global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTUREScomputer-based system with a view to disrupting or evennegating control. The effectiveness of current safeguardsin preventing such access and the neutralizing, deranging,or seizing of launch control is uncertain, at least tothis <strong>commission</strong>. What can be argued is that a de-alertingregime that stands down 100 percent of the strategic forceson all sides would be effective in thwarting the mostdiabolical of cyber warfare scenarios that can be imagined– as well as those that have so far escaped imagination.In short, a persuasive case can be made to acceleratethe de-alerting schedule proposed in this report.XI. U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT PROJECT ON DE-ALERTINGIn conjunction with the urgent business of eliminatingprompt launch from the nuclear postures of both sides,and reciprocally standing down a portion of their highalertstrategic forces according to the draw-down schedulepresented earlier, Russia and the United States need toresume nuclear talks. Their experts should work togetherto design, test, demonstrate, and validate de-alertingmethods and associated verification procedures. As partof this joint undertaking, they should compare and shareassessments of the risks posed by their current strategicpostures, including the risks to the integrity of nuclearcommand, control, communications, and early warningnetworks posed by cyber warfare. They should jointlyassess the nuclear programs of other countries, the risksthey carry, and remedies including confidence-buildingmeasures and de-alerting.XII. TOWARD A GLOBAL MULTILATERALDE-ALERTING AGREEMENTPrevious sections and the model U.S. presidential nuclearguidance presented later explained the grounds forstanding down and keeping down the nuclear forces ofall nations. Simply put, de-alerting serves their nationalsecurity interests. There are no exceptions. The dotsbetween de-alerting and a wider set of Chinese, French,Indian, Israeli, Pakistani, Russian, U.K. and U.S. securityconsiderations have been connected and elaborated. It isdifficult to refute.The present position of the U.S. government neverthelessdoes refute the basic claims presented in this report – notably,that the risks of nuclear weapons use are excessive,that they stem from inadequate warning and decisiontime, and that other weaknesses in nuclear command andcontrol create opportunities for nuclear weapons use byaccident or design. The official refutation is brief and tothe point. It was most recently articulated in a letter writtenin response to a United Nations resolution calling forthe nuclear weapons countries to reduce the operationalreadiness of their nuclear forces. (For further discussionof the de-alerting movement at the United Nations, seethe next section of this report.) Speaking on behalf of theUnited Kingdom and France as well as the United States,U.S. Ambassador Robert Wood wrote:We continue to disagree with the basicpremises of this resolution, which suggestthat the current level of readiness of nuclearweapons increases the risk of the unintentionalor accidental use and that loweredalert levels will automatically and inall cases lead to heightened internationalsecurity. While alert levels can and havebeen lowered in response to an improvedinternational security climate, the relationshipbetween alert levels and securityis complex and not reducible to simple formulaicresponses.We would like to restate that the operationalreadiness of our respective nuclearweapons systems is maintained at a levelconsonant with our national security requirementsand our obligations to our allies,within the larger context of the current<strong>global</strong> strategic situation. In reflectionthereof, we have decreased the operationalreadiness and alert levels of our respectiveforces since the early 1990s. Additionally,our respective nuclear weapons systems areno longer targeted against any state.Collectively, those steps have reduced the62
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESvalue of further “de-alerting” as a priorityfor nuclear disarmament.We would also like to reiterate that ournuclear weapons systems are subject to themost rigorous command, control and communicationsystems, to ensure against thepossibility of accidental or unintentionaluse, and to guarantee that such weaponscould only be used at the sole direction ofthe proper national command authorityand to maximise that authority’s decisiontime. 108With due respect to this official tripartite position, thisreport contends that current operational readiness is notconsonant with French, U.K. and U.S. national securityrequirements and that significant adjustments to the currentposture are necessary to align readiness with thoserequirements. The value of further de-alerting is not declining,but rather is growing – and the case for furtherde-alerting flows not from premises, but from fact-basedanalysis. The readers of this report can decide for themselveswhether it builds a rigorous case.This <strong>commission</strong> believes, furthermore, that de-alertingwould also serve the national security interests of thelarger constellation of nations including all the nuclearpossessor states as well as key non-nuclear weaponscountries.A. WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL SUPPORTAND STANDING FOR DE-ALERTINGSince 2007, a group of five countries – Chile, Malaysia,New Zealand, Nigeria and Switzerland – has put forwarda resolution on decreasing the operational readiness ofnuclear weapons systems at the United Nations GeneralAssembly (UNGA) on five separate occasions. Each res-108 Amb. Robert A. Wood, “Cluster One: Explanation of the Vote Afterthe Vote,” statement to the Sixty-Ninth United Nations General AssemblyFirst Committee, New York City, October 29, 2014.olution calls on nuclear weapons states to take “furtherpractical steps […] to decrease the operational readinessof nuclear weapons systems, with a view to ensuring thatall nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status.”109 Taking up this call to action, they believe, wouldlower the risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclearweapons and contribute to the process of nucleardisarmament by reducing the role of nuclear weapons innational security policy and strengthening transparencyand confidence-building measures.At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, states party to thetreaty, including Russia and the United States, agreed thatnuclear weapons states should further reduce the operationalstatus of nuclear weapons systems as part of the “13practical steps” toward nuclear disarmament. The importanceof this step was underscored at the 2010 NPT ReviewConference when all parties adopted a 64-point actionplan to accelerate progress on nuclear disarmament,which included further reductions in the operational statusof nuclear weapons.In 2012, the General Assembly passed the fourth incarnationof the de-alerting group’s resolution with a voteof 164 in favor, 4 against, and 19 abstaining. 110 The vote109 General Assembly resolution 69/42, Decreasing the operationalreadiness of nuclear weapons, A/RES/69/42, December 11, 2014.110 U.N. General Assembly voting record for 2012 Resolution 67/46Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems:In favor: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia(Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon,Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China,Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus,Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica,Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji,Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala,Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India,Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s DemocraticRepublic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania,Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique,Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,63
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