22.03.2013 Views

Vision and Voyages for Planetary Science in the - Solar System ...

Vision and Voyages for Planetary Science in the - Solar System ...

Vision and Voyages for Planetary Science in the - Solar System ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

MISSION STUDY PROCESS AND TECHNICAL EVALUATION<br />

In <strong>the</strong> course of this decadal survey, <strong>the</strong> committee commissioned technical studies of many<br />

c<strong>and</strong>idate missions (Appendix G). These c<strong>and</strong>idate missions were selected <strong>for</strong> study on <strong>the</strong> basis of white<br />

papers submitted by <strong>the</strong> scientific community <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> recommendations of <strong>the</strong> panels. Each study was<br />

led by one or more “science advocates” from <strong>the</strong> committee’s panels (selected by <strong>the</strong> panel based upon<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir expertise to represent <strong>the</strong> panel’s science <strong>in</strong>terests), <strong>and</strong> was conducted by <strong>the</strong> Jet Propulsion<br />

Laboratory, <strong>the</strong> Applied Physics Laboratory, Goddard Space Flight Center, or Marshall Space Flight<br />

Center. The studies were funded by NASA <strong>and</strong> delivered to <strong>the</strong> agency, which <strong>the</strong>n delivered <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong><br />

decadal survey. Although NASA was aware of <strong>the</strong> contents of <strong>the</strong> studies, <strong>the</strong> agency was not <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> direction of <strong>the</strong> studies <strong>the</strong>mselves or <strong>the</strong>ir prioritization by <strong>the</strong> decadal survey.<br />

A subset of <strong>the</strong> mission studies was selected by <strong>the</strong> committee <strong>for</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r Cost <strong>and</strong> Technical<br />

Evaluation (CATE) by The Aerospace Corporation, a contractor to <strong>the</strong> National Research Council. This<br />

selection was made on <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong> four prioritization criteria listed above. The CATE process was<br />

designed to provide an <strong>in</strong>dependent assessment of <strong>the</strong> technical feasibility of <strong>the</strong> mission c<strong>and</strong>idates, as<br />

well as to produce a rough estimate of <strong>the</strong>ir costs. The process takes <strong>in</strong>to account many factors when<br />

evaluat<strong>in</strong>g a mission’s potential costs, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> actual costs of analogous previous missions. It<br />

<strong>the</strong>re<strong>for</strong>e reflects cost impacts that may be beyond <strong>the</strong> control of project managers <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>cipal<br />

<strong>in</strong>vestigators. It <strong>in</strong>cludes a probabilistic model of cost growth due to technical <strong>and</strong> schedule risks, <strong>and</strong><br />

hence projects cost growth result<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>in</strong>sufficient technical maturity identified as part of <strong>the</strong> technical<br />

evaluation. Follow<strong>in</strong>g NASA policy, costs were estimated at <strong>the</strong> 70 percent confidence level. Appendix<br />

C discusses <strong>the</strong> CATE process <strong>in</strong> more detail.<br />

The CATE process typically resulted <strong>in</strong> cost estimates that were significantly higher than <strong>the</strong><br />

estimates produced by <strong>the</strong> study teams. The primary reason <strong>for</strong> this is that bas<strong>in</strong>g cost estimates on <strong>the</strong><br />

actual costs of analogous part projects avoids <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>herent optimism of o<strong>the</strong>r cost estimation processes.<br />

Only <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependently generated cost estimates were used <strong>in</strong> evaluation of <strong>the</strong> c<strong>and</strong>idate missions by <strong>the</strong><br />

committee <strong>in</strong> <strong>for</strong>mulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al recommendations. This approach is <strong>in</strong>tentionally cautious, <strong>and</strong> was<br />

designed to help avoid <strong>the</strong> unrealistic cost estimates <strong>and</strong> consequent replann<strong>in</strong>g that has sometimes<br />

characterized <strong>the</strong> planetary program <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past. In <strong>the</strong> sections below, we present both a recommended<br />

plan that is based on <strong>the</strong>se conservative cost estimates, <strong>and</strong> recommendations <strong>for</strong> what could be added to<br />

<strong>the</strong> plan if <strong>the</strong> estimates prove to be too conservative.<br />

It should be stressed that <strong>the</strong> studies carried out were of specific “po<strong>in</strong>t designs” <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> mission<br />

c<strong>and</strong>idates that were identified by <strong>the</strong> committee’s panels. These po<strong>in</strong>t designs are a “proof of concept”<br />

that such a mission may be feasible, <strong>and</strong> provide a basis <strong>for</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g a cost estimate <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> purpose of<br />

<strong>the</strong> decadal survey. The actual missions as flown may differ <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir detailed designs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir f<strong>in</strong>al costs<br />

from what was studied, but <strong>in</strong> order to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a balanced <strong>and</strong> orderly program, <strong>the</strong>ir f<strong>in</strong>al costs<br />

must not be allowed to grow significantly beyond those estimated here. This fact is one of many<br />

reasons why a cautious approach to cost estimation is appropriate. The sections below make specific<br />

recommendations <strong>for</strong> steps that should be taken if <strong>the</strong> projected costs of certa<strong>in</strong> missions grow beyond<br />

expected bounds.<br />

DEFINITION OF MISSION COST CLASSES<br />

The committee’s statement of task divides NASA’s planetary missions <strong>in</strong>to three dist<strong>in</strong>ct cost<br />

classes: small missions cost<strong>in</strong>g less than $450 million current year dollars, medium missions cost<strong>in</strong>g<br />

between $450 <strong>and</strong> $900 million, <strong>and</strong> large missions cost<strong>in</strong>g more than $900 million current year dollars.<br />

The first corresponds to <strong>the</strong> Discovery <strong>and</strong> Mars Scout programs, <strong>the</strong> second to <strong>the</strong> New Frontiers<br />

program, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> third to <strong>the</strong> so-called “Flagship” missions. It is with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> committee’s purview, per <strong>the</strong><br />

statement of task, to recommend changes to <strong>the</strong> classes, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir cost ranges.<br />

PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION<br />

9-4

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!