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Ayrıntılı Bilimsel Program ve Bildiri Özetleri - YAEM2010

Ayrıntılı Bilimsel Program ve Bildiri Özetleri - YAEM2010

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YAEM 2010<br />

YÖNEYLEM ARAÞTIRMASI VE ENDÜSTRÝ MÜHENDÝSLÝGI 30. ULUSAL KONGRESÝ<br />

group decision support system (GDSS) is de<strong>ve</strong>loped based on an<br />

Analytic Hierarchy Process model. The GDSS provides a fast, flexible<br />

and dynamic environment which enables the participation of se<strong>ve</strong>ral<br />

evaluators with the use of advanced web technologies.<br />

An Experimental Study on Internet Auctions Using Agent<br />

Based Modeling Approach<br />

Osman Nuri Darcan, Bertan Badur<br />

Department of MIS, Boðaziçi Uni<strong>ve</strong>rsity, Istanbul<br />

With the widespread use of the Internet, e-auctions become popular<br />

in order to trade increasing number of goods. The effect of the<br />

bidding strategies on the winner's payoff is studied theoretically in<br />

microeconomics, where perfect rationality of participants is assumed.<br />

To o<strong>ve</strong>rcome this limitation, the newly emerging agent based<br />

modeling and simulation methodology is adapted to in<strong>ve</strong>stigate the<br />

behavior and interactions of autonomous, heterogeneous, bounded<br />

rational agents in electronic markets.<br />

The aim of this study is to present a dynamic model of an ascending-<br />

bid, second-price auction to examine how the auction outcome and<br />

the winner's payoff are affected. We adapt the agent based modeling<br />

methodology in de<strong>ve</strong>loping a simplified model of e-auction which<br />

consists of a single seller offering one item. There are n<br />

bidders/agents with predetermined reservation prices; each is<br />

assigned one of the eight non-intelligent strategies mainly<br />

differentiated by the bid-increment techniques applied during the<br />

course of the auction. Sensitivity of the auction outcome on market<br />

design parameters such as duration of the auction, are also<br />

in<strong>ve</strong>stigated. We basically obser<strong>ve</strong>d that all the strategies con<strong>ve</strong>rged<br />

to the same payoff that corresponds to the difference between two<br />

highest prices, which is consistent with the weakly dominant strategy<br />

of Vickrey.<br />

78

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