ECONOMY

arry r. weingast & donald a. wittman 19
show more of these qualities than marsupials. Without pro-social emotions, all humans
(rather than just a few) might be sociopaths, and human society as we know
it might not exist despite the institutions of contract, government law enforcement,
and reputation. 22
Groups that overcome prisoner’s dilemmas (and other social dilemmas) are likely
to be more productive in gathering food and more successful in warfare against other
groups. In turn, this leads to greater reproductive success. The central question for
evolutionary models is how, if at all, evolutionary pressure keeps individual shirking
in check. It seems, for example, that a person who is slightly less brave in battle is
more likely to survive and have children than his braver compatriots. Bravery at once
increases the risk for the brave while making it more likely that the less brave survive.
If bravery/cowardice is genetic, how is a downward spiral of cowardice prevented?
The answer proceeds along the following lines: if the individuals are punished for
shirking (in this case, being cowardly), this will keep them in line. But, because engaging
in punishment is costly (possibly resulting in the would-be punisher’s death),
who will do the punishing? The evolutionary approach suggests that punishment, a
kind of vengeance, will be a successful strategy for the punisher if he gains even a mild
fitness advantage (status, more females, etc.). This is because, in equilibrium, the cost
to the punisher is relatively small since punishment does not have to be meted out
very often. Punishment need not be carried out frequently to be effective. It is the
threat that is important. To the degree that shirkers by being punished (possibly by
being banished from the tribe) become less fit, the need to engage in punishment
decreases even more as there are fewer shirkers. And given that those who punish are
more aligned with the interests of the society and therefore may be more likely to
survive, there may be enough potential punishers so that the need for any individual
to bear the costs of punishment is reduced still further (which of course means that
the benefits received will also be reduced). If altruism and vengeance are gene based
rather than meme based, there may have been a co-evolution of memes and genes.
Over the eons, human society may have encouraged pro-social genetically based
emotions. 23
The force of this argument is that pro-social emotions bypass the cognitive optimizing
process that is at the core of rational economic man. This cognitive difference
implies that at times we should observe profound differences between the evolutionary
model and the economic model. Under certain circumstances, seemingly
irrational behavior, such as vengeance or shame, may be evolutionarily stable even if
it runs counter to utility maximization. Moreover the relatively slow genetic evolution
in comparison with meme evolution (especially in the last 100 years) yields a further
²² For further discussion along these lines see Bowles and Gintis, this volume; Friedman and Singh
2000; Boydetal.2003; Gintisetal.2005.
²³ This just gives the flavor of the argument. Once again, it is worthwhile to emphasize that the
research summarized here employs very carefully specified models. The challenge for researchers in the
field is to characterize a situation where vengeance survives, but does not become so intense that it
undermines social relations. At the same time, the researcher must account for the possibility that
non-vengeful types may want to mimic vengeful types. Finally, the researcher must mix the memes and
genes so that they are in a stable equilibrium.