ECONOMY

462 the structure of public finance
Niskanen, W.A.,Jr. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine-
Atherton.
Olson, M.,Jr. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Osborne, M.J.,andSlivinsky, A.1996. A model of political competition with citizencandidates.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111: 65–96.
Ostrom, E.1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pantaleoni, M.1883. Contribution to the theory of the distribution of public expenditure.
Repr. as pp. 16–27 in Classics in the Theory of Public Finance,ed.R.MusgraveandA.Peacock.
New York: Macmillan, 1958.
Persson, T.,Roland, G.,andTabellini, G.2004. How do electoral rules shape party structures,
government coalitions, and economic policies? CESifo Working Paper No. 1115.
and Tabellini, G.2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.
Pigou, A.C.1951. A Study in Public Finance, 3rd edn. London: Macmillan.
Profeta,P.2002. Retirement and social security in a probabilistic voting model. International
Tax and Public Finance, 9: 331–48.
Ramsey,F.P.1927. A contribution to the theory of taxation. Economic Journal, 37: 47–61.
Riker,W.H.1986. The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Roemer, J.E.2001. Political Competition: Theory and Application. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
2003. Indeterminacy of citizen candidate equilibrium. Cowles Foundation Discussion
Paper No. 1410.
Romer, T.1975. Individual welfare, majority voting and the properties of a linear income tax.
Journal of Public Economics, 4: 163–85.
Rutherford, T.,andWiner, S.L.1990. Endogenous policy in a computational general
equilibrium framework. Pp. 285–309 in S. Winer, Political Economy in Federal States: Selected
Essays of Stanley L. Winer, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002.
Salanié,B.2000. Microeconomics of Market Failure. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Samuelson, P.A.1954. The pure theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 36: 387–9.
Schofield, N. 1978. Instability of simple dynamic games. Review of Economic Studies,
45: 575–94.
2003. Valence competition in the spatial stochastic model. Journal of Theoretical Politics,
15: 371–83.
Schumpeter,J.A.1954. History of Economic Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shepsle, K.A.,andWeingast, B.R.1981. Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative
choice. Public Choice, 37: 503–19.
Shoven, J.B.,andWhalley, J.1992. General Equilibrium Modeling. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Skaperdas, S.2003. Restraining the genuine homo economicus: why the economy cannot be
divorced from its governance. Economics and Politics, 15: 135–62.
Stigler, G. 1972. Economic competition and political competition. Public Choice, 13:
91–106.
Tiebout, C.M.1956. A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy,
64: 416–24.
Tullock,G.1967. The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft. Western Economic Journal,
5: 224–32.