Dismounted Reconnaissance Troop - Army Electronic Publications ...
Dismounted Reconnaissance Troop - Army Electronic Publications ...
Dismounted Reconnaissance Troop - Army Electronic Publications ...
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Chapter 8<br />
time than service station resupply. At times, leaders use the in-position resupply method, although it takes<br />
more time to accomplish.<br />
Return to the Logistic Release Point<br />
8-41. Once resupply operations are complete, the LOGPAC vehicles are prepared for the return trip. <strong>Troop</strong><br />
vehicles requiring evacuation for maintenance are lined up and prepared for towing. Human remains and<br />
personal effects are carried on cargo trucks, fuel trucks, or disabled vehicles. Enemy prisoners of war ride<br />
in the cargo trucks. They are guarded by the walking wounded or by other troop personnel. Supply requests<br />
and personnel action documents are consolidated for forwarding to the field trains, where the appropriate<br />
staff section processes them for the next LOGPAC. The supply sergeant leads the LOGPAC back to the<br />
LRP. The LOGPAC keeps moving through the LRP to avoid interdiction by enemy forces or artillery.<br />
Whenever possible, the reunited LOGPAC convoy returns to the BSA together. When METT-TC dictates,<br />
or when the LOGPAC arrives too late to rejoin the larger convoy, the vehicles return to the BSA on their<br />
own.<br />
LOGPAC SURVIVABILITY<br />
8-42. The very nature of an ambush—a surprise attack from a concealed position—places the ambushed<br />
unit at a disadvantage. Combat situations often prevent a convoy from taking all the measures necessary to<br />
avoid being ambushed; therefore, it takes all possible measures to reduce its vulnerability. These are<br />
generally passive measures, supplemented by active measures, taken to defeat or escape from an ambush.<br />
(For information on the types of ambushes, see FM 3-21.8.)<br />
8-43. No single defensive measure, or combination of measures, prevents or effectively counters all<br />
ambushes or IED detonations. The effectiveness of counterambush measures is directly related to the state<br />
of Soldiers’ training and the ability of their leaders.<br />
Avoiding an Ambush<br />
8-44. Leaders and Soldiers take the following actions to avoid an ambush:<br />
Select the best convoy route.<br />
Maintain vigilant observation of the route ahead of the convoy to detect anything suspicious.<br />
Conduct map (digital) reconnaissance.<br />
Conduct ground reconnaissance.<br />
Conduct aerial reconnaissance.<br />
Obtain current intelligence information.<br />
Use OPSEC to deny the threat foreknowledge of the convoy.<br />
Present a formidable target by:<br />
Manning all crew-served weapons.<br />
Maintaining 360-degree security.<br />
Remaining vigilant and alert.<br />
Maintaining a disciplined, aggressive posture.<br />
Never routinely schedule convoys by time or route.<br />
Reducing the Effectiveness of an Ambush<br />
8-45. Leaders and Soldiers take the following actions to reduce the effectiveness of an ambush:<br />
Harden vehicles.<br />
Cover loads.<br />
Space prime targets throughout the convoy.<br />
Wear protective equipment.<br />
Use assistant drivers.<br />
Carry troops and supplies.<br />
Use prearranged signals to warn the convoy of an ambush or IED.<br />
8-8 ATTP 3-20.97 16 November 2010