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Contents ..................................... About the Contributors xiii PART I INTRODUCTION 1. The Reach of Political Economy 3 Barry R. Weingast &Donald A. Wittman PART II VOTERS, CANDIDATES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 2. Voters, Candidates, and Parties 29 Stephen Ansolabehere 3. Rational Voters and Political Advertising 50 Andrea Prat 4. Candidate Objectives and Electoral Equilibrium 64 John Duggan 5. Political Income Redistribution 84 John Londregan 6. The Impact of Electoral Laws on Political Parties 102 Bernard Grofman PART III LEGISLATIVE BODIES 7. Legislatures and Parliaments in Comparative Context 121 Michael Laver 8. The Organization of Democratic Legislatures 141 Gary W. Cox
Page 2: the oxford handbook of ............
Page 6: the oxford handbooks of political s
Page 10: Dedicated to my parents, Barbara an
Page 18: contents ix PART VI SOCIAL CHOICE 2
Page 22: contents xi 45. Trade, Immigration,
Page 26: About the Contributors ............
Page 30: about the contributors xv Alan Haml
Page 34: about the contributors xvii Barry R
Page 42: chapter 1 .........................
Page 46: arry r. weingast & donald a. wittma
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arry r. weingast & donald a. wittma
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chapter 2 .........................
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stephen ansolabehere 31 make the co
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stephen ansolabehere 33 The additio
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stephen ansolabehere 35 data to “
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stephen ansolabehere 37 the plurali
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stephen ansolabehere 39 components
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stephen ansolabehere 41 learning ab
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stephen ansolabehere 43 4 Learning
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stephen ansolabehere 45 Polls and e
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stephen ansolabehere 47 narrow self
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stephen ansolabehere 49 and Green,
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andrea prat 51 and Helpman 2001, ch
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andrea prat 53 The plan of the pres
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andrea prat 55 accepts a deal from
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andrea prat 57 equilibrium with dis
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andrea prat 59 If quality matters b
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andrea prat 61 One promising avenue
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andrea prat 63 Potters, J.,Sloof, R
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john duggan 65 In this chapter, I c
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john duggan 67 modeling candidate o
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john duggan 69 x ~ 1 x'' x ~ 2 x x'
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john duggan 71 in the Downsian mode
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john duggan 73 to their policy posi
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john duggan 75 F i that pile probab
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john duggan 77 vector of probabilit
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john duggan 79 When the policy spac
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john duggan 81 occur even in highly
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john duggan 83 Ferejohn,J.1986. Inc
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john londregan 85 rely on governmen
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john londregan 87 voter recognizes
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john londregan 89 coalitions and, i
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john londregan 91 candidates, the t
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john londregan 93 steel workers’
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john londregan 95 of voters with re
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john londregan 97 Notice that the a
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john londregan 99 tend to be poorer
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john londregan 101 Hotelling,H.1929
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ernard grofman 103 Electoral incent
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ernard grofman 105 is 1/2 since a m
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ernard grofman 107 When we calculat
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ernard grofman 109 between votes an
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ernard grofman 111 Downsian converg
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ernard grofman 113 any given candid
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ernard grofman 115 members are pote
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ernard grofman 117 Lee, S.-C.,Winck
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part iii ..........................
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122 legislatures and parliaments to
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124 legislatures and parliaments 2.
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126 legislatures and parliaments is
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128 legislatures and parliaments O
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130 legislatures and parliaments on
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132 legislatures and parliaments hi
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134 legislatures and parliaments Ov
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136 legislatures and parliaments ju
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138 legislatures and parliaments be
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140 legislatures and parliaments Ro
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142 the organization of democratic
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chapter 9 .........................
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164 coalition government viability.
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166 coalition government SIE theory
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168 coalition government BC C D B A
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170 coalition government Compared t
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172 coalition government immediate
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174 coalition government in parliam
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176 coalition government replaced n
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178 coalition government Diermeier,
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chapter 10 ........................
