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ECONOMY

Weingast - Wittman (eds) - Handbook of Political Ecnomy

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ui j. p. de figueiredo, tonja jacobi & barry r. weingast 207<br />

Table 11.2 Regulatory appointments to the NLRB<br />

Predicted sign of change<br />

Actual sign of change Total<br />

− 0 +<br />

− 6 3 1 10<br />

0 3 12 3 18<br />

+ 0 6 9 15<br />

Total 9 21 13 43<br />

Source: Snyder and Weingast 2000, table 2.<br />

Table 11.2 summarizes the results. As can be seen, most appointees are as predicted:<br />

when the predicted sign change of the median is negative (a move to the right),<br />

60 per cent of the actual appointees move the median to the left; when the predicted<br />

sign is 0, two-thirdsareaspredicted;andwhenthepredictedsignispositive,<br />

60 per cent are as predicted. Moreover, using a nested-regression framework, they test<br />

this model against both the null model and the presidential dominance hypothesis<br />

(predicting that only the president’s preferences matter). The separation-of-powers<br />

model outperforms both the presidential dominance and null models.<br />

In short, the model shows the importance of the interaction of the president and<br />

Senate with respect to appointments. Both branches matter, and the president must<br />

take the Senate’s preferences into account when making nominations, lest she risk<br />

failure.<br />

2.1 Conclusions<br />

The new separation-of-powers approach provides powerful new insights into presidential<br />

behavior. The use of spatial models and other techniques affords an accounting<br />

system that allows us to keep track of different parameters in the political<br />

environment, in turn, allowing us to say how presidential behavior varies with the<br />

political environment. The models of veto behavior, budgets, and appointments all<br />

show the systematic influence of Congress on the president. To further her goals, the<br />

president must anticipate the interaction with Congress.<br />

3 The Courts<br />

.............................................................................<br />

As with the other branches, the courts operate within, and constitute part of, the<br />

political system: the policy positions of Congress, the president, and the bureaucracy<br />

constrain judges in their policy-making role. The new separation-of-powers analysis<br />

shows how the formal constraints that operate on the judiciary force it to consider

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