cities

Blurred intergovernmental responsibilities affect cooperative governance
The unclear allocation of responsibilities to national, provincial and city governments blurs accountability
and affects development coordination across government spheres and sectors. This is most notable in
relation to devolved powers such as housing, energy, transport, land, water and spatial planning. It
also creates local expectations that cities find difficult to meet because “communities may demand
answers from councillors regarding policing issues, education, housing subsidies, identity documents
and pensions, while the Constitution locates competence over these issues with national and provincial
governments concurrently” (de Visser, 2010b: 50).
In addition to creating expectations and being contrary to the principles of cooperative governance,
in practice national and provincial spheres of government tend to define priorities, which means that
“councils have only limited power and discretionary resources to address their own priorities – as
identified by their citizens”. 3 This disconnect – between what cities can do with the resources available
to them, and what citizens’ expect from them – is often a reason for popular local anger, dissatisfaction
and rising service delivery protests.
Section 154 of the Constitution obliges national and provincial governments to “support and
strengthen the capacities of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to exercise their powers and
to perform their functions”. However, the intergovernmental fiscal, planning and delivery processes
and mandates are poorly aligned. The Cabinet cluster system, which was introduced to improve policy
implementation by bringing together different spheres and linked departments, also does not appear
to be effective. The IGR system is inherently weak on accountability because it does not link incentives
and sanctions to performance. Cases in point are integrated transport, housing, energy and
infrastructure. Although cities, as the implementing sphere, have some control over ensuring better
coordination and alignment of interventions, they do not always have the finance, capacity or skills to
deliver what has often been decided at national level.
Uncertainties arise across the IGR system as a result of the devolution or non-devolution of functions,
which raises the question of “who should make urban policy decisions, and be held accountable for
urban development outcomes” (Savage, 2013: 11). Legislation, such the National Housing Act and the
National Land Transportation Act, does not provide guidelines or deadlines on the delegations. As a
result, policy is worked out without thinking through the complexities of implementation within city
spaces, and national and provincial departments sometimes duplicate what cities are supposed to be
doing. This duplication could be avoided if the roles and responsibilities of cities, provinces and
national departments were clearly delineated.
An integrated approach is needed because governing cities is complex. Integrated service delivery
demands functional, operational, planning and systems integration, but South Africa’s public service
generally operates in functional silos. The silo mentality within and between national, provincial and
3 Mail & Guardian. ‘The people rate local government’, 1 April 2011. http://mg.co.za/article/2011-04-01-the-people-rate-local-government
210 State of South African Cities Report 2016