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182 bicameralism closer to i’s id
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184 bicameralism legislatures with
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186 bicameralism national policy as
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188 bicameralism proposer is chosen
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190 bicameralism would naturally as
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192 bicameralism 5 Informational Ex
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194 bicameralism preservation of fe
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part iv ...........................
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200 the new separation-of-powers ap
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224 legislative pivots pivot theori
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226 legislative pivots 1 2 3... 50.
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228 legislative pivots flat at m th
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230 legislative pivots the two pote
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232 legislative pivots outcome, m =
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234 legislative pivots Table 12.1 A
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236 legislative pivots Table 12.3 C
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238 legislative pivots because such
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240 legislative pivots Shepsle, K.A
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242 presidential agenda control sta
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244 presidential agenda control set
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246 presidential agenda control q2p
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248 presidential agenda control Mor
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250 presidential agenda control wil
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252 presidential agenda control mer
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254 presidential agenda control Cam
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chapter 14 ........................
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258 politics, delegation, and burea
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274 the judiciary and the role of l
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chapter 16 ........................
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ussell hardin 291 duty to support s
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ussell hardin 293 self-seeking. It
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ussell hardin 295 Note that in the
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ussell hardin 297 points, however,
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ussell hardin 299 of a ruler—or,
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ussell hardin 301 is the result of
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ussell hardin 303 5 Representative
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ussell hardin 305 (pp. 354-5) argue
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ussell hardin 307 institutions from
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ussell hardin 309 historically was
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ussell hardin 311 Williamson, O.E.1
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adam przeworski 313 My purpose is t
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adam przeworski 315 0.15 0.10 TDA 0
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adam przeworski 317 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0
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adam przeworski 319 this threshold.
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adam przeworski 321 contractarian t
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adam przeworski 323 0.30 0.25 0.20
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adam przeworski 325 motivations, to
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adam przeworski 327 Bruszt, L., and
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chapter 18 ........................
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geoffrey brennan & alan hamlin 331
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ichard a. epstein 343 all persons s
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ichard a. epstein 345 violence, and
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ichard a. epstein 347 counted as a
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ichard a. epstein 349 revenge (Allg
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ichard a. epstein 351 very day with
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ichard a. epstein 353 relying on th
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ichard a. epstein 355 reducing publ
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chapter 20 ........................
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jonathan a. rodden 359 Thus the tas
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jonathan a. rodden 361 3 Positive P
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jonathan a. rodden 363 2006; Riker1
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4.1 Representation jonathan a. rodd
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jonathan a. rodden 367 Castles (200
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jonathan a. rodden 369 Bolton, P.,a
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part vi ...........................
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374 social choice of game theory to
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376 social choice and everything in
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378 social choice discovery of the
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380 social choice A good example wh
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382 social choice of the actual pre
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384 social choice rule among three
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386 social choice technology leads
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388 social choice Laslier,J.F.,Fleu
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chapter 22 ........................
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392 a tool kit for voting theory Fi
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394 a tool kit for voting theory th
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396 a tool kit for voting theory F
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398 a tool kit for voting theory Th
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400 a tool kit for voting theory ze
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402 a tool kit for voting theory C
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404 a tool kit for voting theory we
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406 a tool kit for voting theory ha
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chapter 23 ........................
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410 interpersonal comparisons of we
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426 fair division Some of the cake-
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428 fair division procedure uses th
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430 fair division Thus, instead of
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432 fair division determine what wi
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434 fair division But the real bite
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436 fair division Brams, S.J.,Edelm
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part vii ..........................
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442 the structure of public finance
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chapter 26 ........................
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466 fiscal institutions This chapte
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468 fiscal institutions 3 Political
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470 fiscal institutions 4 Limiting
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472 fiscal institutions ministers c
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474 fiscal institutions the efficie
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476 fiscal institutions Goldstein,
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478 fiscal institutions and von Hag
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480 voting and efficient public goo
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chapter 28 ........................
