global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report
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GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORTDE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURESremaining in the stockpile would greatly diminish – almost allweap<strong>on</strong>s previously requiring it would be eliminated from theactive inventory. This drastic curtailing of the life-extensi<strong>on</strong> programfor thousands of weap<strong>on</strong>s currently in the pipeline wouldsave many billi<strong>on</strong>s of dollars.The existing plut<strong>on</strong>ium pit facility at Los Alamos could readilyservice the regular pit manufacturing demands of a 900-warheadarsenal. Assuming a 50-year pit shelf life, 135 <strong>on</strong>ly 2 percentof the active stockpile (18 warheads) would need to be remanufacturedeach year. The facility has a normal throughput capacityof about 20 per year with the opti<strong>on</strong> to add extra staff shiftsin order to raise capacity to 40 pits per year. With the additi<strong>on</strong>of extra equipment (5-6 years to install), the capacity could beincreased to perhaps as high as 80 per year.This number would grow higher still if old pits could be reusedand if pits with sensitive, c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al high explosives couldbe refitted with insensitive high explosives to improve safety.Current studies underway at the U.S. nati<strong>on</strong>al laboratories to becompleted within the next couple of years should determine thefeasibility of these opti<strong>on</strong>s. Preliminary analyses suggest that upwardsof 50 percent of plut<strong>on</strong>ium pits in the stockpile could beswapped out in these processes, allowing for a much faster rateof pit replacement.In an emergency in which a systemic defect in <strong>on</strong>e of the fourwarhead types warranted a crash effort to replace those warheads,it appears feasible that upwards of 120 defective weap<strong>on</strong>sper year could be remedied through a combinati<strong>on</strong> of pit manufacturingand pit re-use. Such a systemic defect is a low-probabilityevent, but assuming 225 defective warheads (noti<strong>on</strong>ally<strong>on</strong>e-fourth of the 900-warhead total) needed to be repaired, itwould take approximately two years of full-capacity work to finishthe job.In sum, the current plut<strong>on</strong>ium facility – with some new equipmentworking overtime with other partners such as the Pantexfacility – could probably handle an unusual emergency to replacea big chunk of the arsenal. This capability of the existing135 This is extremely c<strong>on</strong>servative. Recent government scientific studiesestimate pit l<strong>on</strong>gevity at 85-150 years.facilities obviates the need to build the multi-billi<strong>on</strong>-dollar newfacility now in the early c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> stage at Los Alamos. However,some small additi<strong>on</strong>al <strong>risk</strong> of reduced stockpile reliabilitymust be acknowledged if we shrink the variety of warhead typesfrom seven to four, and the margin of comfort for replacing anentire category of weap<strong>on</strong>s in the event of a systemic defect isnot large. On balance, these <strong>risk</strong>s appear to be quite low, andacceptable.Nevertheless, the President requests a full-scope survey by thepertinent agencies – NNSA, the nati<strong>on</strong>al laboratories, and StrategicCommand – to determine an optimal infrastructure insupport of the 900-warhead arsenal outlined herein.I. MISSILE DEFENSE AND CONVENTIONALFORCE AUGMENTATIONWhile reducing U.S. reliance <strong>on</strong> offensive <strong>nuclear</strong> weap<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong>launch-ready alert, the United States will shift to a defensivestrategy featuring vigilant missile defenses backed by advancedc<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al forces kept <strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>stant alert and by cyber warfarecapabilities. This integrated new strategy will offset any <strong>risk</strong> incurredby the downsizing of the U.S. strategic arsenal, partiallyoffset the decrease in target coverage, and provide a cushi<strong>on</strong>during an initial 24-72 hours of c<strong>on</strong>flict when U.S. offensive <strong>nuclear</strong>forces may be generated to combat alert status. It thereforewill support the goal of increasing <strong>nuclear</strong> decisi<strong>on</strong> time andthus have a stabilizing effect <strong>on</strong> the U.S. <strong>nuclear</strong> posture.Alert missile defenses augmented by passive defenses (e.g.,hardening, sheltering) provide especially effective tools in deterringor defeating a regi<strong>on</strong>al adversary such as Iran or NorthKorea for a 24-72 hour period. Such a time-limited requirementwould ease the burden <strong>on</strong> missile defenses to interceptingthe maximum number of offensive missiles that an adversarycould launch during this period – defined as the total numberof launchers times the number of reloads per launcher duringa 24-72 hour period. Missile defenses will not have to handleevery missile in the adversary’s stockpile – <strong>on</strong>ly those that couldbe fired during this initial phase of c<strong>on</strong>flict.This reduced burden would allow a theater missile defense program,such as the adaptive system for protecting Europe from79