Ayrıntılı Bilimsel Program ve Bildiri Özetleri - YAEM2010

Ç4-07
YAEM 2010
YÖNEYLEM ARAÞTIRMASI VE ENDÜSTRÝ MÜHENDÝSLÝGI 30. ULUSAL KONGRESÝ
Tedarik Zinciri Yönetimi 3: Supply Chain Management (I)
30 Haziran 2010 / 17:15 - 18:45
Oturum Salonu: MDBF L055
Oturum Düzenleyicisi: Murat Kaya
Oturum Baþkaný: Murat Kaya
A Private Contributions Game for Joint Replenishment
1 1 2
Evren Körpeoðlu , Alper Þen , Kemal Güler
1 Department of Industrial Engineering, Bilkent University, Ankara
2 Hewlett - Packard Laboratories, Palo Alto, USA
We study a non-cooperative game for joint replenishment by n
firms that operate under an EOQ-like setting. Each firm decides
whether to participate in joint replenishment or to replenish
independently, and each participating firm decides how much to
contribute to joint ordering costs. Joint replenishment cycle time
is set by an intermediary as the lowest cycle time that can be
financed with the private contributions of participating firms. We
characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium behavior and outcomes.
Outsourcing vs. In-House Production: A Comparison of Supply
Chain Contracts with Effort Dependent Demand
Onur Kaya
Department of Industrial Engineering, Koc University, Istanbul
We analyze the effort and pricing decisions in a two facility supply
chain in which one of the parties can exert costly effort to
increase demand. We consider an outsourcing model in which the
supplier makes the effort decision and an in-house production model
in which the manufacturer decides on the effort level and we compare
these two models with each other. We analyze and compare several
contracts for decentralized supply chain models and we aim to find
which contracts are best to use in different cases. We find the
optimal contract parameters in each case and perform extensive
computational testing to compare the efficiencies of these contracts.
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