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global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESc<strong>on</strong>sequences of such strikes, including whether the attack isdeliberate, accidental, or unauthorized. The informati<strong>on</strong> mustbe sufficient to determine the U.S. nati<strong>on</strong>al security interestand best course of acti<strong>on</strong>. The President must have a range ofresp<strong>on</strong>se opti<strong>on</strong>s that serve such purposes, the necessary timeto c<strong>on</strong>sider them, and the ability to c<strong>on</strong>duct such operati<strong>on</strong>sthrough reliable command-c<strong>on</strong>trol links.To this end, a large percentage of deployed U.S. strategic <strong>nuclear</strong>forces and associated command-c<strong>on</strong>trol-communicati<strong>on</strong>sand early warning networks must be able to survive inan extremely adverse <strong>nuclear</strong> envir<strong>on</strong>ment that may includea massive laydown of <strong>nuclear</strong> warheads and bombs, and electromagneticpulse det<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong>s at high altitudes. Rec<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>of a sec<strong>on</strong>d-strike retaliatory force through force generati<strong>on</strong>(“re-alerting”) that is resp<strong>on</strong>sive to operati<strong>on</strong>al directi<strong>on</strong>by the President and his duly c<strong>on</strong>stituted successors mustbe ensured even under worst-case c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s. C<strong>on</strong>tinuity ofgovernment in accordance with the provisi<strong>on</strong>s of the C<strong>on</strong>stituti<strong>on</strong>and applicable legislati<strong>on</strong> and other lawful Presidentialinstructi<strong>on</strong>s must be preserved under such c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s.The President must have <strong>nuclear</strong> and n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> opti<strong>on</strong>s insuch circumstances. Nuclear, cyber, special operati<strong>on</strong>s, andc<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al force opti<strong>on</strong>s designed for c<strong>on</strong>trolling escalati<strong>on</strong>will target what the aggressor values most and inflictdamage to reduce its power while leaving intact enough forit to prefer to terminate the c<strong>on</strong>flict. The main objective ofintra-war strategy is to make de-escalati<strong>on</strong> less costly to theaggressor than escalati<strong>on</strong> and terminate the c<strong>on</strong>flict with theleast amount of damage to the United States and our allies.In additi<strong>on</strong> to seeking to prevent escalati<strong>on</strong>, the United Stateswould attempt to limit damage to itself and its allies by disruptingthe operati<strong>on</strong>s of Russian <strong>nuclear</strong> forces and commandand communicati<strong>on</strong>s systems while leaving intact thosechannels needed to end the c<strong>on</strong>flict <strong>on</strong> acceptable terms. TheUnited States would employ <strong>nuclear</strong>, cyber, and c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>alforces to selectively target Russian <strong>nuclear</strong> forces withheldfrom the initial attack, leadership/military command facilities,and military and industrial facilities that support war fighting.In the case of a <strong>nuclear</strong> c<strong>on</strong>flict initiated by China, comparableefforts would be made to c<strong>on</strong>trol escalati<strong>on</strong> and limitdamage to the United States and its allies. Bey<strong>on</strong>d disrupti<strong>on</strong>,the President will have <strong>nuclear</strong> and n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> opti<strong>on</strong>s forlimiting damage to the United States and its partners by minimizingdamage caused by Chinese <strong>nuclear</strong> forces. To this end,the United States would selectively target Chinese <strong>nuclear</strong>forces, leadership/military command posts, and war-supportingindustry.Although the United States may execute <strong>nuclear</strong> retaliatoryopti<strong>on</strong>s against any or all of the above target categories even ifthe targets are located in urban areas, the priority in employmentplanning will be to provide n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> opti<strong>on</strong>s againsttargets in urban areas. The President must have the ability towithhold <strong>nuclear</strong> strikes <strong>on</strong> leadership and other targets inurban areas, and must be provided with viable n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong>opti<strong>on</strong>s if strikes against such targets are deemed necessary.The United States cannot expect c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al forces, cyberwarfare capabilities, and/or missile defenses to completelyreplace <strong>nuclear</strong> forces (unless and until <str<strong>on</strong>g>global</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>zero</str<strong>on</strong>g> becomesa reality), and these n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> capabilities in combinati<strong>on</strong>with <strong>nuclear</strong> forces cannot meaningfully limit damage to theUnited States in the event of an all-out Chinese or Russianfirst-strike. Furthermore, these n<strong>on</strong>-<strong>nuclear</strong> capabilities willnot be developed for the purpose of limiting damage to theUnited States in c<strong>on</strong>juncti<strong>on</strong> with a U.S. preventive or preemptivefirst strike against Chinese or Russian <strong>nuclear</strong> capabilities,and they may not be employed for such purposes inview of this guidance’s firm pledge not to initiate the use of<strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s against China or Russia.This no-first-use commitment does not preclude the employmentof U.S. missile defenses to attempt to defeat limited<strong>nuclear</strong> missile strikes initiated by China or Russia, whetherthose aggressive acti<strong>on</strong>s are deliberate, accidental, or unauthorized,and to buy time in c<strong>on</strong>sidering <strong>nuclear</strong> resp<strong>on</strong>seopti<strong>on</strong>s.D. NORTH KOREA, IRAN AND SYRIAThese foes of the United States and our allies in NortheastAsia and the Middle East will be pressed to forgo <strong>nuclear</strong>weap<strong>on</strong>s development and disarm. The priorities of U.S. <strong>nuclear</strong>strategy toward Iran and North Korea are: (i) prevent73

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