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564 political-economic cycles 2000. Election timing in majoritarian parliaments. Paper presented at APSA Annual Meetings. Tsebelis, G.2002. Veto Players. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tufte, E.1975. Determinants of the outcomes of midterm congressional elections. American Political Science Review, 69: 812–26. 1978. Political Control of the Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wittman, D.1977. Candidates with policy preferences: a dynamic model. Joumal of Economic Theory, 14: 180–9. Wright, G.1974. The political economy of New-Deal spending. Review of Economics and Statistics, 56: 30–9.
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the oxford handbook of ............
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the oxford handbooks of political s
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Dedicated to my parents, Barbara an
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viii contents 9. Coalition Governme
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x contents PART IX DEMOCRACY AND CA
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xii contents 56. The Future of Anal
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xiv about the contributors CharlesM
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xvi about the contributors Thomas R
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part i ............................
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4 introduction: the reach of politi
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10 introduction: the reach of polit
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part ii ...........................
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30 voters, candidates, and parties
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chapter 3 .........................
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52 rational voters and political ad
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chapter 4 .........................
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66 candidate objectives and elector
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68candidate objectives and electora
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78candidate objectives and electora
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chapter 5 .........................
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86 political income redistribution
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chapter 6 .........................
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104 the impact of electoral laws th
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106 the impact of electoral laws No
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108 the impact of electoral laws Th
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110 the impact of electoral laws ba
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112 the impact of electoral laws a
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114 the impact of electoral laws Ce
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116 the impact of electoral laws Re
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118 the impact of electoral laws Ta
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chapter 7 .........................
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michael laver 123 motion of confide
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michael laver 125 to turn individua
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michael laver 127 terms legislative
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michael laver 129 If parliamentaria
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michael laver 131 fund the costs of
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michael laver 133 than smaller cart
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michael laver 135 dominated by the
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michael laver 137 policy positions
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michael laver 139 and Stevenson, R.
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chapter 8 .........................
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gary w. cox 143 3 The Legislative S
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gary w. cox 145 coalitions at diffe
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gary w. cox 147 powers wielded by o
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gary w. cox 149 the literature does
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gary w. cox 151 In general, assembl
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7.3 Roll Rates gary w. cox 153 The
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gary w. cox 155 One argument in whi
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gary w. cox 157 (1) complex/conflic
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gary w. cox 159 Baron, D.1998. Comp
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gary w. cox 161 and S. Smith, S.199
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daniel diermeier 163 It is the dist
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daniel diermeier 165 super-majority
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daniel diermeier 167 AC BC C Dimens
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daniel diermeier 169 accepted, the
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daniel diermeier 171 The demand bar
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daniel diermeier 173 6 Non-cooperat
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daniel diermeier 175 section, this
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daniel diermeier 177 References Ans
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daniel diermeier 179 1998. Efficien
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michael cutrone & nolan mC carty 18
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chapter 11 ........................
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ui j. p. de figueiredo, tonja jacob
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chapter 12 ........................
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keith krehbiel 225 Conventional wis
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keith krehbiel 227 Outcomes p I II
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keith krehbiel 229 Outcome I II III
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keith krehbiel 231 No rolls Minorit
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keith krehbiel 233 5 Endogenous Sta
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keith krehbiel 235 Table 12.2 Sum o
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keith krehbiel 237 Sum of squared r
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keith krehbiel 239 paucity of major
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chapter 13 ........................
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charles m. cameron 243 causal mecha
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charles m. cameron 245 (3) the pres
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charles m. cameron 247 way: the bla
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charles m. cameron 249 president wh
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charles m. cameron 251 leaving the
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charles m. cameron 253 This topic i
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charles m. cameron 255 Lewis, D.200
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john d. huber & charles r. shipan 2
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chapter 15 ........................
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mathew d. m C cubbins & daniel b. r
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part v ............................
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290 constitutionalism In general, i
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292 constitutionalism can make a la
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294 constitutionalism “reasonable
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296 constitutionalism the Electoral
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298 constitutionalism But you may n
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300 constitutionalism certain commo
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302 constitutionalism behavior. In
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304 constitutionalism government, T
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306 constitutionalism Hume (1739-40
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308 constitutionalism coordination
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310 constitutionalism Hobbes,T.1642
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chapter 17 ........................
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314 self-enforcingdemocracy individ
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316 self-enforcingdemocracy First t
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318 self-enforcingdemocracy 5 4 3 2
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320 self-enforcingdemocracy democra
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322 self-enforcingdemocracy Thus, l
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324 self-enforcingdemocracy point i
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326 self-enforcingdemocracy whether
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328 self-enforcingdemocracy Marx,K.
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330 constitutions as expressive doc
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chapter 19 ........................
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344 the protection of liberty, prop
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358 federalism factors. Moreover, t
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360 federalism classics of politica
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362 federalism federations, provinc
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364 federalism work on federalism
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366 federalism skewed income distri
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368 federalism literature often com
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370 federalism Musgrave, R.1959. Th
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chapter 21 ........................
