ECONOMY

daniel diermeier 177
References
Ansolabehere, S.,Snyder, J.M.J.,Strauss, A.B.,andTing, M.M.2003. Voting weights
and voter advantages in the formation of coalition governments. Mimeo.
Austen-Smith, D.,andBanks, J.S.1988. Elections, coalitions and legislative outcomes.
American Political Science Review , 82: 405–22.
1990. Stable governments and the allocation of policy portfolios. American Political Science
Review, 84: 891–906.
2005. Positive Political Theory, ii:Strategies and Structures. AnnArbor:Universityof
Michigan Press.
Axelrod,R.1970. Conflict of Interest. Chicago: Markham.
1972. Where the votes come from: an analysis of electoral coalitions. American Political
Science Review, 66: 11–20.
Banks,J.S.,andDuggan,J.2000. A bargaining model of collective choice. American Political
Science Review, 94: 73–88.
2003. A bargaining model of legislative policy-making. Mimeo.
Baron, D.P.1989. A noncooperative theory of legislative coalitions. American Journal of
Political Science, 33: 1048–84.
1991. A spatial theory of government formation in parliamentary systems. American
Political Science Review, 85: 137–65.
1993. Government formation and endogenous parties. American Political Science Review,
87: 34–47.
1996. A dynamic theory of collective goods programs. American Political Science Review,
90: 316–30.
1998. Comparative dynamics of parliamentary governments. American Political Science
Review, 92: 593–609.
and Diermeier, D.2001. Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation
systems. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116: 933–67.
and Ferejohn, J.A.1989. Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review,
83: 1181–206.
Binmore, K.1986. Bargaining and coalitions. In Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, ed.
A. Roth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Browne,E.C.,andFranklin,M.1973. Aspects of coalition payoffs in European parliamentary
democracies. American Political Science Review, 67: 453–69.
and Frendreis,J.P.1980.Allocatingcoalitionpayoffs by conventional norm: assessment
of the evidence for cabinet coalition situations. American Journal of Political Science, 24:
753–68.
and Gleiber, D.W.1984. An “events” approach to the problem of cabinet stability.
Comparative Political Studies, 17: 167–97.
1986. The process of cabinet dissolution: an exponential model of duration and stability
in western democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 30: 628–50.
1988. Contending models of cabinet stability: a rejoinder. American Political Science
Review, 82: 923–30.
Carrubba, C.J.,andVolden, C.2000. Coalitional politics and logrolling in legislative institutions.
American Journal of Political Science, 44: 261–77.
Diermeier, D.1997. Explanatory concepts in positive political theory. Mimeo, Graduate
School of Business, Stanford University.
Eraslan, H.K.K.,andMerlo,A.2003a. A structural model of government formation.
Econometrica, 71: 27–70.