04.10.2015 Views

ECONOMY

Weingast - Wittman (eds) - Handbook of Political Ecnomy

Weingast - Wittman (eds) - Handbook of Political Ecnomy

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS
  • No tags were found...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

charles blackorby & walter bossert 421<br />

ordering ranks utility vectors which have the same sum. However, it shows that<br />

there do not exist many orderings other than utilitarianism and leximin satisfying<br />

the axioms of the theorem statement. The following two theorems illustrate how<br />

utilitarianism or leximin can be obtained by modifying one or another of the axioms.<br />

We begin with utilitarianism, which has received a considerable amount of attention<br />

in the literature on social choice. The following theorem is due to Maskin (1978;<br />

see also Deschamps and Gevers 1978). It is obtained by replacing minimal equity with<br />

continuity in Theorem 6.<br />

Theorem 7: Suppose there are at least three individuals. A social evaluation<br />

ordering satisfies anonymity, strong Pareto, continuity, independence of the utilities<br />

of unconcerned individuals, and information invariance with respect to cardinal full<br />

comparability if and only if it is utilitarian.<br />

Theorem 7 illustrates the power of the continuity axiom. Leximin clearly is not<br />

continuous and neither is leximax. Consequently, neither of these principles survives<br />

if this property is added. Because minimal equity is required in Theorem 6 only<br />

to exclude leximax, it is no longer needed in Theorem 7 because this principle is<br />

already ruled out by continuity. Continuity also forces equal goodness according to<br />

utilitarianism to be respected if the corresponding betterness relation is respected<br />

and, therefore, utilitarianism rather than the weakly utilitarian rules are obtained.<br />

D’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) provide an alternative characterization of utilitarianism<br />

that does not require the independence axiom (see also Blackwell and Girshick<br />

1954;Milnor1954;andRoberts1980b).<br />

A characterization of the leximin ordering due to d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977)<br />

replaces information invariance with respect to cardinal full comparability by information<br />

invariance with respect to ordinal full comparability in Theorem 6.<br />

Theorem 8: Suppose there are at least three individuals. A social evaluation ordering<br />

satisfies anonymity, strong Pareto, minimal equity, independence of the utilities of<br />

unconcerned individuals, and information invariance with respect to ordinal full<br />

comparability if and only if it is leximin.<br />

Clearly, ordinal full comparability rules out all weakly utilitarian principles (including<br />

utilitarianism itself) and, as a consequence, Theorem 8 follows immediately from<br />

Theorem 6.<br />

Hammond (1976) provides an alternative characterization of leximin. Because it<br />

does not employ an information invariance condition, we do not state it here.<br />

6 Concluding Remarks<br />

.............................................................................<br />

This chapter provides a brief introduction to welfarist social choice theory. It is argued<br />

that the most promising route of escape from the negative conclusion of Arrow’s

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!