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1997). Where elites never faced a threat of replacement from a credible and wellorganized
set of opposition forces, this despoilation could go on unchecked, as in
central Asia (Jones Luong 2002). Indeed, the post-Communist context demonstrates
that democratic contestation, rather than undermining economic reform, enables it
(e.g. Hellman 1998;Fish1998).
Representative elite competition, then, is one key to the successful introduction
of both market reform and democracy (Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002).
This is not simply a question of elite turnover, but of a mutual holding in check,
and the generation of incentives to appeal to broader constituencies. This effect is
predicated on the representativeness of elites, and on their contestation, not simply on
fragmentation or divisions among elites. As both Latin American and African cases
show, political fragmentation per se can pose major obstacles to economic reform. 4 In
contrast, an active and well-organized opposition limits the excesses of the governing
elites, by creating a credible threat of replacement to the government.
2.3 The Roles of the State and Informal Institutions
Both structure- and agency-based accounts of democratization have tended to focus
on the formal institutions of representation and accountability. Given that without
elections and contestation, we cannot speak of democratization, this is not an unreasonable
emphasis. However, it overlooks the other institutional aspects of successful
democratization: specifically, the role of the state and informal institutions.
First, with few exceptions, the state has long been ignored in the study of democratization
and of market reforms. 5 The emphasis has been on the pluralization of
politics, economics, and civil society (e.g. Dahrendorf 1990;Fatton1999), rather than
on the institutions of the state, such as centralized bureaucracies and the networks of
security, redistribution, and market regulation, that they administer.
Yet, the post-Communist experience demonstrates that the type and extent of state
structures found in the countries undergoing transition profoundly influence democratization
(e.g. Carothers 2002; Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002; O’Donnell
1996). For example, a clear division between state and society generates powerful
incentives both for elites to appeal to outside constituencies, and for these constituencies
to hold elite despoliation in check. Moreover, the more the state had
grown independent of the party during Communist rule, and the more it developed
the capacity to administer (through implementing economic reforms, co-opting
potential opposition, etc), the more successfully it could navigate the simultaneous
transition to market and democracy. And a more apolitical state whose representatives
have experience in administering liberalization has been a key contributor to the
success of democratization.
⁴ Similar arguments have been raised about the lack of reform progress in Ukraine (Motyl 1997).
Haggard and Kaufman 1995 and van de Walle 1999 go as far as to argue that in these contexts, dominant
party systems are more likely to initiate and sustain reform.
⁵ These exceptions include Linz and Stepan 1996 and O’Donnell 1993.