global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESthe watchword of our strategy. It must not be compromised bytactical exigencies that stem from Minuteman vulnerability.Although numerical parity with Russia will not be a rigidguideline for U.S. force sizing or for formal nuclear arms talksin the future, the United States will seek comparable Russianreductions and other modifications that preserve roughequality, work to assure U.S. allies, and mark progress towardthe goal of the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons.The U.S. “Berlin offer” to bilaterally cut the number of operationallydeployed weapons by one-third on each side remainson the table. Lack of progress in nuclear arms negotiationswith Russia will not, however, derail our efforts to removepressures to “use or lose” nuclear weapons.Given the infinitesimal probability of a nuclear conflict pittingthe United States simultaneously against both China andRussia, U.S. nuclear forces will no longer prepare to conductoperations against both nations at the same time. Given theextremely remote likelihood that Russia would deliberatelyinitiate a massive counterforce strike aimed at comprehensivelydestroying U.S. strategic forces in their undergroundsilos, submarine pens and airbases, the United States willno longer plan an option for launch on warning (otherwiseknown as launch under attack) or an option for preemptivestrikes against Russia. An inter-agency process should beginimmediately to pursue negotiations with Russia to reach anexecutive agreement, as outlined by the Dvorkin memo (detailedearlier) that eliminates the option of launch-on-warning/launch-under-attackfrom the repertoire of U.S. and Russiannuclear command operations, exercises, and training.The United States will not be the first to employ nuclear weaponsin a conflict with China or Russia. This commitment willbe reflected in declaratory and employment doctrine. To reinforceits credibility, the number of normally deployed U.S. warheadsshall not exceed the threshold number (~270 warheads)that would theoretically pose a decapitating sudden first-strikethreat to Russia, and the U.S. delivery vehicles carrying thedeployed warheads will require 24-72 hours of generation toreach launch-ready status. The remainder of the total activestockpile (strategic reserve and tactical deployed and reservewarheads) will require much longer time to deploy.In signaling U.S. intent not to negate Chinese or Russian nuclearforces, the United States will refrain from targeting theirre-locatable land- and sea-based nuclear delivery systems thathave dispersed from their missile (mobile ICBM) garrisonsand submarine (SSBN) pens to field deployment sites and patrolstations. The United States will no longer target Chineseor Russian chemical facilities.Close-in U.S. surveillance along Chinese and Russian bordersand related intrusive activities devoted to nuclear employmentplanning will be discontinued as a routine peacetime activity.In the unlikely event of a nuclear conflict with China or Russia,it would likely grow out of conventional conflict on theperiphery of these countries, and begin with limited nuclearstrikes. The canonical Cold War-like scenario of a bolt-fromthe-bluemassive Russian attack or smaller-scale surprise Chineseattack is so remote as to be negligible and shall not be abasis of contingency planning.Accidental or unauthorized strikes are also improbable, butsuch possibilities must be taken into account in planning. TheUnited States will encourage China and Russia and to join theUnited States in removing nuclear forces from launch-readystatus in peacetime. (China already largely follows this practice.)As noted earlier, we will seek an executive agreementwith Russia to eliminate the possibility of launching missileson the basis of faulty indications from early warning systems.We also will encourage China and Russia to negotiate newbilateral confidence-building measures such as comprehensivepre-notification of ballistic missile launches, includingshort- and medium-range ballistic missiles as well as cruisemissile launches within range of each others’ territories, inorder to minimize their risks of nuclear false alarms. China’sexpansion of its missile deployments and its intensifying testingprogram are increasing the frequency of urgent Russianattack assessment and of false readings.In the remote event of a nuclear conflict involving China orRussia, the United States would seek, regardless of the natureand scale of strikes against us and/or our allies, to control escalationand terminate the conflict on the best possible terms.The President must be able to receive the intelligence and earlywarning assessments necessary to determine the nature and72
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESconsequences of such strikes, including whether the attack isdeliberate, accidental, or unauthorized. The information mustbe sufficient to determine the U.S. national security interestand best course of action. The President must have a range ofresponse options that serve such purposes, the necessary timeto consider them, and the ability to conduct such operationsthrough reliable command-control links.To this end, a large percentage of deployed U.S. strategic nuclearforces and associated command-control-communicationsand early warning networks must be able to survive inan extremely adverse nuclear environment that may includea massive laydown of nuclear warheads and bombs, and electromagneticpulse detonations at high altitudes. Reconstitutionof a second-strike retaliatory force through force generation(“re-alerting”) that is responsive to operational directionby the President and his duly constituted successors mustbe ensured even under worst-case conditions. Continuity ofgovernment in accordance with the provisions of the Constitutionand applicable legislation and other lawful Presidentialinstructions must be preserved under such conditions.The President must have nuclear and non-nuclear options insuch circumstances. Nuclear, cyber, special operations, andconventional force options designed for controlling escalationwill target what the aggressor values most and inflictdamage to reduce its power while leaving intact enough forit to prefer to terminate the conflict. The main objective ofintra-war strategy is to make de-escalation less costly to theaggressor than escalation and terminate the conflict with theleast amount of damage to the United States and our allies.In addition to seeking to prevent escalation, the United Stateswould attempt to limit damage to itself and its allies by disruptingthe operations of Russian nuclear forces and commandand communications systems while leaving intact thosechannels needed to end the conflict on acceptable terms. TheUnited States would employ nuclear, cyber, and conventionalforces to selectively target Russian nuclear forces withheldfrom the initial attack, leadership/military command facilities,and military and industrial facilities that support war fighting.In the case of a nuclear conflict initiated by China, comparableefforts would be made to control escalation and limitdamage to the United States and its allies. Beyond disruption,the President will have nuclear and non-nuclear options forlimiting damage to the United States and its partners by minimizingdamage caused by Chinese nuclear forces. To this end,the United States would selectively target Chinese nuclearforces, leadership/military command posts, and war-supportingindustry.Although the United States may execute nuclear retaliatoryoptions against any or all of the above target categories even ifthe targets are located in urban areas, the priority in employmentplanning will be to provide non-nuclear options againsttargets in urban areas. The President must have the ability towithhold nuclear strikes on leadership and other targets inurban areas, and must be provided with viable non-nuclearoptions if strikes against such targets are deemed necessary.The United States cannot expect conventional forces, cyberwarfare capabilities, and/or missile defenses to completelyreplace nuclear forces (unless and until <strong>global</strong> <strong>zero</strong> becomesa reality), and these non-nuclear capabilities in combinationwith nuclear forces cannot meaningfully limit damage to theUnited States in the event of an all-out Chinese or Russianfirst-strike. Furthermore, these non-nuclear capabilities willnot be developed for the purpose of limiting damage to theUnited States in conjunction with a U.S. preventive or preemptivefirst strike against Chinese or Russian nuclear capabilities,and they may not be employed for such purposes inview of this guidance’s firm pledge not to initiate the use ofnuclear weapons against China or Russia.This no-first-use commitment does not preclude the employmentof U.S. missile defenses to attempt to defeat limitednuclear missile strikes initiated by China or Russia, whetherthose aggressive actions are deliberate, accidental, or unauthorized,and to buy time in considering nuclear responseoptions.D. NORTH KOREA, IRAN AND SYRIAThese foes of the United States and our allies in NortheastAsia and the Middle East will be pressed to forgo nuclearweapons development and disarm. The priorities of U.S. nuclearstrategy toward Iran and North Korea are: (i) prevent73
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TABLEOF CONTENTSExecutive Summary1O
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