global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report

GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESremaining in the stockpile would greatly diminish – almost allweapons previously requiring it would be eliminated from theactive inventory. This drastic curtailing of the life-extension programfor thousands of weapons currently in the pipeline wouldsave many billions of dollars.The existing plutonium pit facility at Los Alamos could readilyservice the regular pit manufacturing demands of a 900-warheadarsenal. Assuming a 50-year pit shelf life, 135 only 2 percentof the active stockpile (18 warheads) would need to be remanufacturedeach year. The facility has a normal throughput capacityof about 20 per year with the option to add extra staff shiftsin order to raise capacity to 40 pits per year. With the additionof extra equipment (5-6 years to install), the capacity could beincreased to perhaps as high as 80 per year.This number would grow higher still if old pits could be reusedand if pits with sensitive, conventional high explosives couldbe refitted with insensitive high explosives to improve safety.Current studies underway at the U.S. national laboratories to becompleted within the next couple of years should determine thefeasibility of these options. Preliminary analyses suggest that upwardsof 50 percent of plutonium pits in the stockpile could beswapped out in these processes, allowing for a much faster rateof pit replacement.In an emergency in which a systemic defect in one of the fourwarhead types warranted a crash effort to replace those warheads,it appears feasible that upwards of 120 defective weaponsper year could be remedied through a combination of pit manufacturingand pit re-use. Such a systemic defect is a low-probabilityevent, but assuming 225 defective warheads (notionallyone-fourth of the 900-warhead total) needed to be repaired, itwould take approximately two years of full-capacity work to finishthe job.In sum, the current plutonium facility – with some new equipmentworking overtime with other partners such as the Pantexfacility – could probably handle an unusual emergency to replacea big chunk of the arsenal. This capability of the existing135 This is extremely conservative. Recent government scientific studiesestimate pit longevity at 85-150 years.facilities obviates the need to build the multi-billion-dollar newfacility now in the early construction stage at Los Alamos. However,some small additional risk of reduced stockpile reliabilitymust be acknowledged if we shrink the variety of warhead typesfrom seven to four, and the margin of comfort for replacing anentire category of weapons in the event of a systemic defect isnot large. On balance, these risks appear to be quite low, andacceptable.Nevertheless, the President requests a full-scope survey by thepertinent agencies – NNSA, the national laboratories, and StrategicCommand – to determine an optimal infrastructure insupport of the 900-warhead arsenal outlined herein.I. MISSILE DEFENSE AND CONVENTIONALFORCE AUGMENTATIONWhile reducing U.S. reliance on offensive nuclear weapons onlaunch-ready alert, the United States will shift to a defensivestrategy featuring vigilant missile defenses backed by advancedconventional forces kept on constant alert and by cyber warfarecapabilities. This integrated new strategy will offset any risk incurredby the downsizing of the U.S. strategic arsenal, partiallyoffset the decrease in target coverage, and provide a cushionduring an initial 24-72 hours of conflict when U.S. offensive nuclearforces may be generated to combat alert status. It thereforewill support the goal of increasing nuclear decision time andthus have a stabilizing effect on the U.S. nuclear posture.Alert missile defenses augmented by passive defenses (e.g.,hardening, sheltering) provide especially effective tools in deterringor defeating a regional adversary such as Iran or NorthKorea for a 24-72 hour period. Such a time-limited requirementwould ease the burden on missile defenses to interceptingthe maximum number of offensive missiles that an adversarycould launch during this period – defined as the total numberof launchers times the number of reloads per launcher duringa 24-72 hour period. Missile defenses will not have to handleevery missile in the adversary’s stockpile – only those that couldbe fired during this initial phase of conflict.This reduced burden would allow a theater missile defense program,such as the adaptive system for protecting Europe from79