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hervé moulin 375 the set R contai
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hervé moulin 377 Endstate justice:
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hervé moulin 379 4 The Complementa
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hervé moulin 381 whether direct or
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hervé moulin 383 The advantages of
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hervé moulin 385 will submit a bid
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hervé moulin 387 References Ausube
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hervé moulin 389 Pattanaik,P.K.,an
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donald g. saari 391 C 9 + 2s C 3 4
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donald g. saari 393 winner Ann wins
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donald g. saari 395 desired A ∼ C
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donald g. saari 397 C Procedure lin
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donald g. saari 399 where the plura
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donald g. saari 401 In selecting th
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donald g. saari 403 Next, add “co
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donald g. saari 405 7 Arrow and Sen
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donald g. saari 407 References Arro
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charles blackorby & walter bossert
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chapter 24 ........................
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steven j. brams 427 50 per cent van
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steven j. brams 429 3. Assume playe
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steven j. brams 431 Solving for x g
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steven j. brams 433 adifferent set
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steven j. brams 435 Next consider a
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steven j. brams 437 Shishido, H.,an
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chapter 25 ........................
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stanley l. winer & walter hettich 4
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jürgen von hagen 465 are, the grea
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jürgen von hagen 467 induce a shif
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jürgen von hagen 469 targeted poli
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jürgen von hagen 471 final budget
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jürgen von hagen 473 an elevated p
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jürgen von hagen 475 References Ad
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jürgen von hagen 477 Persson,T.,Ro
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chapter 27 ........................
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john ledyard 481 Does this mean one
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john ledyard 483 produced. Taxes ar
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john ledyard 485 markets to attain
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john ledyard 487 Example 15: Suppos
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john ledyard 489 So we have two int
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john ledyard 491 for mechanisms tha
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john ledyard 493 particular mechani
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john ledyard 495 Myerson (1981) cal
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3.4 “Voting Works” in Large Env
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john ledyard 499 maximize their pro
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john ledyard 501 and Satterthwaite,
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david e. wildasin 503 warrant furth
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david e. wildasin 505 mobility impl
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david e. wildasin 507 A r' = r* + t
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david e. wildasin 509 equivalent in
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david e. wildasin 511 (on property)
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david e. wildasin 513 First, the pa
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david e. wildasin 515 be assessed,
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david e. wildasin 517 can materiali
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david e. wildasin 519 political par
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part viii .........................
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524 the non-politics of monetary po
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Page 1112: 538 the non-politics of monetary po
Page 1128: 546 political-economic cycles diffe
Page 1132: 548 political-economic cycles this
Page 1136: 550 political-economic cycles As th
Page 1140: 552 political-economic cycles incen
Page 1144: 554 political-economic cycles unemp
Page 1148: 556 political-economic cycles prefe
Page 1152: 558 political-economic cycles polic
Page 1156: 560 political-economic cycles oppos
Page 1160: 562 political-economic cycles Downs
Page 1166: chapter 31 ........................
Page 1170: douglas a. hibbs, jr. 567 importanc
Page 1174: douglas a. hibbs, jr. 569 Taking av
Page 1178: douglas a. hibbs, jr. 571 (6) to be
Page 1182: douglas a. hibbs, jr. 573 If equati
Page 1186: douglas a. hibbs, jr. 575 forward-l
Page 1190: douglas a. hibbs, jr. 577 % 65 Real
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Page 1198: douglas a. hibbs, jr. 581 to the co
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Page 1206: douglas a. hibbs, jr. 585 1982b. On
Page 1210: chapter 32 ........................
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j. lawrence broz & jeffry a. friede
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chapter 33 ........................
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torben iversen 603 economic institu
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torben iversen 605 for example, sug
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torben iversen 607 represent partis
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torben iversen 609 Clearly this tas
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torben iversen 611 elites that oppo
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torben iversen 613 the middle class
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torben iversen 615 are exposed to r
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torben iversen 617 a historical acc
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torben iversen 619 2004. Fighting P
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torben iversen 621 Kelly,N.J.2005.
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torben iversen 623 Schmitter, P.197
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edward l. glaeser 625 less redistri
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edward l. glaeser 627 redistributio
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edward l. glaeser 629 Inequality th
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edward l. glaeser 631 takenasfirstc
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edward l. glaeser 633 as Przeworski
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edward l. glaeser 635 than European
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edward l. glaeser 637 pre-existing
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edward l. glaeser 639 5 Conclusion
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edward l. glaeser 641 Reagan, R.198
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anne wren 643 We will begin by desc
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anne wren 645 Lange and Garrett’s
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anne wren 647 the policy goals of s
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anne wren 649 now weigh demands for
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anne wren 651 innovation and the ma
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anne wren 653 management. On the ot
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anne wren 655 Sargent,T.,andWallace
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anna grzymala-busse & pauline jones
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chapter 37 ........................
