ECONOMY

62 rational voters and political advertising
this is an unrealistic requirement, especially in a sphere of decision-making, such as
voting, which is characterized by both free riding and complexity. Agreeing with such
an objection does not imply going back to the “black box.” A microfounded model of
campaign finance need not include full Bayesian rationality. On the contrary, it would
be interesting to develop a model of campaign finance starting from non-standard assumptions
on the way voters make decisions. Such model could incorporate some of
the cognitive biases that are by now well documented in the psychological literature.
A non-Bayesian microfounded model of campaign finance would still be amenable
to welfare analysis, and may provide insights that are not available with rational
voters.
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