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ECONOMY

Weingast - Wittman (eds) - Handbook of Political Ecnomy

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subject index 1089<br />

see also American politics, new<br />

separation-of-powers approach to<br />

sequential bargaining (Baron-Ferejohn model), and<br />

coalition formation 168–70<br />

Serbia, and democratization 662<br />

service sector, and employment in 646–7<br />

shame, and pro-social emotions 962–3<br />

shirking, and evolutionary models of behavior 19<br />

single non-transferable vote 113, 114–15<br />

single transferable vote 112<br />

single-member districts 104<br />

Slovakia, and democratization 662<br />

Slovenia, and democratization 661–2, 664<br />

social choice:<br />

and collective preference theory 902–5<br />

core emptiness 908–9<br />

large populations 907<br />

opportunities for trade 906–7<br />

and collectivities 972–3<br />

and constitutional design 973<br />

and decision-making 972<br />

as descriptive theory 974<br />

and dictatorships 972<br />

and distributive justice 374–6<br />

and endstate cum procedural justice 381–3<br />

and endstate justice 376–8<br />

and endstate/procedural justice<br />

complementarity 379–81<br />

and fair division 373<br />

and game theory 905–6<br />

core emptiness 910–12<br />

and impossibility theorem 373<br />

and macro political economy 526–7<br />

and mechanism design 373<br />

and origins of 373<br />

and procedural justice 378<br />

and resource allocation, modeling of 374–6<br />

and social welfare functions 526–7<br />

and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms 383–6<br />

and strategy-proofness 382–3<br />

see also social evaluation<br />

social contract, see contractarian theories<br />

social evaluation 421–2<br />

and alternatives 408–9<br />

and Arrow’s theorem 409, 419<br />

and axioms 413–16<br />

anonymity 413–14<br />

continuity 414<br />

independence condition 415<br />

independence of irrelevant alternatives 409, 412<br />

minimal equity 414–15<br />

Pareto indifference 412<br />

unlimited domain 412<br />

and information invariance 417–19<br />

and interpersonal comparisons 408<br />

and Pareto indifference 409<br />

and social evaluation functionals 409, 411–12<br />

and social evaluation orderings:<br />

dictatorial 415–16<br />

leximin 416<br />

utilitarianism 416<br />

and theorem statements 419–21<br />

and utility functions 409, 410<br />

and utility profiles 409, 411<br />

and welfarism 409, 411–13, 421–2<br />

and well-being 409–10<br />

interpersonal comparisons 409, 410–11<br />

measurability 409–10<br />

social groups, and voting behavior 41–2<br />

social planning, and public sector 442, 443<br />

social relations, and interest 944<br />

social welfare:<br />

and inequality 629–30<br />

and maximization of 442<br />

and social welfare functions 526–7<br />

sociology, see economic sociology<br />

South Africa 681<br />

South-East Asian crisis (1997–8) 524<br />

Soviet Union, and democratization 662<br />

Spain:<br />

and ethnicity 854<br />

and federalism 366<br />

spatial models of policy-making, and<br />

bicameralism 181–4<br />

spatial relationships, see economic geography<br />

spatial theory of voting 29–30, 65<br />

and candidate divergence 35<br />

candidate preferences 37<br />

political parties’ platform choices 37–8<br />

third parties 36–7<br />

valence issues 36<br />

and criticisms of 30–1<br />

and cut-points 33–4<br />

and equilibrium analysis of public finance 452–3<br />

probabilistic spatial voting models 449–50,<br />

451–2<br />

and median voter theorem 29, 31<br />

and paradoxes of rationality 43<br />

attempted resolutions of 40–2<br />

rational ignorance 39–40<br />

rational non-participation 38–40<br />

and valence issues 32–5<br />

and voters’ sources of information 43–6<br />

see also voting behavior; voting theory<br />

specific factors model, and international<br />

trade 818–20<br />

speech, freedom of, and United States Supreme<br />

Court 344–6<br />

stability:<br />

and bicameralism 182–3<br />

and neo-realism 834–5<br />

state, the:<br />

and anthropology 709<br />

and formation of 716–18<br />

and international bargaining 766–8<br />

and international monetary relations 588–9<br />

cooperation 590–1<br />

coordination 589–90<br />

as object of study 981–2<br />

and organic conceptualization of 981<br />

and political competition 1010–11<br />

and role in development 718–20<br />

creation of institutions 709<br />

equilibrium path 712–15<br />

international relations 710<br />

necessity of 708

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