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daron acemoglu & james a. robinson
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chapter 38 ........................
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stephen haber 695 A number of schol
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stephen haber 697 This is not to sa
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stephen haber 699 information, or a
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stephen haber 701 4 The Logic of Co
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stephen haber 703 of command. Alfre
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stephen haber 705 Recent research b
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stephen haber 707 Mackey, S.2003. T
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obert h. bates 709 use of power fro
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obert h. bates 711 village and kins
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obert h. bates 713 his income from
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obert h. bates 715 When G is willin
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5.1 Demand-driven Explanation rober
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obert h. bates 719 promoted order a
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obert h. bates 721 Fudenberg, D.,an
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chapter 40 ........................
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torsten persson & guido tabellini 7
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3.2 Indirect Effects torsten persso
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chapter 41 ........................
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anthony j. venables 741 Table 41.1
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anthony j. venables 743 and low pro
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anthony j. venables 745 avoiding th
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anthony j. venables 747 The model i
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anthony j. venables 749 advantages
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anthony j. venables 751 which fisca
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anthony j. venables 753 Henderson,
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part xi ...........................
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758 international political economy
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chapter 43 ........................
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780 national borders and the size o
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800 european integration became evi
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802 european integration concession
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804 european integration political
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806 european integration which can
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808 european integration of governm
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810 european integration appointed
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812 european integration setting an
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chapter 45 ........................
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816 trade, immigration, and cross-b
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chapter 46 ........................
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uce bueno de mesquita 833 de Mesqui
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uce bueno de mesquita 835 They note
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uce bueno de mesquita 837 the tempo
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uce bueno de mesquita 839 In place
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uce bueno de mesquita 841 An altern
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uce bueno de mesquita 843 from thei
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uce bueno de mesquita 845 Autocrats
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uce bueno de mesquita 847 before. T
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uce bueno de mesquita 849 and Lalma
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uce bueno de mesquita 851 Smith, A.
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james d. fearon 853 in which member
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james d. fearon 855 Table 47.1 Desc
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james d. fearon 857 Finally, a numb
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james d. fearon 859 preferences wil
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james d. fearon 861 next door in Za
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james d. fearon 863 Thus, Cetinyan
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james d. fearon 865 relationship be
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james d. fearon 867 2000b. Violence
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chapter 48 ........................
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dan reiter & allan c. stam 871 As w
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dan reiter & allan c. stam 873 may
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dan reiter & allan c. stam 875 audi
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dan reiter & allan c. stam 877 Refe
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dan reiter & allan c. stam 879 Mill
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chapter 49 ........................
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stergios skaperdas 883 following co
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stergios skaperdas 885 The marginal
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stergios skaperdas 887 other benefi
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stergios skaperdas 889 Since the tw
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stergios skaperdas 891 In particula
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stergios skaperdas 893 The multipli
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stergios skaperdas 895 Esteban, J.M
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part xiii .........................
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900 economic methods in political t
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916 laboratory experiments economic
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918 laboratory experiments the core
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920 laboratory experiments 2.3 TheR
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922 laboratory experiments or distr
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924 laboratory experiments Collier
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926 laboratory experiments 3.3 Asym
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928 laboratory experiments In fact,
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930 laboratory experiments Hence th
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932 laboratory experiments There ar
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934 laboratory experiments Palfrey,
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936 laboratory experiments Morton,
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938 the tool kit of economic sociol
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952 the evolutionary basis of colle
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Table 53.1 Seven experimental games
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part xiv ..........................
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972 questions about a paradox becau
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974 questions about a paradox you s
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976 questions about a paradox I’m
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978questionsaboutaparadox influence
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chapter 55 ........................
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982 politics and scientific enquiry
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chapter 56 ........................
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998 the future of analytical politi
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1000 the future of analytical polit
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1002 the future of analytical polit
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1004 what is missing from political
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chapter 58 ........................
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1012 modeling party competition in
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1032 the riker objection revisited
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Name Index ........................
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1052 name index Caesar 307-8 Cain,
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1054 name index Eyerman, J 875 Eyta
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1056 name index Hertzendorf, M N 59
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1058 name index Lijphart, A 103, 10
Page 2156:
1060 name index North, D C 20 n24,
Page 2160:
1062 name index Rowe, D M 771 Rowth
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1064 name index Talvi, E 466, 473 T
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Subject Index .....................
Page 2172:
1068 subject index Bulgaria 314 bur
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1070 subject index constitutionalis
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1072 subject index democratization
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1074 subject index economics, and f
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1076 subject index European Court o
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1078 subject index game theory: (co
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1080 subject index International Co
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1082 subject index liberalization:
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1084 subject index partisanship: (c
Page 2208:
1086 subject index political-econom
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1088 subject index and policy 43-4
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1090 subject index state, the: (con
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1092 subject index United States Su
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