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504 fiscal competition Competition
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506 fiscal competition taxes accoun
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508 fiscal competition of public fu
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510 fiscal competition First, as we
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512 fiscal competition all in addit
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514 fiscal competition in a major m
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516 fiscal competition In a dynamic
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518 fiscal competition levels of go
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520 fiscal competition Keen, M.,and
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chapter 29 ........................
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susanne lohmann 525 ethnic conflict
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susanne lohmann 527 1988). The occa
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susanne lohmann 529 aggregate distr
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susanne lohmann 531 Government spen
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susanne lohmann 533 increases emplo
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susanne lohmann 535 into their wage
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susanne lohmann 537 The redistribut
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susanne lohmann 539 5 The Poverty o
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susanne lohmann 541 In the early 19
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susanne lohmann 543 Diamond, L.2005
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chapter 30 ........................
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obert j. franzese, jr. & karen long
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chapter 31 ........................
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douglas a. hibbs, jr. 567 importanc
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douglas a. hibbs, jr. 569 Taking av
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douglas a. hibbs, jr. 571 (6) to be
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douglas a. hibbs, jr. 573 If equati
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douglas a. hibbs, jr. 575 forward-l
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douglas a. hibbs, jr. 577 % 65 Real
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douglas a. hibbs, jr. 579 sub-group
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douglas a. hibbs, jr. 581 to the co
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douglas a. hibbs, jr. 583 landmark
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douglas a. hibbs, jr. 585 1982b. On
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chapter 32 ........................
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j. lawrence broz & jeffry a. friede
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chapter 33 ........................
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torben iversen 603 economic institu
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torben iversen 605 for example, sug
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torben iversen 607 represent partis
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torben iversen 609 Clearly this tas
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torben iversen 611 elites that oppo
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torben iversen 613 the middle class
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torben iversen 615 are exposed to r
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torben iversen 617 a historical acc
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torben iversen 619 2004. Fighting P
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torben iversen 621 Kelly,N.J.2005.
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torben iversen 623 Schmitter, P.197
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edward l. glaeser 625 less redistri
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edward l. glaeser 627 redistributio
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edward l. glaeser 629 Inequality th
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edward l. glaeser 631 takenasfirstc
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edward l. glaeser 633 as Przeworski
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edward l. glaeser 635 than European
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edward l. glaeser 637 pre-existing
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edward l. glaeser 639 5 Conclusion
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edward l. glaeser 641 Reagan, R.198
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anne wren 643 We will begin by desc
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anne wren 645 Lange and Garrett’s
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anne wren 647 the policy goals of s
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anne wren 649 now weigh demands for
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anne wren 651 innovation and the ma
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anne wren 653 management. On the ot
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anne wren 655 Sargent,T.,andWallace
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anna grzymala-busse & pauline jones
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chapter 37 ........................
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daron acemoglu & james a. robinson
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chapter 38 ........................
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stephen haber 695 A number of schol
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stephen haber 697 This is not to sa
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stephen haber 699 information, or a
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stephen haber 701 4 The Logic of Co
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stephen haber 703 of command. Alfre
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stephen haber 705 Recent research b
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stephen haber 707 Mackey, S.2003. T
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obert h. bates 709 use of power fro
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obert h. bates 711 village and kins
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obert h. bates 713 his income from
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obert h. bates 715 When G is willin
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5.1 Demand-driven Explanation rober
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obert h. bates 719 promoted order a
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obert h. bates 721 Fudenberg, D.,an
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chapter 40 ........................
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torsten persson & guido tabellini 7
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3.2 Indirect Effects torsten persso
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chapter 41 ........................
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anthony j. venables 741 Table 41.1
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anthony j. venables 743 and low pro
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anthony j. venables 745 avoiding th
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anthony j. venables 747 The model i
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anthony j. venables 749 advantages
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anthony j. venables 751 which fisca
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anthony j. venables 753 Henderson,
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part xi ...........................
