ECONOMY

544 the non-politics of monetary policy
Mayer,T.1998. The monetarist policy debate: an informal retrospective. In Economics and
Methodology: Crossing Boundaries, ed. R. E. Backhouse, D. M. Hausman, U. Maki, and
A. Salanti. New York: St Martin’s Press.
Meltzer Commission 2000. International financial institutions reform. Available at: www.
house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.htm; accessed 16 May 2005.
Mueller,D.2003. Public Choice, 3rd edn. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
New York Times 2005. Editorial: an insecure nation. Real security, or politics as usual? 1 May.
Olson, M.1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Nordhaus,W.D.1975. The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42: 169–90.
Persson, T., and Tabellini, G. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Rich, B.1994. Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the
Crisis of Development. Boston: Beacon Press.
Rogoff, K.1985. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100: 1169–89.
and Sibert, S.1988. Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. Review of Economic
Studies, 55: 1–16.
Sen,A.1981. Poverty and Famines. New York: Clarendon Press.
Shepsle, K.,andWeingast, B.1987. The institutional foundations of committee power.
American Political Science Review, 81: 86–108.
Stokes,G.2001. Why the west? Lingua Franca, 11: 30–8.
Tullock, G.,Seldon, A.,andBrady, G.L.2002. Government Failure: A Primer in Public
Choice. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.
USA Today. 2005. Gallup poll results. 15 Mar., www.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/2005-
03-15-poll.htm; accessed 26 Apr. 2005.
Waller,C.J.1989. Monetary policy games and central bank politics. Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, 21: 422–31.
1992. A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 29: 411–28.
Walsh,C.1995. Optimal contracts for central bankers. American Economic Review, 85: 150–67.
Wittman, D.1989. Why democracies produce efficient results. Journal of Political Economy,
97: 1395–424.
1995. The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are Efficient. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.