global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESC. CURRENT U.S.-RUSSIA NUCLEAR WEAPONS-RELATED CBMSDATE COUNTRY CBMJune 20, 1963Sept. 30,1971June 22, 1973Sept. 15,1987Sept. 23,1989Sept. 27,1991U.S.S.R. andU.S.U.S.S.R. andU.S.U.S.S.R. andU.S.U.S.S.R. andU.S.U.S.S.R. andU.S.U.S.Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link (“Hotline” Agreement) – Hotlineestablished between national command authorities in Washington and Moscow (after Cuban Missile Crisis).Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War – Agreed to notification ofmissile launches beyond national borders and prompt warning in case of accident or unauthorized launch.Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War – Agreed to consult with each other in the event of a situationof nuclear confrontation or the danger of a nuclear confrontation between them or any other countryin order to avoid risk of escalation.Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers – Nuclear Risk Reduction Centersestablished in Washington and Moscow charged with transmitting notifications of strategic ballistic missilelaunches and other information.Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises – Agreed to notify the othercountry no less than 14 days prior to carrying out any major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers.Presidential Nuclear Initiatives: Announcement Regarding the Unilateral Reduction of Nuclear Weapons– Committed to reduce and limit the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons arsenal by withdrawing all overseasdeployed ground-launched short-range weapons and destroying them as well as destroying existing U.S. stockpilesof the same weapons; de-alerting all strategic bombers and all intercontinental ballistic missiles; and ceasingdeployment of tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraftduring “normal circumstances.”Oct. 5, 1991 U.S.S.R. Presidential Nuclear Initiative: Announcement Regarding Unilateral Reductions of Nuclear Weapons –Committed to destruction of all nuclear artillery ammunition and nuclear mines; removal to central storagelocations of nuclear warheads from anti-aircraft missiles and all tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships andmultipurpose submarines; de-alerting strategic bombers and 503 ICBMs, including 134 with multiple warheads;stopping development of a short-range missile for heavy bombers and plans to develop mobile ICBMs and buildnew mobile launchers for existing ICBMs; pledging to eliminate an additional 1,000 nuclear warheads comparedto what was required by START; and a one-year unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.Jan. 29, 1992 Russia Presidential Nuclear Initiative – Stated that Russia is legal successor to the Soviet Union and will continueto adhere to all agreements related to arms control; Russia will continue to work to eliminate nuclear weapons“gradually on a parity basis.”Dec. 7, 1993 U.S. Openness Initiative – Reformed the Department of Energy’s classification and declassification system; ledto more declassification of warhead numbers, technical information on warheads, plutonium and highly-enricheduranium production and stocks and basic science related to nuclear weapons.Jan. 1994 Russia and U.S. Detargeting Agreement – Agreed to no longer target strategic ballistic missiles at each other, but missilescan be retargeted in seconds, implemented as of May 1994.Dec. 1994May 27, 1997May 24, 2000Russia, U.S.Ukraine & U.K.NATO andRussiaChina, France,Russia, U.K.,U.S.2004 India &PakistanBudapest Memorandum – Ukraine agreed to remove all nuclear weapons from its territory and sign theNPT; Russia, UK and US agree to respect Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereigntyFounding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation– Among various security measures the act contains NATO’s qualified pledge not to deploy nuclearweapons or station troops in the new member states and lays out areas of cooperation between Russia andNATO in nonproliferation, nuclear safety issues, and arms control.Target Declaration at NPT Review Conference – All nuclear weapons states party to the NPT declaredthat all their nuclear weapons are not targeted at any state.Hotline Agreement – Established hotline between Indian and Pakistani foreign ministries.52
GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESD. PROPOSED U.S.-RUSSIA NUCLEARWEAPONS-RELATED CBMSThis report concurs with the suggestions for a “special systemof confidence-building measures in the field of strategic arms”outlined by a Russian expert. The measures include severalurgent steps in the military arena in addition to “measuresto downgrade the alert mode of nuclear forces.” 88 These stepswould complement de-alerting steps as part of a broader scaffoldingof confidence building designed to avert a nuclear catastrophe.The springboard for these proposals was a summit held severalyears ago in which the presidents of the United States andRussia declared that the relationship between the two countrieshad entered a new stage and that they no longer viewedeach other as enemies (a position also stated in the 2002 U.S.Nuclear Posture Review). The expert outlines a set of tasksmeant to reinforce that declaration in general, and particularto establish confidence that (i) “there is no possibility of theunintentional use of nuclear weapons due to provocation onthe part of other countries, extremists or terrorists” and (ii) “asudden nuclear attack that gives the attacker an advantage islikewise impossible.” 89First, the two sides should provide detailed notification byeach of the parties well in advance of intended missile launches,assure the timely detection of all missile launches, andexchange real-time information on detected missile launchesand the identity of the country responsible for the launch.This sharing of missile launch information would be especiallyvaluable to Russia because of the current severe limitationson the performance of its early warning system. A joint earlywarning center, manned by Russian and U.S. personnel (andlater expanded with the participation of Chinese and others)would provide a conduit for this sharing. Russia and the UnitedStates agreed to establish such a center in a memorandumof agreement signed long ago by the two presidents (Vladimir88 Col. Gen. (Ret.) Victor Esin, unpublished paper.89 Ibid.Putin and George W. Bush). 90 It was never built. Its resuscitationwould serve both sides’ national interests.The Memorandum of Agreement signed by the U.S. and Russiain June 2000 calling for the establishment of a Joint DataExchange Center (JDEC) in Moscow envisioned that bothcountries would manage operations facilitating the exchangeof information on detected missile launches in “near-realtime,” including launches by third parties directly affecting eithercountry. 91 In the view of this <strong>commission</strong>, the JDEC wouldbenefit from including the exchange of information on cyberwarfare attacks as well missile launches. This cooperationcould assist in identifying the source of attacks. Among otherbenefits, it would provide an additional safeguard against falsewarnings of missile launch and other corrupted nuclear commandand warning processes that might otherwise result froma computer attack against a country’s nuclear systems.Second, the two countries should inform each other of the generallocation of nuclear-armed missiles that “can be launchedwith a minimal arrival time.” 92 The weapons of keenest interestin this regard are those based at sea. “It is this componentof the nuclear triad that has a significantly greater capacity tosecretly approach a target and launch missiles with a minimalarrival time.” 93 As a diagram shown previously in this reportindicates, a U.S. Trident submarine at a launch station in theNorwegian Sea could lob warheads into Russia with as little asten minutes warning provided to Russia by its ground-basedsurveillance radars. Russian decision-making within this fleetingtimeline would be fraught; a false alarm could have direconsequences for the United States and for Russia and indeedfor the world. The Russian expert wishes that the United Stateswould let Russia know when U.S. strategic submarines enteror leave waters so close to Russian borders, and vice-versa, in90 See Notes in Appendix C.91 Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, Memorandumof Agreement Between the United States of America and theRussian Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchangeof Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of MissileLaunches (JDEC MOA), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State,June 4, 2000, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4799.htm.92 Col. Gen. (Ret.) Victor Esin, unpublished paper.93 Ibid.53
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