global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESof material has gotten loose from Russia.Strictly from the standpoint of nuclear terrorism as well as proliferation,another major concern to Russia, Russia’s nationalsecurity interest lies squarely in arms regulation that optimizesthe security of its nuclear arsenal. A de-alerting agreementwould advance this objective.However, Russia has to contend with other potential threats toits security, and it views nuclear weapons as playing a critical rolein dealing with them. The main purpose of Russia’s large nuclearforce is to deter nuclear attack by threatening large-scale retaliationto any nuclear attack. Despite the end of the Cold Wardecades ago and massive voluntary reductions in Russian nuclearstockpiles, this deterrent mission remains a core elementof Russian security strategy. The mission is aimed primarily atthe United States and its nuclear-armed NATO allies (France,and the United Kingdom, and other NATO allies assigned todeliver some of the 180 U.S. nuclear bombs stored in Europe),and China. As noted earlier, approximately 800 Russian nuclearmissile warheads are poised for immediate firing in the nameof classic deterrence, a posture that is interlocked with U.S. alertmissiles in a mutually reinforcing stand-off that exposes bothnations – and the world – to the risks of accidental, mistaken orunauthorized strikes by forces on either side.In addition to providing the capacity for second-strike retaliation,Russia’s nuclear arsenal serves a general war-fightingpurpose. Russia’s nuclear policy asserts its readiness to resortto nuclear weapons to defeat any aggression that threatens thevery survival of the Russian nation. This position, adopted in1993 and reaffirmed by recent military doctrine (2014), impliesthat Russia may initiate the use of nuclear weapons in situationsof extreme danger to the state.In Russia’s estimation, these situations mainly include conventionalattack against its territory by NATO or Chinese forces.Such attacks may take the form of a classic invasion of massedenemy forces overrunning border defenses and crossing intoRussian territory. China and NATO (to a lesser extent) projectthis threat. Or they may take the form of a massive aerial assaultsspearheaded by warplanes armed with precision-guidedconventional forces used for surgical strikes against key Russianfacilities (e.g., national command posts, missile silos, earlywarning radars). The United States alone possesses this capability.Russian strategists believe such conflicts would likely grow outof lower-intensity regional conflicts on Russia’s periphery (e.g.,Ukraine and Georgia) that inadvertently escalate and spread tothe next level. At an early phase in such scenarios these strategistsenvisage the first use of tens to hundreds of Russian nuclearweapons, primarily tactical nuclear forces, in order to shoreup its conventional forces and establish escalation dominance,a throwback to the Cold War days of U.S.-NATO plans for earlyfirst use of nuclear weapons in the event of an overwhelmingSoviet conventional assault. The risk of further nuclear escalationin such a situation is clearly high.All of these scenarios, except for terrorism, could only unfoldover a timeframe far longer than the 24-72 hour re-alertingtimeline proposed by this report – even if this constraint appliedto all of the nuclear forces on both sides. Such a timelinewould more than suffice to allow Russia to respond in a timelyway to any and all current and foreseeable contingencies involvingconflict with the United States/NATO or China, or anyoneelse for that matter. There are no conflicts of interest among anyof these nations that would justify direct military conflict. Butin the improbable event of military hostilities among them, theRussian nuclear forces could maintain central deterrence andgeneral war-fighting capabilities at much lower levels of attackreadiness than presently exists.The touchstone issue is reaching an understanding betweenRussia and the United States/NATO on the structure and operationof missile defenses being deployed in the European theaterwhose primary purpose is to protect Europe from shortandmedium-range Iranian missiles. Russia’s concern is thatthis defensive shield could evolve into one capable of threateningthe remnants of Russia’s strategic missile force decimatedby a U.S./NATO nuclear first strike. Similarly, Russia viewsU.S. long-range precision-guided conventional weapons as apotential threat to a sizable portion of its nuclear arsenal andcommand-control facilities, and therefore seeks to count theseweapons against treaty-imposed ceilings on nuclear weapons,or otherwise to constrain them.The other major points of contention from a Russian perspec-40
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTUREStive reflect its desire to prohibit the deployment of any weaponsin outer space, including conventional missile defense weapons,to require nuclear weapons to be located only on the territoryof their owners (this would only affect the 180 U.S. tacticalweapons in Europe), and to ratify a new treaty that would redressRussia’s overall conventional inferiority in the Europeantheater (this treaty, the Adapted Conventional Forces EuropeTreaty, was successfully negotiated but tripped up over the BalticNATO states’ refusal to ratify it until Russia withdraws itsforces from non-NATO Georgia/Abkhazia, leading Russia tosuspend its implementation of the treaty).Russia’s linkage of these contentious issues to future nucleararms control, including presumably any opening round ofbilateral or multilateral negotiations on de-alerting, reflectsRussia’s strong desire to broaden the security agenda and formnew <strong>global</strong> security architecture on the principal of equal securityfor all nations. This broadened agenda and architecturewould encompass much more than narrow military considerationsand in this respect economic ties and “soft” power couldsignificantly offset Russia’s technical military disadvantages.A more cooperative security relationship between Russia andEurope would open the door much wider for deep bilateralnuclear arms reductions. The model U.S. presidential guidancepresented later in this report seeks to find new ways to bridgethe divide.Unfortunately, the chasm is wider than ever. In light of theUkraine crisis and the estranged relations between Russiaand the West, such security cooperation has little pulse at themoment. In certain respects this state of affairs with its seriouspotential for further miscalculation and escalation gives allthe more reason to pursue confidence-building measures likede-alerting. The potential for the Ukraine crisis to escalate inadvertentlyand become unmanageable is steadily growing andneeds to be contained through urgent risk reduction measures.Russia has nothing to lose and much to gain from beginninga constructive dialogue on de-alerting – even if all the othersticking points are not immediately resolved. There is a growingrisk of nuclear inadvertence leading to the accidental, unauthorizedor mistaken use of nuclear weapons that could bereduced through de-alerting measures. Russia would becomemore secure. Russia would also demonstrate anew its commitmentto international norms and law. By taking de-alertingsteps that decrease the operational readiness of its nuclear forces,it would conform to the provisions of the NPT that Russiaitself approved during prior Review Conferences. Taking themodest initial steps outlined in this report would be roundlyapplauded by all or virtually all of the nations of the world.In this spirit, eminent Russian experts have advanced a boldproposal for de-alerting Russian strategic forces. These experts,who include several former senior Russian military officerswho are members of this <strong>commission</strong>, studied the U.S. de-alertingand force structure proposals contained in the model U.S.guidance spelled out later in this report, and formulated aRussian plan for reciprocal de-alerting (and force reductions)geared to the same timelines. They recommend a total weaponsceiling of 1,500 strategic and tactical weapons combined – a 70percent cut in the Russian arsenal – and endorse removing allremaining Russian strategic forces from launch-ready alert, onthe condition that multilateral talks on nuclear arms reductionsthat include China are initiated. According to these analysts,their plan would be fully consistent with Russian national securityinterests and strategy:Russia’s Nuclear Forces in 2022:Possible Force StructureTotal nuclear warheads 1,500of which:Strategic and in a state of reducedoperational readiness1,000Tactical and non-deployed 500Total deployed strategic warheads 500of which:On 270 ICBMs 270On 8 nuclear submarines with 128 SLBMs 140On 15 heavy bombers 90All strategic warheads in active reserve 500of which to be deployed:ICBMs 270Nuclear submarines 140Heavy bombers 9041
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