ECONOMY

donald g. saari 407
References
Arrow,K.1951. Social Choice and Individual Values.NewYork:Wiley(2nd edn. 1963).
Brams, S.,andFishburn, P.1983. Approval Voting. Boston: Birkhauser.
Fishburn, P.1981. Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules. Discrete Applied Mathematics,
3: 27–36.
and Brams, S.1983. Paradoxes of preferential voting. Mathematics Magazine, 56: 207–14.
Gibbard,A.1973. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica, 41: 587–601.
Nurmi, H.2003. Voting Procedures under Uncertainty. NewYork:Springer-Verlag.
Saari,D.G.1989. A dictionary for voting paradoxes. Journal of Economic Theory, 48: 443–75.
1990. The Borda Dictionary. Social Choice and Welfare, 7: 279–317.
1994. Basic Geometry of Voting.NewYork:Springer-Verlag.
1995. A chaotic exploration of aggregation paradoxes. SIAM Review, 37: 37–52.
1999. Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes. Journal of Economic Theory,
87: 313–35.
2000. Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. Economic Theory, 15: 1–101.
2001a. Chaotic Elections! A Mathematician Looks at Voting. Providence,RI:American
Mathematical Society.
2001b. Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected.NewYork:CambridgeUniversity
Press.
2003. Disturbing aspects of voting theory. Economic Theory, 22: 529–56.
and Petron, A.2006. Negative externalities and Sen’s liberalism theorem. Economic
Theory.
and van Newenhizen, J.1988. Is Approval Voting an “unmitigated evil?” Public Choice,
59: 133–47.
Satterthwaite, M.1975. Strategyproofness and Arrow’s conditions. Journal of Economic
Theory, 10: 187–217.
Sen,A.1970a. The impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Journal of Political Economy, 78: 152–7.
1970b. Collective Choice and Individual Welfare. San Francisco: Holden Day.
Tabarrok,A.2001, Fundamentals of voting theory illustrated with the 1992 election, or could
Perot have won in 1992? Public Choice, 106: 275–97.
and Spector, L.1999. Would the Borda Count have avoided the civil war? Journal of
Theoretical Politics, 11: 261–88.