Metaphor and Literalism in Buddhism: The ... - misterdanger.net

THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF NIRVANA
the end of its activities – arising, duration, decay and ceasing – within its
series. That is to say, it could be achieved not by its inherent continuous
extinction but by non-arising or non-existence of that dharma within its
series.
We can see almost the same approach to the word nirodha in one of the
best known treatises of the Theravadins, the Visuddhimagga: ‘But it is because
the kind of destruction called “cessation consisting in non-arising” [that is,
nibbAna] serves figuratively speaking as decisive support [for the path] that
[nibbAna] is called “destruction” as a metaphor for it.’ 155 One could blame
Buddhaghosa, a northerner, for introducing this into the Theravada. In fact,
the expression ‘cessation consisting in non-arising’ (anuppattinirodha) was not
seen earlier in the Theravada tradition and is confined to quite late materials.
This could suggest that the Theravadins accepted the Buddhist theory of
momentariness in a fully developed form later than the Northern Buddhist
schools.
Under the influence of the Buddhist theory of momentariness, the
Theravada concept of nirvana seems to have changed: it is the cessation
consisting in non-arising and exists separately (pAMiyekka) from the mere
destruction of passion, hatred and delusion. Although nirvana for them is
the one and only unconditioned, it is explained through the two different
concepts of nirvana with a remainder of clinging (sopAdisesanibbAna) and
nirvana without a remainder of clinging (anupAdisesanibbAna), with different
definitions: the cessation of defilements for the former and the cessation of
the aggregates for the latter. The Theravadins need to explain how both
nirvana images could be united as one. 156 This problem had not been solved
even at the time of Buddhaghosa.
Apart from the KathAvatthu, the presentation of doctrines in the form of
debates between Buddhist schools is rare in the Theravada tradition. In the
Visuddhimagga, problems concerning nirvana were presented exclusively in
the form of debates. The following occurs in the middle of the argument:
[Q.3.] Then is the absence of present [aggregates] as well nibbana?
[A.] That is not so. Because their absence is an impossibility, since if
they are absent their non-presence follows. [Besides if nibbana were
absence of present aggregates too,] that would entail the fault of
excluding the arising of the nibbana element with the result of past
clinging left (sopAdisesanibbAnadhAtu), at the path moment, which
has present aggregates as its support. [Q.4.] Then will there be no
fault if it is non presence of defilements [that is nibbana]? [A.] That
is not so. Because it would then follow that the noble path was
meaningless. For if it were so, then, since defilements [can be] nonexistent
also before the moment of the noble path, it follows that
the noble path would be meaningless. 157
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