ECONOMY

1092 subject index
United States Supreme Court: (cont.)
and Minnesota vs Clover Leaf Creamery Co
(1981) 347
and Munn vs Illinois 350
and Nebbia vs New York (1934) 350
and NewYorkTimesvsSullivan(1964) 345
and Penn Central Transp Co vs New York (1978) 353
and Penn Central vs New York (1978) 353
and Pennsylvania Coal Co vs Mahon (1923) 352–3
and Plessy vs Ferguson (1896) 346
and protection of contract and property 347
contracts affected with the public interest 350–1
contracts clause 347–8
economic liberties 348–50
takings clause 351–4
and Reed vs Reed (1971) 347
and Slaughterhouse Cases (1872) 348, 349
and Smyth vs Ames (1898) 350
and social and moral issues:
equal protection of the laws 346–7
freedom of speech 344–6
and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc vs Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency (2002) 354
and Truax vs Raich (1915) 349
and United States vs Addyston Pipe & Steel Co
(1899) 349
and Usery vs Turner Elkhorn Mining Co (1976) 348
and Virginia Board of Pharmacy vs Virginia
Consumer Council (1976) 346
and West Lynn Creamery vs Healy (1994) 351
and Yee vs Escondido (1992) 351
urban economics 739
utilitarianism 983, 988
utility maximization 4
and voting behavior 38–9
valence issues:
and candidate divergence 36, 926
and spatial theory of voting 32–5
varieties of capitalism 614–17
and coordinated market economies 615
and institutional complementarity 615
and liberal market economies 615
and relationship of economic/political
institutions 616
and role of economic institutions 614–15
and state’s economic role 650–1
and welfare state 615–16
veil of ignorance 1035–6
Venezuela 319, 701
vengeance 18
veto rights/powers:
and American presidency
new separation-of-powers approach 202–4
political economy approach 242, 245–7, 250–1
and negative agenda power 149–50
gridlock 151–2
reactions to gridlock 152
roll rates of veto players 153
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms 384–5
and allocation of public goods 487–92
Virginia School 455
virtual representation 303–4
voice, and fiscal competition 512–14
vote motivation, and monetary policy 534–5
voting, and allocation of public goods
in large Bayesian environments 495–6
in large environments 497
majority rule 485–7, 489–91
voting behavior:
and citizen duty 40–1
and consumption approach 42
and deterministic voting 67–8
office motivation 68–70
policy motivation 70–2
and economic voting 548
and electoral framework 66–7
and expressive activity 333–5
and expressive voting 41
and game theory 910–12
and group rule utilitarianism 41–2
and impact of electoral rules 527
and information aggregation 15–17, 928–9
and information revelation 11–15
candidate quality 15
election-timing 12
pressure group finance 12–14
and laboratory experiments on elections 922
asymmetric contests 926
candidate convergence 923
median voter theorem 923–4
multicandidate elections 924–5
retrospective voting 923–4
andmedianvotertheorem 29, 31
and paradoxes of rationality 43, 304, 333
attempted resolutions of 40–2
rational ignorance 39–40
rational non-participation 38–40
and party identification 997
and political advertising 12–13, 45–6
directly informative 57–9
indirectly informative 53–7
role of 455–6
and political-economic cycles:
electioneering 545
partisaneering 545–6
and probabilistic voting, stochastic partisanship
model 72–3
vote motivation 73–5
win motivation 75–7
and probabilistic voting, stochastic preference
model 77–8
policy motivation 80–1
vote motivation 78–9
win motivation 79–80
and prospective voting 569–71, 572–5
and rationality 333–4, 335, 550–1
and retrospective voting 468, 569–71, 575–8, 923–4
and sources of information 43–6
and spatial theory of voting 29–30
candidate divergence 35–8
criticisms of 30–1
cut-points 33–4
valence issues 32–5
and strategic voting 102, 110
and turnout 929–32