving 425 still on alert.• Within six years, 80 percent (680 weapons on eachside) would be off alert, leaving 170 on alert.Within ten years, 100 percent (850 weapons on each side)could be off alert if U.S.-Russian relations have returned tonormal and their security cooperation has deepened.The keygoal is to decrease attack readiness from current launch times54