Metaphor and Literalism in Buddhism: The ... - misterdanger.net

NOTES
(1969: 378–82), which was made directly from the Sanskrit version. I have consulted
both translations.
40 SA (TD2 184a22–4). Cf. SN V 236 (according to Pasadika 1986): ‘O monks, five
faculties if cultivated and developed conduce to the abandonment of bonds’
( pañcimAni bhikkhave indriyAni bhAvitAni bahulCkatAni saNyojanAnam pahAnAya
saNvattanti). The five faculties are faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and
wisdom.
41 The Sautrantika’s position on extinction through knowledge, or nirvana, was
basically non-arising of further defilements and life: ‘It is said that nirvana is
attained through acquiring the basis (AUraya) which prevents completely the arising
of defilement (kleUa) and rebirth (punarbhava), by acquiring an antidote
(pratipakLa)’, (pratipakLalAbhena kleUapunarbhavopAdAtyantaviruddhAUrayalAbhAt
prAtaN nirvAOaN, Akb-h p. 93). Thus it could only be of the future and not of the
past and present.
42 The same as Paramartha’s (Akb-pm (TD29 192a)). Xuan-zang, however, gives a
slightly different reading: ‘It does not necessarily conflict. Although there is that
statement of the sEtra, its meaning is not contradicted’ (Akb-x (TD29 p. 34b)).
43 According to Yauomitra (Sa-w p. 219, Sa-d p. 323), ‘their objects’ are past and
present sufferings: ‘through the abandonment of the defiling passions for their
objects which are past and present sufferings’ (atCtapratyutpannaduPkh
’AlambanakleUaprahAOAd). Thus, in a way the physically perceptible and the rest
are abandoned by eliminating desire and passion for them, and in that way past
and present sufferings are abandoned by eliminating defiling passions for them.
44 SA (TD2 19c26), SN III 27.
45 In the TaWhasutta (AN II pp. 211–12), the speculations of craving (altogether
thirty-six in number) are classified into two categories: the eighteen speculations
of craving concerning the inner self and the eighteen speculations of craving
concerning what is external to self.
46 Literally, ‘the state of being seed’.
47 ‘And certainly there is no profit in making an effort at ceasing that which has
already ceased in the past’, according to Sa-w and Sa-d.
48 SA (TD2 225c27), AN III p. 34.
49 The Theravadins could have similar position. See Collins (1998: 181–2).
50 Vasubandhu applied a similar logic to deny the existence of homogeneous
character (sabhAgatA), saying it is only the non-difference of birth ( jAtyabheda),
Akb-h p. 67. That is to say, out of something cannot be a separate existent.
51 Akb-h pp. 298–303, La Vallée Poussin (1923: 812–20).
52 The same argument is applied to deny that pudgala, or Atman, is a real existent
(La Vallée Poussin 1923: 1314). ‘In fact, unconditioned things are not known
through direct perception (pratyakLa), as is the case for physical matter, sensation,
etc.; and they are not known through inference (anumAna), by reason of
their activity, as is the case for the sense organs’, according to La Vallée Poussin
(1923: 284). Neither direct perception nor inference is mentioned in any of the
Sanskrit or Chinese versions, including Xuan-zang. Louis de La Vallée Poussin
may have put those in because they are mentioned in Yauomitra (Sa-d p. 325, Saw
p. 221). We could also see this logic in the denial of homogeneous character
(sabhAgatA) in the AbhidharmakoUabhALya (Akb-h pp. 67–8). Both direct perception
(pratyakLa) and inference (anumAna) are mentioned in the SphuMArtha
AbhidharmakoUavyAkhyA (Sa-w p. 158).
53 While, for the Vaibhalikas, the cessation or nirvana is one thing and suffering is
another thing, cessation for the Sautrantikas is just absence of suffering, i.e.
nirvana is not a separate existent.
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