Metaphor and Literalism in Buddhism: The ... - misterdanger.net

THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF NIRVANA
regarded as a name (prajñapti) given to something else, the second, homogeneous
character (sabhAgatA), he considered to be non-existent.
Although the homogeneous character of the group (nikAyasabhAga) was
virtually the same as homogenous character (sabhAgatA ) according to the
AbhidharmakoUabhALya, 72 the homogeneous character (sabhAgatA) described
in the text was different from what we have seen in the MahAvibhALAUAstra
with the name of homogeneous character of the group (nikAyasabhAga). In
the AbhidharmakoUabhALya it was understood not as a dharma operating
exclusively in the rebirth process to determine the specific rebirth state of
sentient beings, 73 but as an abstract principle of universality through which
entities are recognized as members of the same category or class. 74
In this respect, it was more like the generality (sAmAnya) or particular
generality (sAmAnyaviUeLa) of the Vaiuelikas. This was pointed out by
Vasubandhu in one of the five arguments against the existence of homogeneous
character in the AbhidharmakoUabhALya. 75 Among the five, 76 the second
argument seems to be a classic example to show how the Sautrantikas refute
the existence of this dharma. It reads as follows: ‘Neither can ordinary people
(loka) see homogenous character, since it is without form (rEpa), and is not
distinguished through knowledge (prajñA).’ 77
Despite the name Sautrantika, which gives the impression that their argument
depends largely on textual testimony (sEtra), they were also keen on
using two other criteria used by traditional Indian scholars: direct perception
(pratyakLa) and inference (anumAna). 78 Although seeing (paUyati) alone
was mentioned, seeing here was used to stand for perception in general. As
pointed out by Jayatilleke, 79 seeing has been used predominantly over other
forms of perception since the UpaniLad, and this can be justified simply by
the fact that the largest number of our perceptions are visual perceptions.
Thus, the word for visual perception is extended to denote perception in
general.
Although the word knowledge (prajñA) was used in the second negation,
it represented, as glossed by Yauomitra, the second criterion, inference
(anumAna). In fact, both words, pratyakLa and anumAna, are mentioned in
the interpretation of this argument in his SphuMArthA AbhidharmakoUavyAkhyA,
the commentary on the AbhidharmakoUabhALya. 80 Thus, homogeneous
character (sabhAgatA) was, as in the case of asaNskKta 81 and pudgala, 82 neither
recognized through direct perception (pratyakLa), like form (rEpa), nor
inferred through inference (anumAna), like the faculty of sight.
Where does this abstract principle come from? The answer given from
Vasubandhu was that it was simply non-difference of birth, or category
( jAtyabheda). 83 The logic behind this answer was that homogeneous character
(sabhAgatA) is not a separate existent but just the absence of difference,
and the lack of something cannot be a real existent. Vasubandhu used similar
logic to define the truth as ‘lack of contradiction’ (aviparCta), in order to
interpret the third noble truth as non-existence. 84
88