Ayrıntılı Bilimsel Program ve Bildiri Özetleri - YAEM2010

YAEM 2010
YÖNEYLEM ARAÞTIRMASI VE ENDÜSTRÝ MÜHENDÝSLÝGI 30. ULUSAL KONGRESÝ
Prior literature is rich in terms of the productivity and profitability
impact of IT but it is limited in terms of explaining the IT risk-return
relationship. Even the existing research on the impact of IT
investments on firm risk measures such as earnings or stock-returns
volatility is not still well established. A recent empirical study by
Dewan, Shi, and Gurbaxani (2007) has established a link between IT
risk and IT return using a production function framework. However,
their dataset spans a time period which do not allow them to see the
impact of post-Internet era. We conduct a replication analysis of
Dewan, Shi, and Gurbaxani (2007) with a recent and unique dataset
spanning across fairly different firms and industry segments in order
to test their findings and interpret the differences that we discover
between the two empirical analyses. While we find little support on
the relative contribution of IT on firm risk, we support the highly
positive return on IT among high IT risk firms. Our results shed new
light on the IT risk-return relationship.
Is Better Nuclear Weapon Detection Capability Justified?
1 2
Onur Bakýr , Detlof Von Wýnterfeldt
1 Bilkent University, Industrial Engineering Department
2 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg,
Austria
We present a decision tree model to evaluate the next generation
radiation portals to scan containers entering the United States non-
intrusively against nuclear weapons. Advanced Spectroscopic Portals
(ASPs) are compared against current designs of portal monitors
(PVTs). We consider five alternatives: 1) Exclusive deployment of
ASPs 2) Sequential deployment of ASPs with PVTs installing ASPs in
secondary and some primary inspections areas, 3) Sequential
deployment of ASPs with PVTs installing ASPs in only secondary
inspections areas, 4) Exclusive deployment of PVTs, 5) Continue
inspections with the current capacity. The baseline solution
recommends a strategy that supports the deployment of ASPs for
secondary inspections and PVTs for primary inspections. This solution
is very sensitive to the probability of attack attempt, the type of
weapon shipped through ports of entry, the probability of successful
detonation, detection probabilities and the deterrence benefit of each
alternative.
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