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758 international political economy
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chapter 43 ........................
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780 national borders and the size o
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800 european integration became evi
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802 european integration concession
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804 european integration political
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806 european integration which can
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808 european integration of governm
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810 european integration appointed
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812 european integration setting an
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chapter 45 ........................
Page 1668:
816 trade, immigration, and cross-b
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chapter 46 ........................
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uce bueno de mesquita 833 de Mesqui
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uce bueno de mesquita 835 They note
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uce bueno de mesquita 837 the tempo
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uce bueno de mesquita 839 In place
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uce bueno de mesquita 841 An altern
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uce bueno de mesquita 843 from thei
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uce bueno de mesquita 845 Autocrats
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uce bueno de mesquita 847 before. T
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uce bueno de mesquita 849 and Lalma
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uce bueno de mesquita 851 Smith, A.
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james d. fearon 853 in which member
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james d. fearon 855 Table 47.1 Desc
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james d. fearon 857 Finally, a numb
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james d. fearon 859 preferences wil
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james d. fearon 861 next door in Za
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james d. fearon 863 Thus, Cetinyan
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james d. fearon 865 relationship be
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james d. fearon 867 2000b. Violence
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chapter 48 ........................
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dan reiter & allan c. stam 871 As w
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dan reiter & allan c. stam 873 may
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dan reiter & allan c. stam 875 audi
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dan reiter & allan c. stam 877 Refe
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dan reiter & allan c. stam 879 Mill
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chapter 49 ........................
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stergios skaperdas 883 following co
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stergios skaperdas 885 The marginal
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stergios skaperdas 887 other benefi
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stergios skaperdas 889 Since the tw
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stergios skaperdas 891 In particula
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stergios skaperdas 893 The multipli
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stergios skaperdas 895 Esteban, J.M
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part xiii .........................
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900 economic methods in political t
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916 laboratory experiments economic
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918 laboratory experiments the core
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920 laboratory experiments 2.3 TheR
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922 laboratory experiments or distr
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924 laboratory experiments Collier
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926 laboratory experiments 3.3 Asym
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928 laboratory experiments In fact,
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930 laboratory experiments Hence th
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932 laboratory experiments There ar
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934 laboratory experiments Palfrey,
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936 laboratory experiments Morton,
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938 the tool kit of economic sociol
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952 the evolutionary basis of colle
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Table 53.1 Seven experimental games
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part xiv ..........................
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972 questions about a paradox becau
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974 questions about a paradox you s
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976 questions about a paradox I’m
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978questionsaboutaparadox influence
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chapter 55 ........................
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982 politics and scientific enquiry
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chapter 56 ........................
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998 the future of analytical politi
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1000 the future of analytical polit
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1002 the future of analytical polit
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1004 what is missing from political
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chapter 58 ........................
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1012 modeling party competition in
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1032 the riker objection revisited
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Name Index ........................
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1052 name index Caesar 307-8 Cain,
Page 2144:
1054 name index Eyerman, J 875 Eyta
Page 2148:
1056 name index Hertzendorf, M N 59
Page 2152:
1058 name index Lijphart, A 103, 10
Page 2156:
1060 name index North, D C 20 n24,
Page 2160:
1062 name index Rowe, D M 771 Rowth
Page 2164:
1064 name index Talvi, E 466, 473 T
Page 2168:
Subject Index .....................
Page 2172:
1068 subject index Bulgaria 314 bur
Page 2176:
1070 subject index constitutionalis
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1072 subject index democratization
Page 2184:
1074 subject index economics, and f
Page 2188:
1076 subject index European Court o
Page 2192:
1078 subject index game theory: (co
Page 2196:
1080 subject index International Co
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1082 subject index liberalization:
Page 2204:
1084 subject index partisanship: (c
Page 2208:
1086 subject index political-econom
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1088 subject index and policy 43-4
Page 2216:
1090 subject index state, the: (con
Page 2220:
1092 subject index United States Su
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