ECONOMY

subject index 1077
Borda Count 435
efficiency 432, 433
envy-free division 432, 433, 434
paradoxes 432, 433, 434
Rawlsian maximin criterion 434
and procedural justice 378
and several divisible goods:
adjusted winner 429–32
efficiency 431
equitability adjustments 430
equity 431
and single heterogeneous good:
assumptions made 426
cut-and-choose 426–7
envy-free division 426–9
squeezing procedure 428–9
and social choice 373
see also resource allocation
Federal Reserve System 541
federalism:
and bicameralism 181
and centralization/decentralization tension 358–9
and distributive politics 613–14
and economic problems 361
and economic theories 359–60
competitive federalism 360
‘Leviathan’ theory 360
public finance theory 359
welfare economics 359–60
and endogenous institutions 364
intergovernmental fiscal systems 365–7
political parties 367
representation 365
and goal of 358
and necessity of 359
and normative tradition 357, 367
and perspectives on 357, 367–8
and positive political economy literature 357–8,
361, 368
intergovernmental fiscal systems 363
nature of representation 361–3
political incentives 361
political parties 363–4
field, and economic sociology 941–2
and definition of 941
and organizational field 941
and structure of society 941
and uses of concept 942–3
filibusters 143
and pivotal politics theory 225, 226–7
financial crises, see economic and financial crises
fiscal competition 502–3
and basic model of 505–9
American local government 505–6
capital investment 506–7
capital mobility 508–9
interpretations and applications of 509–12
property taxes 505–9
and capital mobility 504–5
and exit and voice 512–14
and implications of 505
and institutional change 517–18
and labor mobility 504
and models of 504–5
tax competition 504–5
and nature of 503–4
and normative implications of 512
and perfect competition 503
and policy choice 502
and resource mobility 512–14, 518–19
dynamics of 514–17
see also fiscal institutions; public finance
fiscal institutions 465, 474
and budget process 470–4
centralization 470–1
common-pool problem 473–4
contract approach 471–2
delegation 471–2
enforcement 472
impact of centralization 473–4
impact of electoral rules 472
stages of 470–1
and electoral rules 468–9
common-pool problem 468–9
evidence of impact of 469
political competition 469
and ex ante fiscal rules 466–7
effectiveness of 466–7
see also fiscal competition; public finance
fiscal systems, and federalism 361–3, 365–7
flat taxes 527–8
flypaper effect 1025–6
folk theorem 710, 955
foreign aid policy 845–6, 847–8
foreign direct investment, and impact of distance 741
foreign policy:
and audience costs 874–5
and public opinion constraints 871–3
see also international conflict
free riding, and spatial theory of voting 39
free trade 758
and state size 782, 793–4
see also international trade
freedom of speech, and United States Supreme
Court 344–6
Gallagher Index 105
game theory:
and application in political science 900–1, 905–6
and bicameralism 187–8
concurrent majorities 188–9
fiscal prudence 190–1
information acquisition 193
malapportionment 191
super-majorities 189
and coalition formation:
cabinet stability 173–4
demand bargaining 170–1
efficient negotiations 171–2
sequential bargaining 168–70
structure-induced equilibrium 165–8
and committee decision-making:
bargaining in multidimensional policy
spaces 917–18
committee bargaining 921–2
core clustering 919–21