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Weingast - Wittman (eds) - Handbook of Political Ecnomy

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subject index 1079<br />

Indonesia 702<br />

industrialization:<br />

and inequality 626–7<br />

and the New World 747–8<br />

and newly industrializing countries 760<br />

inequality 624–5, 639<br />

and American exceptionalism 634–8<br />

beliefs about inequality 637–8<br />

economic explanations of 634<br />

ethnic heterogeneity 635<br />

failure of left-wing movements 636–7<br />

political institutions 635–7<br />

and causes of 625–31<br />

demand for skilled workers 627<br />

distribution of skills 627–8<br />

economic development 626–7<br />

education policy 629<br />

ethnic heterogeneity 628–9, 630<br />

political factors 627<br />

political institutions 630–1<br />

religion 628<br />

technology 627<br />

welfare spending 629–30<br />

and cross-national variations 627–8<br />

and measurement of 625<br />

Gini coefficient 625<br />

Kuznets curve 626<br />

share of national income 625<br />

and political impact of 631–4<br />

corruption 634<br />

democracy 632–3<br />

expropriation 633–4<br />

increased preference for redistribution 631–2<br />

institutional structure 632–4<br />

reduced redistribution 632–3<br />

and state size 790–1<br />

inflation:<br />

and macro political economy 532–3<br />

and public opinion 524<br />

see also demand management, and the state<br />

information 4<br />

and aggregation of:<br />

bicameralism 192–3<br />

in committees 917, 927–9<br />

voting behavior 15–17, 44–5, 46<br />

and income redistribution 98–9<br />

and social evaluation and information<br />

invariance 417–19<br />

and voting behavior:<br />

information aggregation 15–17, 44–5, 46<br />

information revelation 11–15<br />

sources of information 43–6<br />

institutional analysis 223<br />

Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico) 367<br />

institutionalism, and coalitions 162–5<br />

cabinet stability 165<br />

minority governments 164–5<br />

reappraisal of existing theory 163–4<br />

structure-induced equilibrium 165–8<br />

institutions:<br />

and approaches to study of 6<br />

and choice of 1035–7<br />

preference drift 1037<br />

status quo bias 1036–7<br />

uncertainty 1036–7<br />

veil of ignorance 1035–6<br />

and comparative analysis of 7<br />

as constraint 1034<br />

and definition of 945–6, 1032<br />

and distributive politics 611–14<br />

and dynamic nature of 1032<br />

as equilibria 1033–5<br />

as game forms 1032–3<br />

and interest aggregation 764–6<br />

and interest-based concept of 945–7<br />

and maintenance of 1037–40<br />

incomplete awareness 1038–9<br />

self-confirming equilibrium 1038–9<br />

self-generating revision 1038, 1039–40<br />

self-stability 1041<br />

and new structuralism 617–18<br />

and origins of 617<br />

and problems in studying 976<br />

and procedural change 1042–3<br />

admission of new members 1046<br />

amendment procedures 1040–1, 1043<br />

emergency powers 1046–7<br />

escape clauses/nullification 1044–5<br />

interpretative courts 1043–4<br />

secession 1045–6<br />

suspension of rules 1044<br />

and research process 4<br />

and Riker Objection 1032, 1040–2, 1047–8<br />

and strategic social interaction and choice 1033<br />

and varieties of capitalism:<br />

coordinated market economies 615<br />

institutional complementarity 615<br />

liberal market economies 615<br />

relationship of economic/political<br />

institutions 616<br />

role of economic institutions 614–15<br />

welfare state 615–16<br />

instrumental activity 329<br />

and constitutions 333, 334, 339–40<br />

interdependence 759<br />

interest groups:<br />

and campaign contributions 50, 52<br />

and economic practice 530–1<br />

and European integration 806, 807<br />

and exchange rates:<br />

level of 595<br />

regime choice 592<br />

and older people 537–8<br />

and political actors 528<br />

and political advertising:<br />

directly informative 57–9<br />

indirectly informative 53–7<br />

and political economy approach 528–9<br />

and special interest gridlock 530<br />

interests:<br />

and interest-based concept of institutions 945–7<br />

and Open Economy Politics (OEP) 762–4<br />

institutional aggregation of interests 764–6<br />

and sociological concept of 943–4<br />

social relations 944<br />

intergenerational conflict 525, 536–8

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